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Summary 
This thesis comprises three chapters centered on two common themes. 
The first theme is the application of non-cooperative game theory 
to economic questions; the second is the study of the kind of 
arrangements that can arise in the labour market as a response to 
asymmetric information. 
The first chapter surveys recent developments in non-cooperative game 
theory, and then attempts an extension of the recent results 
characterising perfect equilibrium payoffs in repeated games without 
discounting to more general games. We choose the dynamic game framework 
for the generalisation, and shows that there are two jointly, but not 
indi vidually sufficient condi tions for the generalisation to 
go through. 
We then turn to an application of these ideas to the theory of long-
term contracts. The main motivation for this is that the view that 
wages and employment are determined by risk-sharing implicit contracts 
is now a well established alternative to fixed-price and market-
clearing theories. In general, long-term arrangements may mitigate 
inefficiencies in the short-term contract that arise from various 
sorts of asymmetric information which are likely to be prevalent in 
worker-firm relationships. In this chapter two things are attempted; 
first, we try to integrate the game-theoretic approach to contractinq 
of Radner with the work of Townshend, Rogerson, Roberts and Manning 
among others, and second, we characterise the optimal contract, and 
obtain some new results. 
The labour market is also the topic of the third chapter. Here, we 
attempt to extend a well-known model of "frictional" labour market 
equilibrium to the case where onr or both sides of the market 
differ in inherent characteristics (e.g. skills) which may be 
observable or unobservable. We show first that the equilibrium 
may be inefficient even in the absence of externalities which work 
through the matching technology. Also, the model with unobservable 
characteristics provides a framework for a theoretical anal;Tsis of 
the practice of firms of screening workers by unemployment duration. 
We show that in our model, there are screening equilibria, and also 
investigate in some detail the impact of exogenous variables on the 
equilibrium. 
1 
Introduction 
This thesis is comprised of three essays grouped round two common 
themes. The first of these themes is the theory of repeated games; the 
"pure" theory is surveyed in Chapter 1, and many of the ideas 
discussed there are applied to the study of long-term contracts in 
Chapter 2. The major application of, and motivation for, analysing 
long-term contracts is the labour market, and the presentation and 
discussion of the results in Chapter 2 is in terms of risk-sharing 
contracts between firm and worker. The labour market is the second 
common theme, as the third chapter is concerned with questions of both 
the nature and efficiency of labour market equilibrium in a search 
framework where workers are heterogenous - in particular, we are 
concerned to explain, within a rational choice framework, the fact 
that worker's unemployment histories appear to affect their 
reemployment probabilities. 
Nevertheless, the three chapters are quite self-contained, and it 
would be misleading and uninformative to introduce them by focussing 
on the central themes. Rather, we will discuss them individually, 
beginning with Chapter 1. 
This begins with an overview of recent developments in the th~ory 
of non-cooperative games, concentrating in particular on recent 
results which attempt to characterise the degree of cooperation that 
can credibly be achieved between players in an infinite-horizon 
context - or, more technically, the perfect, (or sequential) 
equilibrium payoffs of repeated games. Many general results are now 
available for repeated games with complete information, and some more 
specific results for repeated games with asymmetric information, which 
suggest that the nature of the set of equilibrium payoffs depends 
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crucially on whether the informational asymmetry is one or two sided. 
By contrast, the extent to which the powerful results of the 
complete information case (i.e. the "folk" theorems surveyed in 1.1) 
generalise beyond the repeated game case is hardly known. The 
motivation for such an extension is self-evident, as virtually all 
realistic models of strategic economic interaction have intertemporal 
linkages. However, the question is one of method; is it better to 
analyse models on a case-by-case basis, or to search for general 
results? 
In Chapter 1, we argue that if one is willing to consider the no 
discounting case, (which clearly imposes strong restrictions on 
preferences) then otherwise very general and satisfactory results can 
be obtained. In particular, it is shown that there are two conditions 
that are jointly, but not individually, sufficient for a "folk " 
theorem (namely, that all individually rational payoffs are perfect 
equilibrium payoffs) to be valid. A precise statement of these 
conditions reqiures some sort of structure, or model, and we choose 
the dynamic game framework, where intertemporal linkages are 
summarised by a state variable or variables. The major restriction of 
this framework is that it imposes additive separability of preferneces 
over time, but in applications, this is often not restictive. We then 
show that these two conditions can easily be checked in specific 
models, and we use Spence's model of strategic investment as an 
illustration. The general conclusion is that the two conditions 
will be satisfied in "most" economic models, and so for subgame 
perfection to have real force (e.g. in eliminating Pareto-efficient 
Nash equilibria) there must be discounting. 
The second chapter brings some of these game-theoretic techniques 
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to bear on the problem of long-term contracting with asymmetric 
information. Before going into details, it is worth recalling the 
origins of the current interest in long-term contracting. 
In the mid 70's Azariadis and Baily, among others, suggested that 
the observed fact that firms responded to contractions in demand by 
laying off workers rather than lowering wages could be due to the 
fact that there "implicit contracts" between firm and workers (or 
union) which insured workers from wage fluctuations. Unfortunately, it 
was soon realised that two of the most realistic features of the 
Azariadis/Baily model (i.e. that it predicted more layoffs, or greater 
employment variation, than in a spot market economy, and that these 
layoffs were involuntary) depended crucially on the assumption that 
the firm could not make layoff payments to the workers. 
If this assumption was dropped, one had a theory of real wage 
rigidity, but no theory of involuntary (or even inefficient) layoffs. 
One way of reintroducing these elements was to introduce asymmetric 
information into the risk-sharing contract, as Grossman and Hart(198 I) 
observed. This too, had its limitations, however - for example, a very 
special information structure, and special conditions on preferences, 
are needed to generate involuntary layoffs as a feature of the optimal 
contract (see Moore(1985) or Arvan(1985)). More fundamentally, 
contract theory as a whole offers no explanation of why some workers 
do not get jobs - or contracts- in the first place, that is invluntary 
unemployment, as opposed to involuntary layoffs. 
In spite of these drawbacks, implicit contract theory has 
had some recent sucesses - in particular, Farmer«1985), (1985a)) has 
argued convincingly that the inefficiencies in contracts with 
asymmetric information may provide a transmission mechanism for 
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monetary policy to affect the real economy. To summarise then, the 
implicit contracts approach has established itself as an alternative 
paradigm to the spot-market over the last ten years, and this provides 
quite a motivation to investigate the nature of long-term labour 
contracts. 
But our actual concerns in Chapter 2 are wider than this; our formal 
model includes those contracting problems where the rationale is not 
risk-bearing, but whose interest rather derives from the tension 
between the agent having private information and the principal wishing 
to extract all the surplus from him i.e. contracting problems 
with ex post participation constraints. In this case, allocative 
inefficiency can still arise, even with risk-neutrality. 
The main interest of studying contracting with asymmetric 
information in a dynamic context is, of course, that one would expect 
that in a repeated setting, one could construct the contract so that 
the inefficiencies of the one-shot contract would be mitigated. This 
observation is very close to the idea that there are Pareto-superior 
equilibria in the repeated game to the Nash equilibrium of the 
one-shot game. 
There have been two very diverse approaches to investigating the 
degree and nature of the improvement that long-term contracting can 
bring. The first is predicated on the assumption that the principal 
can precommit to particular contracts, and consists in showing that 
introducing history-dependence into the long-term contract makes the 
contract more efficient than a series of one-shot contracts. 
There is not yet agreement about what aspects of the inefficiency 
history-dependence improves; the models presented differ, and the 
whole issue is greatly complicated by the fact that the long-term 
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contract is also a savings contract for the agent, as Townshend(1982) 
observed, and this in itself introduces history-dependence. However, 
there seem to be two main answers; Townshend has shown that in a 
"pure" risk-sharing contract it improves first-period risk-sharing, 
and Roberts(1982) presents an argument which suggests that it allows 
the principal improved control over the agent's actions at zero cost. 
A very different approach to the problem is taken by Radner(1981), 
(1985» who observed that without precommitment by the principal, the 
repeated contracting problem could be considered as a repeated game, 
and therefore the question of improvement on the one-shot contract 
is formally equivalent to being able to find an equilibrium of the 
repeated contracting game which dominates the Nash equilibrium of the 
one-shot contracting game. In his 1985 paper, Radner was able to 
construct such an equilibrium, but also noted that it was not 
efficient i.e. there were other equilibria that Pareto-dominated it. 
Three things emerge from this discussion. First, the conditions 
under which history-dependence occurs and the reasons for it are not 
yet well-understood. Second, Radner's game-theoretic approach is not 
well-integrated with the precommitment approach, where it is possible, 
in principle, to write down "the" contracting problem and solve it. 
Third, with the exception of Rogerson(1985) and Townshend(1982), 
nobody has actually attempted to do the latter, and as argued below, 
many questions concerning the structure of the optimal contract remain 
unanswered. 
In Chapter 2, all three of these outstanding problems are tackled 
in an integrated way. The introduction to that chapter outlines in 
much greater detail what is actually invoved and what is achieved, but 
we mention two of the major findings. First, Robert's marginal 
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improvement argument is shown to apply to only a special class of 
contracting problems,and the reasons for this are discussed in detail. 
Second, we are able to show that a general feature of the optimal 
long-term contract is that the agent's marginal utility of income is 
positively serially correlated, and this yields more operational 
predictions e.g. positively serially correlated wages in more specific 
contexts. 
As already remarked, the model analysed in Chapter 2 has provides 
the theoretical basis for a particular view of the labour market. The 
last chapter, Chapter 3, is also concerned with the labour market, but 
from a search-theoretic viewpoint. We make little use there of the 
game-theoretic techniques developed in Chapter 1, apart from the 
notion of Nash equilibrium. The purpose of the chapter, at a general 
level, is to explore the consequences of the fact that workers 
(or firms) are heterogenous i.e. differ in productivity for 
equilibrium in a search model of the labour market. 
In order to fully explain the motivation for this, it would help to 
give a brief review of the objectives and methods of the literature on 
"frictional" labour markets (a more detailed discussion is in 3.1 and 
3.2 below). 
It is a commonplace observation that a certain amount of 
unemployment is frictional, and this component of unemployment took on 
a greatly added significance following the introduction of the idea of 
the "natural" rate of unemployment by Friedman(l968) which has since 
been closely associated with firctional unemployment. ~ot 
surprisingly, this gave an impetus to the development of rigorous 
models of equilibrium search in the labour market, such as that of 
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Lucas and Rapping(1974). However, for reasons more fully discussed in 
3.1 below, the most satisfactory search model, (and the one that has 
achieved prominence in the literature) is the one developed by 
Mortensen, Diamond, and Pissarides; this dispenses entirely with the 
idea of markets, trades taking place instead between firms and workers 
who are stochastically matched. 
One interesting feature of this model is that it exhibits a rich 
array of inefficiencies of the type stressed by Tobin(1972), where the 
decisions by individual agents at several margins of decision-making 
(entry into the market, match-formation, search intensity) have 
external impacts on the matching probabilities of the other agents in 
the market. These "congestion" externalities have been extensively 
investigated by Diamond and Pissarides, among others, and the details 
are surveyed in section 3.2. 
The first objective of Chapter 3 is to show that if workers are 
assumed to be heterogenous, a possibility that has not been 
investigated in the literature, then search equilibrium will be 
inefficient, even in the absence of congestion externalities. 
Furthermore, the direction of this inefficiency is unambigious -
output and employment are too low in equilibrium. 
The second objective of Chapter 3 is to use the matching model to 
investigate the idea that elements of a worker's employment or 
unemployment history can convey information about (unobservable) 
differences in worker attributes. This is motivated by the widespread 
belief that firms "screen" workers on the basis of e.g the length of 
the last unemployment spell. There is certainly some direct evidence 
that such practices go on, and this is also consistent with much of 
what is known about re-employment probabilities (see 3.3 for a full 
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discussion). 
What we try to do is build a model where such screening can be the 
outcome of fully rational behaviour on the part of firms. Our main 
focus of interest is how the level of screening is determined, and how 
it is affected by changes in exogenous variables. Among the more 
interesting results is that the level of screening falls with an 
aggregate demand shock. As the unemployment rises with the level 
of screening, screening provides a mechanism by which demand or 
productivity shocks can impinge upon employment, in addition to the 
more usual channel of a lowering of the marginal productivity at which 
a match is formed. Also, we find that an increase in the supply of 
workers increases the level of screening, and an increase in the level 
of vacancies decreases it. This is not the only issue discussed -
there are also questions of multiple equilibria, and of reconciling 
the pred~ctions of the model with the evidence, and these are all 
discussed at some length in Chapter 3. 
As already emphasised, the differences between the chapters in 
subject matter, techniques, and motivation are at least as great as 
the similarities, especially between Chapter 3 and the rest. For this 
reason, we do not number equations and theorems consecutively 
throughout the thesis, but start the numbering afresh at the beginning 
of every chapter. For the same reason, there is no overall conclusion 
to mirror the introduction - instead, there are short conclusions to 
each chapter. However, the chapters have a common bibliography, and 
this, along with Appendices and footnotes, is to be found at the end 
of the thesis. 
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1. Perfect Equilibrium in Dynamic rcPICS 
Introduction 
In this chapter we do two things. First, we provide a survey and 
overview of recent developments in the theory of repeated games, both 
with complete and incomplete information; in chapter 2 we will 
draw some of the results surveyed. Second, we attempt to analyse the 
extent to which the Aumann-Shapley -Rubenstein characterisation of 
perfect equilibrium in repeated games without discounting extends to 
more general settings where structural dependence between periods is 
allowed for, but retaining the no discounting assumption. We are able 
to derive two conditions that are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for Nash equilibrium paths to be perfect in a very wide 
class of games viz. all those that can be put in state-space form. 
This is clearly interesting in its own right as the repeated game 
framework is extremely restrictive. Also, it gives some indication of 
the problems likely to be encountered in attempting to extend 
Abreu's(1982) characterisation of perfect equilibrium paths in 
repeated games with discounting to more general settings. 
1.1 A Survey of Recent Developments in the Theory of Repeated Games 
A repeated game with complete information is a constituent game in 
normal form played repeatedly, possibly an infinite number of times. 
Within this framework it is possible to have different information 
structures, in that the players may only be able to observe certain 
elements of the past history of play e.g. only last period's moves. 
What is essential is that all players should possess the same 
information at each date, even though this information may be limited. 
Games where in the constituent game some player can only observe the 
actions of another up to a random errror term, such as oligopoly with 
demand uncertainty (such as Green and Porter(1984)), or Radner's 
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(1985~)partnersh1p games, do not fall into this category. Such 
repeated games are technically games with incomplete information. 
We make the distinction equilibria as the two sorts of repeated games 
have rather different properties. 
Nash equilibria in repeated games are easy to characterise -
moreover, it is well-known that these equilibria are extremely 
indeterminate. Much of the recent work in the area has centered round 
the attempt to characterise perfect Nash equilibria in 
such games. It is also well- known that the imposition of subgame 
perfection cannot completely resolve Nash indeterminacy (in contrast 
to what happens in other kinds of infinite-horizon games -
e.g Rubenstein(198J0), so this is not a major motive. Rather, the 
motive is that at first sight, the infinite horizon makes it extremely 
difficult to characterise credible Nash strategies; as Abreu(1982) 
argues, one faces an infinite regress problem. 
The picture is now quite well-developed for the complete 
information case, and we survey the most important of these results in 
what follows. 
(a) A Formal Definition of ~ Repeated Game 
The constituent game of a repeated game is a game in normal form, 
played T times (where possibly T = ro ) by n players, i = =1,2 ••• n. 
Each player chooses an action, ait at date t from a set Ai. This 
choice may be conditioned on the past history of play, ht = 
(a1'a2 ••••• a 1) , where a = (a. ,a2 , ••• a ). All the results t- t 1t t nt 
surveyed below assume that this choice can depend in an unrestricted 
way on h t • Let the mapping from h t into Ai be denoted fit and its 
infinite Cartesian product over dates be fie Then fi is a strategy for 
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i in the repeated game. 
Next, let A be the Cartesian product of the Ai' and AT be the 
T-fold product of A, and let a = (al,a2 ••••• aT) be a typical element 
of AT. Then a is an outcome path of the repeated game. Clearly, any 
n-tuple of strategies f = (fl, f 2 •••• f ) will determine a particular n 
outcome path. 
Finally, payoffs over outcome paths for each player are given by 
T 
Y ot.ui(a ) , with 0 < 0 ( 1 • If T is infinite, the case of no 
t=l t 
discounting (i.e. 0 = 1) 
replace them with limsup 
T~ 
these 
1 T 
payoffs are not well-defined, and we 
- ) u.(a ). If the limit 
T t=l 1 t 
exists in the 
latter expression, the discounted payoffs converge to the limsup as 0 
~ 1. 
Given the mapping from strategies to outcomes, there is clearly an 
induced preference relation over strategies for each player (see 
e.g.Rubenstein (1979) for details.) Then a Nash equilibrium in the 
repeated game is defined in the normal way viz. as an n-tuple of 
strategies that are mutual best responses. Subgame perfection 
requires that these strategies also be mutual best replies 
at each date conditional on every possible history of actions having 
occurred , not just the history generated by the equilibrium 
strategies. 
This quite formal development of the repeated game model is 
necessary to a detailed exposition of some recent work, particularly 
Abreu's, where the distinction between strategies and outcome 
paths is crucial. 
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(b) Characterising Equilibria in Repeated Games 
Our starting point is the observation that infinitely repeated 
1-games admit a large number of Nash equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, 
the set of equilibrium outcomes can easily be described by considering 
Nash equilibria of a special sort, those involving so-called trigger 
* strategies. These strategies prescribe that player i play a i unless 
and until precisely one player (possibly himself) deviates and plays 
, -:I * a . a .• 
.1 J 
If j -:I i, then i switches to an action that punishes j, ai 
and plays this for ever; if on the other hand, it is himself that 
has deviated, he switches from then on to playing his best reply to 
the punishment ai . which he expects to ensue. 
-1 
We might as well consider punishment actions that punish players 
most severely, i.e. punishments, that yield players only their 
security levels Vi in the constituent game, where 
(1) v. = 
1 
min max 
a_ i a i 
u.(a., a .) 
1 1 -1 
v. is defined as 
1 
Let any vector of actions that achieves Vi be denoted mi = (mt ' m~ 
••• 
Now suppose that all players j -:I i announce that they will play 
trigger strategies. What is the best that i can do in reply? If i is 
considering deviating, the best he can get with discounting is a 
payoff of (1 - B) max ui(a*., a.) + &.v., 
-1 1 1 
a.EA. 
1 1 
* because once he has deviated from a once, he can get at most v. from 1 
then on. Hence a* is the equilibrium outcome of a Nash equilibrium 
(in trigger strategies) if and only if a* satisfies 
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( 2) 
Note in particular that as 0 ~ 1, we find that any a* that yields each 
player more than his security level vi (i.e. is strictly individually 
rational for that player) is a Nash equilibrium outcome. This is one 
version of a result known as the "folk" theorem for repeated games. 
Without discounting (i.e. with long-run averaging) we get the 
essentially identical result that any weakly individually rational 
outcome is an equilibrium outcome. 
We illustrate all this with an example from Fudenberg and Maskin 
(1983)) of a matrix constituent game; 
U D 
U 1 ,1 0,-2 
D -2,0 -1,-1 
In this game, player i minimaxes player j by playing D with 
probability 1, and j's best response is to play U with probability 1, 
so v. = 0 forj = 1,2. Then without discounting, any mixed strategies 
J 
(a*I' a~) (where a i denotes the probability that i plays U) which 
yield each player at least 0 can be sustained as an equilibrium 
outcome, using strategies where any defection by i is punished by j 
switching to D for ever. 
Is such an equilibrium perfect, however? The answer is that for 
almost all games~ it is not, the reason being that in the event that 
some player i deviates (a subgame never reached in Nash equilibrium, 
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of course) the players who must then minimax i for ever, will in 
general not wish to do so. For example, in our matrix game 1 
minimaxes 2 by playing D, but given that 2 responds by playing U, 1 
can do better by switching to U himself. To put it another way, l's 
threat to minimax 2 is not credible. 
In a series of papers, Aumann,Shapley , and Rubenstein tackled this 
problem for the case without discounting. Their insight was to point 
out that in order to make trigger strategies credible (i.e. perfect) 
players must also be punished for refusing to cooperate in the 
punishment of another player. Moreover, they showed exactly how this 
could be don~ 
A natural first attempt at modifying the trigger strategies would 
be to declare that players who fail to carry out minimax punishments 
should themselves be minimaxed for ever. However, this will not work 
in our example, as punishing one's opponent for ever is extremely 
costly, yielding a payoff of -2, so that each player would rather be 
punished for ever than punish for ever. 
Rather, the key to constructing credible punishment strategies 
was to make punishment periods finite (play always returning to the 
original a* at the end) and depend on the number of previous 
deviations by any particular player from whatever is prescribed by his 
equilibrium strategy. Suppose that player i is punished for ~n periods 
after his nth deviation. Then, as punishment periods are finite, with 
limit averaging it costs nothing for a player to carry out a 
punishment. Similarly, no player i can gain or lose by a finite 
number of deviations from playing a~ the original cooperative 
1 
agreement. Hence, to establish that any individually rational a* can 
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be sustained as a perfect equilibrium it suffices to show that no 
player i can do strictly better than ui(a*) by deviating an infinite 
number of times.Now, the average gain from any sequence of deviations 
over T periods is bounded above by 
( 3) 
T T 
where bi is an upper bound on ui(a), and n(T) is the largest number of 
complete periods of punishment that can be fitted into T periods (i.e. 
n 
n(T) is the largest integer n such that y. ~i ( T). 
i=l 
It is clear that as long as the ~ increase fast enough with n so n 
that n(T)/T -+- 0 as T -+- ex>, the limit average gain from deviation 
* * as T -+- ex> will be v - (a, ) which is non-positive as long as a i is i 1 
individually rational. This can be achieved, for example, by making 
~ a geometric series 
n 
i.e. ~ 
n 
We have therefore proved; 
a ) 1 • 
Proposition (Aumann-Shapley-Rubenstein) 
Without discounting, any individually rational payoff of the 
constituent game is the payoff of some perfect equilibrium of the 
repeated game. 
The validity of this result depends both on no discounting of the 
future and the repeated game structure. Discounting raises subtle and 
important problems. First, with discounting, the device of 
geometrically increasing punishments fails, as arbitrarily long 
punishments are not arbitrarily severe, because far-off punishments 
are relatively unimportant, so one would expect the imposition of 
perfection to have some real force. 
In fact, we require, roughly speaking, any subgame-perfect 
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* equilibrium outcome a to satisfy (2) where vi is replaced by wi' the 
worst payoff that all players can credibly impose on i (and we expect 
that wi > vi). However, this raises a thorny problem; unlike the Nash 
case, where vi is exogenously defined, wi is endogenous. In fact, wi 
must be the "worst" payoff for i associated with a perfect equilibrium 
(if such a worst payoff exists). 
The reason for this is as follows. Let AP be the set of outcome 
paths associated with perfect equilibria of the repeated game, and let 
f * be f i I . b h * any per ect equ 1 rium w ose outcome path is a • Then wi is 
simply the payoff to i from the continuation of f* from t + 1 onwards 
contingent upon some (otherwise arbitrary) history where i deviates 
from a* at t. By the perfectness of f*, this continuation must also 
be a perfect equilibrium and w. must therefore satisfy only 
1 
co 
(4) 
Furthermore, it seems impossible to break into this circular 
definition of the wi. For example, we do not know whether AP is 
a closed set - i.e. whether worst credible punishments exist. Even 
if they do, we have no constructive means of finding them. 
Abreu (1982) showed how this circularity could be overcome by 
restricting attention to what he calls simple strategy n-tuples. These 
are defined as follows. Let a i be an outcome path. Then a simple 
strategy n-tuple f (a *; a 1, ••• an) prescribes that each player i play 
* a it at each date until one player (say i) deviates at ~ in which case 
all players start playing a i = ) a t ~ + 1, ~ + 2 and so 
on. If j ~ i deviates from this punishment, then aj is started from 
the beginning, and most importantly, if i deviates from his own 
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punishment, a1 is started over again from the beginning.~ Note that 
i 
unlike the trigger punishments, a it 
i 
need not be a best reply to a i 
- ,t 
or in other words, the possibility that players cooperate in their own 
punishments is allowed for. Note also the dimensional simplification -
a simple strategy is entirely characterised by n + 1 outcome paths, 
* 1 n (a , a ••••• a). 
The key property of a simple strategy n-tuple is that is is 
perfect if and only if one-shot deviations from it, contingent upon 
all histories, are not profitable for any player. The conditions which 
ensure this are, assuming a* is stationary ( i.e. * * at = a , all t); 
ex> 
( 5) * * u.(a) ) (I - 6) u.(a ., 
1 1 -1 
a~ ) + 6 y 6t u i (a! ) 
1 t=O 
(6) 
all a~ E Ai' all i 
ex> 
') 
t='t 
all a~E A., all i, j, all 'to 
1 1 
, 
a' ) I 
ex> 
+ 6 tlo 6 t • u i ( a ~ ) 
(5) ensures that deviations from the original outcome path are not 
profitable for my player, whereas (6) ensures that deviations from 
any ongoing punishment (a~ , a~+I ••• ) are not profitable for any 
player. 
The second fundamental property of a simple strategy n-tuple is 
that f(a*; a1-, •••• an) is perfect if and only if the "punishment" 
strategy n-tuple f(a i : a 1 , •••• a n ) is also perfect, i=I,2 ••• n. To see 
this, note that (6) is precisely the condition for f(a i ; a 1 . . . . 
to be perfect, all i as (5) is implied by (6) if a* = ai .( Abreu 
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calls the n-tuple of "punishment" simple strategy n-tuples 
{f(a i , a1, •• an)}i:1, •• n a simple penal code.) Therefore, (6) is 
satisfied if and only if a i is a perfect outcome path, all i. This 
fact enables us to prove that there exist "worst" punishments, or 
equivalently, that AP is closed. 
Let (a 1 
v 
. . . . . be a convergent sequence of n-tuples of 
outcome paths such that a i E AP all i, all v and such that the payoff 
v 
from converge:t to inf 
aE AP 
satisfied for all v as the a i 
v 
I ot.ui(a t ). We know that (6) is t=Q 
are perfect equilibrium outcomes, so 
(6) is also satisfied in the limit as v ~ 00 by the continuity of 
payoffs. Let the limit of a; be ~i; then the strategy n-tuple 
f(a i ; ~l, •••• an) is also perfect all i, and yields i the "worst" 
credible punishment- i.e. the infimum on the RHS of equation 
(4) i above. Abreu calls { f(~ ; 1 a .... n a)}. 1 an optimal 
1= •• n 
simple penal code. 
However, what is most interesting about (6) is that it provides 
a set of necessary conditions that optimal penal codes must satisfy. 
First, it is apparent from (6) that (as already remarked) optimal 
penal codes may not have the "best reply" property, but players can 
credibly be persuaded to cooperate in their own punishments only if 
punishments are more severe at the beginning of the sequence - they 
must have something to lose by going back to the beginning. 
Second, subject to this "stick and carrot" requirement, optimal 
penal codes may have a very simple form, as Abreu himself has shown 
for an oligopoly game. In fact, Fudenberg and Maskin (1983) have 
constructed a class of "simple" simple penal codes which are 
"approximately" optimal as the discount factor tends to unity in the 
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sense that the payoff to i from a i tends to his security level vi as 6 
tends to 1. This enables them to prove a "folk" theorem with 
discounting 13 , which states that (subject to a regularity condition in 
the n-person case) for any strictly individually rational payoff 
vector, there exists a 6* such that this vector is the payoff of a 
perfect equilibrium for all 6* ( 6 < 1. (see Fudenberg and Maskin 
(1983) Theorems 1 and 2). 
The simple penal code involved is particularly "simple" with two 
players, and the algebra is simplified if we consider stationary 
* * * * oucome paths a - i.e. at = a , all t. Then choose a * such that u. (a ) 
1 
> Vi. Then the FIM simple penal code prescribes that in the event of 
any deviation both players should play the strategy mi that minimaxes 
* the other for k periods, and then revert to a , so that 
( 7) (m, m ••• 
k times 
* * m; a , a ••••• ) , wi t h m = ( m i ' m ~ ). 
To prove the F 1M "folk" theorem, (for the 2-person case and stationary 
) f h * h . outcome paths we simply show that or any suc a, t ere eXIsts an 
integer k* and number 6* such that (5) and (6) are satisfied given 
(7) for alII> 6 > 6*. 
For convenience, normalise payoffs so that v. = 0 , i = 1,2. Then it 
1 
is easily verified that (5) and (6) become 
(8) 
and 
( 9) 
* u. (a ) 
1 
W. 
1 
a: EA., all i, 
1 1 
k*+l k*+1 * (1 - 6 ) • u . (m) + 6 • u . (a ) > 0, all i. 
1 1 
AS'vtj(a*) > 0 ~ Uj (m) , a k* and 0* satisfying (8) and (9) can 
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certainly be found. 
Next, we turn to the question of indeterminacY in finitely 
repeated games. First, it is well-known that if the constituent game 
has a unique Nash equilibrium, the only perfect equilibrium of the 
constituent game is repeatedly played. The argument is a simple 
backward induction one; in the final period, the only possible outcome 
in Nash equilibrium. Knowing this, no player can be induced to play 
anything other than his Nash equilibrium strategy in the penultimate 
period, and so on. 
With multiple equilibria, this no longer holds true. Players can 
be threatened by the imposition of "bad" Nash equilibria in later 
periods to play strategies in earlier periods that are not mutual best 
replies - in other words, there may be some perfect equilibrium 
outcomes of the repeated game that are not entirely composed of Nash 
equilibria of the constituent game. This point has been made recently 
and independently by Benoit and Krishna (1985), Friedman (1985), and 
Moreaux (1985). 
For example, consider the following matrix constituent game, due 
to Benoit and Krishna. 
B c D 
B 5,3 0,0 2,0 
c 0,0 2,2 0,0 
D 0,0 0,0 0,0 
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This has two Nash equilibria - a "good" one (B,B) which 
Pareto-dominates the "bad" one, (C,C). Suppose now the constituent 
game is played twice, and players do not discount. Then the trigger 
strategies which prescribe that both players play D in period 0 and B 
in period 1, unless precisely one player deviates in period 0, in 
which case C is played by both players, are in perfect equilibrium 
even though (D,D) is not a Nash equilibrium of the constituent game. 
Benoit and Krishna have exploited the potential of this simple 
idea remarkably fully. Under the assumptions of no discounting 
and that there are "enough" equilibria in the constituent game so that 
each player can be punished by switching from one equilibrium to 
another, they show that given any game repeated T times with 
T 
associated "worst" perfect equilibrium payoffs, w. , for each player , 
1 
one can find a longer game T*, with strictly lower "worst" perfect 
equilibrium payoffs for each player. T Hence, in the limit, w. tend to 
1 
v. for each i, although, surprisingly, they may not do so 
1 
monotonically (see Benoit and Krishna, p.913). It follows immediately 
from this that under the stated assumptions, any strictly individually 
rational payoff can be sustained as the perfect equilibrium payoff of 
a game repeated often enough. 
The argument is an ingenious one, and involves constructing 
T three-stage punishments for each player i, using the wi. The outcome 
path of the three- stage punishment involves a first phase where all 
other players minimax player i, a second reward phase where j~i are 
rewarded for doing this (which is essential if the original T-period 
punishment w~ is preferred by any j to minimaxing i) and a third 
phase where play cycles through a finite sequence of constituent game 
Nash equilibria. Deviations by any player from the first two 
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phases of this outcome path (say at time t) are punished by as many 
repetitions of the original T-period punishment as can be fitted into 
* the remaining T - t periods, "topped up" with playing j's "worst" 
constituent game Nash equilibrium in the remaining T* - t - T + 1 
periods at the end of the game. By constuction, these punishments 
are themselves credible - i.e. perfect equilibrium outcomes. Finally, 
by appropriate choice of the lengths of the various phases, the new 
punishments can be made more severe than the old. 
Note that subject to the constraint imposed by the finite horizon, 
these punishment strategy n-tuples are simple in Abreu's sense. 
Therefore, one can view Benoit and Krishna's results as complementary 
to the work of Abreu and Fudenberg and Maskin - they exhibit simple 
penal codes which are "approximately" optimal in finite horizon games, 
if the horizon is long enough. Apart from these limiting results, 
however, the central question raised by Abreu's work - the 
characterisation of optimal penal codes - remains largely unanswered, 
and it is probably unreasonable to expect any general results, 
although ~ recent paper by Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti does suggest 
a general method for finding them. 
(c) Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 
We have already mentioned repeated games with imperfect monitoring 
of actions. No general characterisation of "perfect" equilibria in 
such games is available, and it is probably fruitless to look for one. 
In fact, the results so far, especially Radner's work, suggest that 
the behavoiur of the equilibrium set depend on the information 
structure of the game «Radner(1981), (1985), Radner, Myerson, and 
Maskin(198~)). In the first two papers, Radner considers a repeated 
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principal agent relationship modelled as a game. The informational 
asymmetry is therefore one-sided; the agent can observe the contract 
that the principal offers (a contract offer is the principal's 
srtategy in the constituent game) but the principal cannot observe 
the agent's effort. Radner showed that without discounting, all fully 
Pareto-efficient payoffs that both players prefer to the one-shot 
equilibrium are perfect (or more precisely, sequential in the 
Kreps-Wilson sense) equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game. As 
stated, it is a weaker result than the A-siR theorem, but it is in a 
sense much more striking, in that it asserts that the principal can 
completely overcome his informational disadvantage by imperfectly 
monitoring the agent's behaviour over long periods. Radner (1985) 
also established the "continuity" result that payoffs arbitrarily close. 
to these same efficient payoffs can be attained as equilibrium 
payoffs if the discount rate is low enough. 
By contrast, Radner et ale show that in an otherwise rather similar 
setting with two-sided imperfect monitoring, a "partnership" game 
where neither partner can observe the other's effort, there is a 
discontinuity in the equilibrium set of payoffs as the discount rate 
goes to zero. It is not yet clear that the one-sided I two-sided 
distinction is the crucial one for these results, but certainly the 
continuity result seems to generalise to other contracting problems. 
For example, we show in chapter 2 below that this continuity result 
gOes through for principal-agent contracts with hidden information, 
rather than hidden actions. 
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1.2 The Folk Theorem for Dynamic r~mes without Discounting 
The repeated game model is a very special one, and does 
not adequately capture many features of the economic environment where 
strategic interaction typically takes place. For example, in 
oligopolised industries there are structural linkages between periods 
arising from durable capital, inventories, intertemporal substitution 
on demand, and the like. Again, in macroeconomic applications, such as 
policy games there are a number of stock-flow conditions such as 
balance-of-payments equations, or intertemporal arbitrage conditions, 
whch impose linkages between periods. 
It is therefore of interest to ask whether there is a simple 
characterisation of perfect equilibria in a more general class of 
infinite horizon games, and this is the objective of this chapter. We 
show that general results can be obtained for the case of no 
discounting, within the framework of dynamic games. (Basar and Oldser 
is the definitive survey of the literature on such games, and we give 
a formal definition below in 1.3.) While not all extensive-form games 
can be put in dynamic form, they cover an extremely wide class of 
games, essentially because the the state-space can be chosen 
arbitrarily. The main restriction of the dynamic game framework is 
that payoffs must be additively separable over time. 
What we do is to present two conditions which are jointly 
sufficient for all indvidually rational payoffs to be perfect 
equilibrium payoffs in a very wide class of dynamic games, and also 
show by means of counterexamples, that neither of these two conditions 
alone is sufficient. In fact, neither of these two conditions alone 
1s even sufficient to ensure that all Nash payoffs are perfect. These 
25 
results can be taken as showing the extent to which the 
Aumann-Shapley-Rubenstein result generalises. In the course of this 
analysis, we also show that all individually rational payoffs are also 
Nash equilibrium payoffs if the first condition holds, but need 
not be otherwise. This is a generalisation of the original "folk" 
theorem for Nash equilibrium in repeated games. 
These conditions are; first, that each player's security level _ 
i.e. the worst payoff that can be imposed upon him over the infinite 
horizon by the other players - is independent of the initial state 
of the game, and second, that any individually rational, but otherwise 
arbitrary outcome path must also possess this independence property. 
That these conditions are jointly sufficient is not entirely 
surprising, because if the long-run payoffs are independent of the 
initial state then timing and commitment are unimportant, and 
therefore the fact that perfect equilibria must involve credible 
punishments also becomes unimportant. The fact that neither of these 
conditions is individually sufficient is somewhat more surprising. 
The reason is that if we allow either payoffs from sequences of 
actions, or security levels, to be state-dependent it is possible to 
construct examples of games where players are able, by taking certain 
actions, to move the game to particular absorbing states which are 
especially advantageous for them. They may not be able to credibly 
threaten not to make such moves, even though such threats may be 
necessary (e.g. as parts of punishments) to sustain certain paths as 
Nash equilibrium paths. But then these Nash paths cannot be perfect. 
To get these results, we need make two structural assumptions. The 
first is that the state-space is finite. The second is that the 
security levels are continuous at infinity i.e. the worst payoff all 
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the other players can impose on any given player over a finite horizon 
converges to the worst payoff over the infinite horizon as the horizon 
length goes to infinity. It is not clear whether these conditions are 
necessary for the result, but it seems unlikely - as the counter-
examples presented below make clear, without discounting, perfection 
seems only to have force in games where payoffs are not independent of 
inital states. (In addition, it seems likely that the "continuity at 
infinity" property follows from the finiteness of the state-space, 
but I have not been able to prove this 5.) 
The layout of the rest of the chapter is as follows. In 1.3 
we present the general dynamic game model and define security levels. 
In Section 1.4 we discuss the relationship between Nash equilibrium 
and individual rationality. In Section 1.5, we do the same for 
perfect equilibrium; it is here where we present the two 
counter-examples and the sufficiency theorem. In 1.6, we give an 
alternative statement of the state-independence condition on outcome 
paths, in terms of closed-loop strategies, or rules. Apart from 
its' general interset, this anticipates 1.7, where a version of 
Spence's (1979) investment model is analysed, as an application of the 
sufficiency theorem, and we contrast our findings with Fudenberg and 
Tirole's analysis of the same model. We show that state-independece of 
paths holds only if the rate of capital depreciation is positive. We 
conclude by briefly discussing the case with discounting. 
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1.3 Dynamic Games 
(a) Notation and Equilibrium Concepts 
In this section we give a brief description of the quite general 
class of dynamic games for which we establish results. For a thorough 
discussion of such games, see Basar and Oldser (19R2). 
We suppose n players and an infinite sequence of dates, t = 0,1 ••• 
At each date each player iF.N chooses an action a
it 
lyin~ in a compact 
subset Ai of some Euclidean space. The state at any time, x , lies in 
t 
a finite subset X of another Euclidean space. Also, the state at t + 1 
is entirely determined by xt and a = (a ••• a ) according to the t it nt 
state equation; 
where g : X x A ~ X with A = X A., and the initial state, x , is 
i 1 0 En 
predetermined. Finally each iEN has a continuous per period payoff u. 
1 
defined on X x A. Note that the repeated game is a special case of a 
dynamic game with a degenerate state space. 
Next, define a history of length t, h
t 
= (xO, aO ••• a 1) as a t-
complete description of the initial condition and actions taken up to 
and including time t - 1. It is assumed that this is the information 
available to each player ay time t. Therefore, a strategy for each 
player,f., is a sequence of maps, f. , t= 0,1 ••• from the space of all 
1 1t 
possible histories into actions, A .• 
1 
We can now define a map, ~, from n-tuples of strategies, f= (f1 
••• f ) and an initial condition, xo' into infinite sequences of 
n 
actions, or outcome paths a = (aO, a1 ••• ) in A~. If a = cr(xO, f) 
then the elements of a are defined inductively by 
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We are now in a position to define payoffs over outcome paths 
and strate~ies. First, define for each player a T-period sum of per 
period payoffs defined on Am X X as follows; 
Any initial condition/outcome pair (a , xo), is now evaluated 
by i accordin~ 
1 
i.e. limsup 
T -+ m T 
to the long-run average payoff associated with it 
uT (a, x ). i 0 
This is not the only concievable evaluation criterion which does not 
discount future payoffs- for example, the overtaking criterion also 
has this property (see e.g. Rubenstein(1979) • However, the "folk" 
thorem and counterexamples hold in an almost unchanged form for this 
latter criterion so the choice of the long-run average is not 
restrictive. 
Strategy n-tuples f are evaluated by i according to 
1 
limsup 
T -+ m T 
We are now in a position to define perfect equilibrium for the 
game. The strategies fi are in perfect equilibrium if, conditional on 
any history h
t
, the fi are in Nash equilibrium. A formalisation of 
this in the repeated game case can be found in Rubenstein (197Q), and 
it is easily adaptable to the dynamic game case. As we do not make use 
of the formalisation directly in what follows, we leave the details of 
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the adaption to the reader. 
It is worth remarking, however, that as presented the game described 
above is not necessarily one of perfect information, as players move 
simultaneously at each date (i.e. choose a in ianorance of a ) it ~ -it • 
Therefore, perfect equilibrium in a finite-horizon version of the game 
(i.e. T < m ) may not exist for the usual reasons that give rise to 
non-existence of Nash equilibrium in simultaneous-move games _ 
discontinous payoffs, and so on. Furthermore, if the equilibrium 
exists and is unique, the equilibrium strategies must have the 
"closed-loop" property that the fit only depend on h
t 
through the 
current state, x • Thus, except in very special circumstances (e.g. t 
when the game is a repeated one) open-loop strategies cannot be 
prefect equilibrium strategies. Neither can more complex strategies, 
which depend on h in a richer way. Without uniqueness, of course, the 
t 
latter is no longer true; mUltiple perfect equilibria in the 
finite-horizon game can be used to construct other perfect equilibria, 
as Benoit and Krishna (1985) have shown. 
One other implication of the apparent simultaneity of moves is that 
it does not seem to easily accommodate dominant-player games, i.e. 
games where the dominant player moves first in each time period. 
(A common example is interaction between government and private agents 
described, for example, in Kydland and Prescott(1977), where the 
government is assumed to be able to move first in any time-period, 
not necessarily in a literal sense, but possibly by precommitment. See 
also Sargent(l QRl) and Gale(19R2)). This can in fact be modelled in 
our framework, by means of either putting the within-period game in 
normal form, or by altering the information structure. The former 
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works by redefining the action space of the follower to be the set of 
responses to the leader's action, or formally the set of all maps from 
Al to Af , where Al is the leader's action set, and Af the follower's. 
If both these sets are finite, then the set of all maps will also be 
finite, and there is no problem. If this is not the case, then 
technical problems could arise e.g. it may be difficult to guarantee 
the compactness of the follower's strategy set. The other alternative 
is to alter the information structure, so that the leader chooses at 
each t an action atl on the basis of ht only, whereas the follower 
chooses an action on the basis of information (h , a 1). t t 
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(b) Individual Rationality 
In this section, we give an exact definition of the players' 
security levels in the game described above, and armed with these, 
define individually rational outcome paths. First, the worst average 
payoff over any finite number of periods, T < m that the coalition of 
all other players can impose on player i is easily defined. It is 
simply i's minimax payoff evaluated over a T-period horizon, and will 
in general, be a function of xo; 
1 
( 10) 
T 
Over the infinite horizon, the security level for i, V~(xo)' is 
1 
defined as in (10) with the limsup operator before liT. It is now 
posible to state precisely the "continuity at infinity" assumption 
that we referred to in section 1.2. This is the condition that 
T m limsup V (xo) = Vi(xo), and we assume this in what follows. 
T-+cc i 
While the definition of the security levels is clear enough, they 
may be very difficult to compute from (10). It is possible to show, 
however, that if the u
i 
are differentiable, then the security levels 
over T-t periods, vI-t (x
t
) must satisfy the Bellman-type equation 
(II) s.t. 
with terminal condition V~ (xT) ~ O. (The min and max operators are 
valid because of the continuity and compactness assumptions made). 
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Therefore the minimax payoff to i over a T-period horizon is given 
by the initial valuation function in (11) i.e. with t set equal to 0, 
and the security level can be found by takng the limit as T + 00. 
In particular examples, it should be therefore be quite easy to 
compute security levels, at least numerically. 
We now turn to individual rationality. The natural definition of an 
individually rational outcome path is one for which at each date T, 
the continuation path aT = (a , a 1"") yields each player at least 
T ~ 
his security level, evaluated in state x , where (X1,X2 ••• ) is the 
T 
path of the state variable actually generated by a, for a given 
initial condition xO. More formally, say that a is individually 
rational if 
) I " I,ui(aT, x ) ) Vi(x~), all i, all T, with (12 ~msup T T v 
Note that it is possible for a path to be individually rational for 
the game starting in one state, but not in another; this fact is 
important in interpreting some of the counterexamples which follow. 
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1.4 Nash EquIlIbrium and Individual Rationality. 
It is well-known that in infinitely repeated games with no 
discounting, all individually rational paths are Nash equilibrium 
outcome paths - this is just the original "folk" theorem. We show here 
that in dynamic games the latter are always a subset of the former, 
and this subset may be strict. Also, we give a condition sufficient 
for them to coincide. 
We begin with a definition of a Nash equilibrium path - a is such a 
path simply if no player prefers to deviate at any date t from at' 
given that he will be minimaxed from t+1 onwards. As finite sequences 
of payoffs are of no interest to the players, the object of 
deviation from a by player i is to switch the game into a state where 
his security level, which he knows will ensue after deviation, is 
relatively high. The condition which states that all such deviations 
are unprofitable is the following; 
(13) limsup 
T-+-<x> 
all i, all ~, with 
Comparing (12) and (13), we can see that the latter condition is 
stronger as Nash paths must also be immune to manipulation by players 
trying to change the state. In fact, it is easy to find examples with 
individually rational outcome paths that are not Nash. 
Consider the following example. There are two players, I and II and 
two states, A and B. The game starts in state A, where the following 
matrix game is played. 
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II 
11 M 1) 
IT 1 , } (),-2 1 ,() 
I M -2,0 -) ,-} O,() 
- 1 1 
T' 0,] 0,0 
-'-
2 2 
If 11 is played by ei ther player except when M is being played by 
either player, the ~ame moves into state B, and stays there. In state 
B, the same matrix game is played, except that ] is added to all the 
payoffs. This means that starting in state A, either player can impose 
° on the other by playing ~ repeatedly, so security levels starting in 
A are o. In B, of course, they are equal to the security levels in the 
constituent game i.e. 1. Therefore, the actions (n,D) played 
repeatedly constitute an individuallly rational path starting in state 
A, but are not a Nash equlibrium, as either player can guarantee 
himself 1 by switching to U at any time, thus moving the game into 
state B. 
It is clear from this example and (12) and (13), however, that if 
if security levels were independent of the state, then Nash and 
individually rational paths would coincide. More formally, assume; 
(A1) V;(xo) is independent of xo' all i. 
Then we have; 
Theorem 1 
If (AI) holds, then all individually rational outcome paths are Nash 
equilibrium outcome paths. 
As already noted, this result can be thought of as a generalisation of 
the class i cal "folk" theorem. We nO\o.' turn to the mat n t opi c of the 
paper, the characterisation of perfect equilibrium. 
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1.5 Perfect Equilibrium and Individual Rationality 
We begin by showing that (AI) on its' own is not sufficient for all 
individually rational paths to be perfect. What we do is present an 
example where (AI) holds, but where there are Nash equilibrium paths 
that are not perfect. Consider the following example. As in the 
earlier example, there are two states, A and B, and the game starts in 
state A, where the left-hand matrix game below is played. If either 
player chooses action D, the state switches to B, where it stays, and 
the right-hand matrix game is played. There are no mixed strategies. 
II 
u D 
u 1,0 0,1 
D -1,0 0,1 
State A 
u 
D 
U 
2,0 
2,0 
II 
D 
0,-1 
0,-1 
State B 
Note that in each constituent game, each player's security level is 
zero, so overall security levels in each state are also equal to zero, 
and so (AI) is satisfied. Now consider the outcome path consisting of 
repeated play of (U,U). This is certainly a Nash equilibrium, as it 
yields each player at least zero. However, it is not perfect, for the 
reason that once in state B, there is no strategy pair that yields 
indivisdually rational payoffs for both players, and gives player I 
less than 2. Therefore, by the Aumann-Shapley-Rubenstein theorem for 
repeated games, the worst payoff that II can credibly impose upon I in 
this state is 2, and so forseeing thiS, player I will always have an 
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incentive to switch from U to D. This completes the example. 
The distinctive feature of this example, however, is that there are 
individually rational outcome paths, such as (U,U) played repeatedly, 
whose payoffs to the players depends on the state. The question then 
arises; if we rule this out, do Nash and perfect paths coincide, and 
if this is so, can we in fact dispense with (AI)? To approach this 
question, the first step is to define state-independence of payoffs 
formally. 
(A2) If a is an individually rational outcome path in the game 
starting in state xO' then 
limsup 
T~ 
1 
T 
T 
.Ui(a , x) is independent of x, all i. 
The first step is to show that (A2) on its own is also not 
sufficient to ensure that all individually rational (or Nash) paths 
are perfect i.e. (AI) is not redundant. Consider the following 
example. There are now three states, A, B, and C, and play starts in 
A, where the left-hand game is played. Again, there are no mixed 
strategies. 
II II 
u M D U M D 
u 1 , 1 0,-2 1,-1 u 1 ,1 1,-2 1,-1 
I M -2,0 -1,-1 -1,0 M -2,1 O,n -1, n 
1 1 1 1 
, 
-1,1 0,-1 
, 
D -1,1 0,-1 D 
2 2 2 2 
States A and B State C 
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The transition between states occurs as follows. As soon 
as either player plays M, the game switches into state B· otherwise , , 
the game remains in A. The game moves into C from B as soon as, and 
only if, both players stop playing M. State C is absorbing. In states 
A and B, security levels are equal to 0, and in C, are equal to 1, so 
that (AI) is violated. 
On the other hand, (A2) is satisfied. To see this we consider 
three mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets of all possible 
individually rational outcome paths for this game in turn. The first 
is the set of paths where only U or D is played at each date. Then it 
is clear by inspection of the payoff matrices above that the payoffs 
from such paths are independent of the initial state. The second 
possible subset is those paths where from some date T onwards, at 
least one player plays M at each date. However, it is clear from 
inspection of the left-hand payoff matrix that such outcome paths can 
never be individually rational starting in state A. Hence, this 
subset is empty. Finally, the third subset consist of paths where up 
to some date T no-one plays M, at ~ at least one player plays M, 
whereas at T + 1, no-one plays M. Starting in state A and following 
such an outcome path, the game moves into state C at ~ + 1, and stays 
there. For such paths to be individually rational, then, after ~ + 1 
the pair (U,U) must be played all but a finite number of times. 
Therefore, the payoffs from any element of this third set are 1 to 
each player, starting in any state, and so this third subset is indeed 
state-independent. As these three subsets exhaust all the 
possibilities, we have proved that (A2) is satisfied. 
Now, the pair (D,D) played repeatedly is in fact a Nash equilibrium 
path, as any devation by one player can at best move the game into B, 
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where the other player can impose a zero payoff-~ him by playing M 
for ever. In the event that one play-er deviates from D by playin~ M 
once and then switching to either U or D, however, it is not ratiqnal 
for the punisher to continue to play M, for by stopping, he can switch 
the game into C where he ~ets 1 rater than (at most) -1. Hence the 
Nash equilibrium is not perfect. 
Thus, we have shown that neither (AI) nor (A2) are individually 
sufficient for Nash paths to be perfect. Our major positive result, 
however, is that jointly, they are sufficient, and it is to this that 
we now turn. 
Theorem 2 
If (AI) and (A2) hold, then all individually rational outcome paths 
are perfect equilibrium outcome paths. 
This can be regarded as a generalisation of the Aumann-Shapley 
-Rubenstein result for repeated games, ano the proof uses their device 
of rapidly increasin~ punishment periods for successive deviations. 
The main difference from the repeated game settin~ is that in a 
punishment phase, the behaviour of the player being punished is more 
complex, and in particular his best response to a T-period punishment 
over the T-period horizon may not be his best response over the 
infinite horizon. We do not need to characterise these punishments 
directly in the proof, but merely prescribe "lenient" punisrnnents that 
not punish the the victim for anv deviatjons froU' his 0\tn1 "best" 
response to punishment over a given number of periods. 
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Proof 
The proof is constructive. That is, for any individually rational 
* outcome path a , we find strategies (fl ••• f ) = f which constitute a 
n 
perfect equilibrium, and which generate the outcome path a*, given the 
* initial condition xo; that is, a = ~(f, xO). 
(i) The first step is to specify the strategies, which are as follows. 
First, we say that all j * i punish i for t periods if they minimax 
him over the t-period horizon, as in (In) above, and say i responds to 
a t-period punishment if he plays his optimal response to this over 
t periods. (the inf and sup in (10) are always attained under the 
assumptions made in Section 1.3 so minimax strategies exist. Then, f 
prescribes; 
* (a) On subgames where no-one has deviated, play a 
(b) On subgames where i deviates from prescribed play for the nth 
time, all j * i punish i for t periods, and i responds to the t 
n n 
period punishment, after which play reverts to * a • By revert, we mean 
* * that if at was the last element of a to be played before the latest 
* punishment phase started, aO 
00; 
is played as soon as it ends, and so 
(c) The one exception to (b) is that if i fails to respond to his own 
punishment, in which case, his punishment continues unaltered; 
(d) If more than one player deviates simultaneously, then no-one is 
punished. 
(a) - (d) give a complete description of (fl .. f ) - i.e. describe 
n 
actions for every player contingent upon every history, h - given a 
t 
particular sequence of punishment durations. 
(ii) We now specify this sequence; let it be a sequence 
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satisfying 
n-1 
(~) lim \ t!t = n, L i n 
n~ro i=l 
N 
and if N(T) is the largest integer N such that ) t ( T, T = 1 , 2 
'- i ... i=1 
(Q) lim N(T)!T = 0. 
~ro 
There certainly exist sequences satisfying (a) and (p); for example, 
n-l 
the sequence defined inductively by t = (I 
n i=l 
(iii) In view of the construction of these strategies (i.e. that 
along any equilibrium path of fl ••• f n , starting in any history, play 
* eventually returns to a ) and the fact that the limsup criterion 
ignores payoffs over finite periods, all we need to do to check that 
fl •• fn are perfect is that there exists no sequence of deviations, 
ro (~n)n=l starting at any t, which yields some i€N a payoff strictly 
higher than from the equilibrium path. (By assumption (A2) 
furthermore, the latter is a constant independent of the state e.g. 
* Ui(a ).) We can assume without loss of generality that this sequence 
is infinite, for if it were finite, so would be the period of 
punishment of i, and hence the gain to deviation would be precisely 
zero. 
The first step in doing this is to note that the sequence of 
deviations by i, (T: )n=l generates both a sequence of intervals 
* ro (t
n 
)~=1 when i is being punished, and a further sequence , (t n )n=l 
which is the the sequence of intervals when i is being not being 
* ro punished. We can now establish some properties of (tn )n=1 • First, 
suppose without loss of generality that t~ is increasing in n. Then 
define N(T) to be the largest integer N such that 
(14) 
N 
\ 
n=l 
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* + tn ) ( T • 
It now follows from the fact that t increases so rapidly that 
n 
N(T) 
I * * * either lim tn IT = 0, or tN(T)~ roo To see this, note that as the tn
T~ro 
are non-negative, the N(T) as defined in (14) is bounded above by the 
N(T) as defined in (Q), so for the former, lim N(T)/T = O. Now suppose 
* that the t are bounded above by b. Then 
n 
() <; lim 
T~ro 
N(T) 
* L tn IT ~ lim N(T).b/T = n. 
i=l T~ro 
* If on the other hand, the tn are unbounded above, as N(T) goes to 00 
* with T, then tN(T) goes to infinity with T also. There are therefore 
two cases to consider. 
(a) 
N(T) * 
lim 1 tn IT = 0 
T~<D i=l 
In this case, from (14) , we conclude that lim 
T~<D 
which in turn implies from property (rr) that 
(15) lim = 1, 
N(T) 
I tn IT = 1, 
n=l 
or in other words, that the last punishment period eventually 
dominates. Then the average payoff over T periods for i is bounded 
above by 
(1 () max 
xF)< 
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where b is an upper bound on per-perio~ utility, which exists under 
the assumptions made in Section 1.3 .Then, as tN(T) goes to infinity 
with T, and x is finite, we can conclude from the "continuity at 
infinity" assumption that the first term in (16) goes to v; with T. On 
the other hand, the second term ~oes to zero by (15). 
(b); ~ + en 
Here we have the case where limsup 
T~en 
N(T) 
I 
n=l 
* tn IT = k 
with n < k ( 1, and where limsup tN(T)/T = (l-k). 
T ~ en 
for some k 
We will now show that for any £ > 0, the payoff to deviation is 
* en bounded above by k.U.(a ) + (l-k)V. + E, so that deviation is not 
1 1 
f bl f ( * en F' h > 0 h . f 11 pro ita e i U. a ) ) V .• 1rst, c oose any C • Ten, 1t 0 OWS 
1 1 
from (A2) and the finiteness of x that there exists a T(E) such that 
the following holds; 
* , x) < T.(U. (a ) + F) all T > T(E), all x ~ x. 
1 
Then define 
(lR) N(E) = {min 
n 
-+ + en, such a N(E:.) exists). Now, at the end of each period of 
punishment, play reverts to a*, so that the payoff to i over the 
* * t * interval of length tn when he is not being punished is 11tn .Vin(a ,x) 
where x is determined by the past history of play. Thus, from 
(17) and (lR), it follows that the payoff to i over that proportion of 
T periods when he is not being punished is bounded above by 
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(19) 
1 N(E)-l 
. I t~. b 
T n=l 
Taking the limsup of both sides of (IQ) , we find that the payoff to i 
. 
over that proportion of the time when he is not being punished is 
bounded above by * k(Ui(a ) + IC ) • Now an argument as in case (a) 
establishes that over that proportion of the time when he is being 
<D punished, he gets at most (l-k).Vi • Therefore, his total payoff to 
d i i i hi d * <D ev at on n t s case is in eed bounded above by k.Ui(a )+(l-k).V
i
+ E. 
(iv) Taking both cases together, we see that deviation from fi cannot 
* <D * be profitable for i as long as U.(a ) > V.' But as a is 
1 1 
individually rational by definition, this inequality always holds. 
This completes the proof. 
Remarks 
The theorem can be extended to games where A. depends on the current 
1 
state and actions of the other players in a stationary way i.e. 
A = A (a , x ). Such dependence may arise in even simple 
i i -i,t t 
economic examples (e.g dynamic duopoly with capacity constraints - see 
e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole(1983)). Also, if the inequality in the 
definition of individual rationality is changed from a weak to a 
strict one, the theorem should also go through in the case where 
infinite sequences of payoffs are evaluated according to the 
overtaking criterion. 
A more pressing problem is to relax the assumption that X is finite. 
Unfortunately, it seems impossible to do this without imposing a 
stronger version of the state-independence condition (A2), which 
would require that the payoff from any individually rational path 
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-
converge to a limit value uniformly in X. When X is finite. of 
course, pointwise convergence implies uniform convergence, and 80 we 
avoid the problem of having to make this additional assumption. It' is 
hard to imagine that uniform state-independence would be a necessary 
condition for Nash paths to be perfect, so relaxing the finiteness 
condition in this way would make the possible results much less sharp. 
A more appealing approach would perhaps be to approximate any game 
with a compact state-space by a sequnce of games with finite 
state-spaces, and try and show that the set of equilibrium paths in 
the latter converged to that of the former. A third possiblity is 
simply to try and verify inequality (17) in the proof above for 
particular examples, for it is this that is essential, not compactness 
per see This is in fact what we do below when applying Theorem (2) to 
the Spence model. 
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l.h Rules and Outcomes 
The natural focus of interest in many dynamic games is not so much on 
sequences of actions as on sequences of rules which prescribe actions 
to be taken in any particular state e.g. industry growth paths in 
Spence's duopoly game. While there is, of course, a mapping from 
these rules to outcomes, the outcome path associated with any 
particular rule will, in general, depend on the initial state, x • 
o 
For example, in the duopoly game if the rule for each firm is to 
accumulate capacity up to a "target" and produce up to capacity in 
each period, then the actual sequence of outputs and investment levels 
will depend on the initial capital stocks. Hence, the question - are 
the outcomes associated with any rule for the outcomes of perfect 
equilibria in the dynamic game? - can only be answered using Theorem 
2 above by "testing" each outcome path of the rule for each Xo to see 
whether it satisfies (A2). 
Therefore, it seems natural to reformulate (A2) so that it applies 
to the rule directly. It turns out that by doing this, we can we can 
prove a theorem which is not a special case of Theorem 2. The 
intiution for this is as follows. Inspection of the proof of Theorem 
2 reveals that for it to go through, at the end of a punishment 
* period, play need not return to a 
always yields approximately limsup 
itself, but just something that 
1 T * 
- .V.(a ,xo) to every player over 
T 1 
a long enough time horizon - for example, a closed loop rule that has 
this property. 
To make this more formal, consider the following condition. 
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(A2') Let a be individually rational jn the game starting 
in xO. Then there exists a fC such that 
1 T c 1 T limsup 
.Ui«(r(f , x), x) = limsup .Ui(a ,x 0) 
T T 
for all x, all i. 
We now show that (A2') is a weaker requirement than (A2). To begin 
with, suppose (A2) holds. Then the (open-loop) rules defined 
implicitly by a = (r(fC,x) all x certainly satisfy (A2'). Note also 
that in the case of a repeated game, a thus defined trivially 
satisfies (A2'). We now show that for some games, (A2') may be 
satisfied while (A2) is not. 
Consider the following very simple example. There are two states, A 
and B, and play starts in state A, where the left-hand matrix ~ame is 
played. There are no mixed strategies and both states are absorbing. 
Security levels are ° for both players. However, this ~ame does 
not satisfy (A2) as any outcome path where (U,U) is played often 
enough is not state-independent. 
II II 
U D U D 
n 1,0 0,0 IT 2,0 0,0 
I 
D 0,0 1,0 D 0,0 1 ,0 
State A State B 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the outcome path is such 
that (U,U) is played a fraction k of the time and (n,D) the rest. 
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Then this yields player I a payoff of k in stat~ ~ and 2k in state B. 
(Note that II always gets 0). Now it is always possible to choose a 
closed-loop rule such that (U,U) is played a fraction k of the time in 
state A and 1/2.k of the time in B - hence (A2') is satisfied in this 
case. 
However, it is important to note that (A2') is not satisfied in 
cases where the folk theorem fails, but (AI) holds e.g. the first 
example presented in 1.~. There, in state B, there is no outcome path 
that yields the players the pair (1,0). 
Now we can state the generalisation of Theorem 2; 
Theorem 3 
If (AI) and (A2') hold, then all individually rational outcome paths 
are perfect equilibrium paths. 
We just give a sketch of the proof here. The proof follows that of 
Theorem 2, except that when a period of minimaxing a deviator is over, 
and the game is in (say) state x, play reverts to ~(fC,x) rather than 
a*. As ~(fc, x) yields individually rational payoffs to all players, 
this is acceptable to the punishers, and part (iii) of the proof goes 
through virtually unchanged. 
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1.7 An Application-Duopoly with Durable Capital 
In this section, we discuss the implications of the "folk" 
theorem, theorem 2, to a game of duopoly with durable capital, due 
originally to Spence (1979 ), and further analysed by Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1983 ). 
We begin by checking the hypotheses of the theorem. We show that 
"'-
as long as there is\strictly positive rate of depeciation, 
outcome paths in this game (which are sequences of pairs of output and 
investment levels) are state-independent in the sense of the 
definition given in 1.4. (Without a positive rate of depreciation, the 
limsup of average payoffs can depend on the initial capital stock, and 
so the state-independence condition (A2) is violated.) 
If we also assume that the state-space is compact, then it is also 
true that along any convergent subsequence, payoffs starting in any 
state converge to the limit uniformly in the initial state. This 
uniformity of convergence is important if we wish to apply Theorem 2 
to the model, as in the Spence model, the state-space is the space of 
pairs of non-negative capital stocks, and hence not finite, so one 
cannot obtain equation (17) in the proof of theorem 2 directly. 
It is also simple to show that security levels are both continuous 
at infinity and state-independent, so we can conclude that with 
positive depreciation, any individually rational outcome path is a 
perfect equilibrium path in the Spence model. 
What are these individually rational paths? If the rate at which 
firms can invest is large enough, or if there is zero capital 
depreciation, then the security levels of the two firms will be 
zero, and so any outcome path which yields firms non-negative 
average profits will be perfect. Otherwise, the security levels mav be 
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strictly greater than zero, which is-perhaps the more interesting 
case. 
One can restate this result in terms of Spence's industry growth 
paths. An industry growth path (IGP) , in game theoretic terms, is a 
closed loop strategy n-tuple involving an initial expansion (or 
contraction, if there is a positive rate of depreciation) of the 
capital stocks to attain target levels, followed by constant output 
and replacement investment only. We have therefore shown that it may 
be the case that any IGP that generates outcome paths 
which yield non-negative profits is "credible"; any "target" 
capacities that give each firm individually rational payoffs can be 
reached by credible threats of rapid expansion of capacity if the 
target is not achieved. In particular, all Pareto-efficient pairs of 
"target" capacities can be so attained. 
These results contrast sharply with the findings of Fudenberg and 
Tirole(1983) who analyse a continuous-time version of this model with 
zero depreciation, and restrict their attention to closed-loop 
strategies (they call the resulting game a "state-space game"). They 
show, among other things that the only perfect equilibrium closed-loop 
strategies are "investment races" where both firms invest as fast as 
possible until a "finishing line" ( FIT more accurately call it a 
"terminal surface" ) is reached. The point reached on this surface, 
and hence the long-run payoffs associated with these equilibria, 
depend crucially on the initial capital stocks. 
However, this is not a consequence of zero depreciation per se, but 
rather the restricted strategy spaces which FIT use - although, as 
remarked above, state-independence fails in this case so that we 
50 
cannot apply the folk theorem directly, it is possible to prove a 
similar folk theorem specifically for the Spence model, exploiting its 
special structur~ 
Finally, it is possible to say more about the structure of the 
perrfect equilibrium strategies. It turns out that the game may be 
"unstable" in the sense that imposing the security level payoff on 
player j can make player i worse off than he would be if he recieved 
his own security level. This means that outcome paths that yield each 
player payoffs below a certain level can only be supported by "finite" 
punishments of the A-siR type discussed in 1.1. 
(a) The Model 
There are two firms, i = 1, 2. The state vector, k = (kl, k2) 
is a pair of non-negative capital stocks. The action for the ith firm 
at time t, a it ' is a pair (lit' Yit ) of an investment level and 
output respectively. The revenue function for firm i, R.(Y., y J,) is 1 1 
bounded above and non-negative, decreasing in y. (strictly so if y. > J 1 
0) and satisfies 
(20) lim R. 
1 y.-+{) 
1 
= lim R. 
1 y.-+co 
1 
The state equations are 
:= lim R. = 0 
1 y.-+co 
J 
= k. t 1 (l - 6) + 1. t 1 1, - 1, - i =1,2 
where 0 ( 6 ( 1 is the rate of depreciation. We assume that the 
initial capital stocks must be bounded above, which implies with a 
positive rate of depreciation, that all the kit must be bounded above. 
Output is produced from capital and labour with Yi ( min (k i , Ii)· 
Payoffs over actions are given by revenue minus short-run costs and 
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investment costs; 
where w is the wage, and p the cost of investment goods. 
Then the action space for i is 
where I is an upper bound on the rate of investment. Note that the 
action space depends on the current capital stock, but in a stationary 
way, so (as explained in the remark following the proof of theorem 2) 
this theorem can be applied to this case. 
(b) Analysis 
We begin with the issue of long-run security levels in this 
ruOGE: 1. As Ri is decreasing in Yj (strictly so as long as Yi > 0) then 
j's unique minimax strategy is to expand capacity as fast as possible 
(i.e. gross investment at rate I) and produce up to capacity as long 
as y i > O. 
Assume to begin with that there is a strictly positive rate of 
depreciation, i.e. 0 < 6 .( 1. Then from (21), j's capacity will tend 
to k. == 1/6 from any initial position. Hence, in the long run, the 
J 
worst j can do to i is to produce at Yj == 1/6 in each period. As 
the maximum sustainable capacity for i is also I/6, then the 
payoff to i from i's best response to y.== 1/6, is in the long run, J 
the maximum of 0 (as i always has the option of closing down) and wi' 
where 
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Therefore, with depreciation, 
co 
Vi = max (wi' 0). (25) 
The payoff to j from minimaxing i is 
z~ = Rj(I/O, y~ ) - (w + po).I/o (26) 
* where Yi is a maximiser in (2 4). If I is large enough, then 
it is possible that 
co co 
z. < V. , and so the game is"unstable", as 
J J 
claimed. 
In the case of no depreciation, any finite level of capacity can be 
sustained at zero average cost over the long run, so that the equation 
determining wi now is (24) with P = 0 and I = +co. Therefore, wi and 
co 
hence Vi are both O. 
Next, outcome paths. We must show first that with positive 
depreciation, the payoffs to each firm from any outcome path a = (aO, 
al···) with at = (It' Yt) do not depend on the initial state. This is 
easy to do. Payoffs depend on the limsup of~. = min(y. k.) and lt lt, lt 
lit' and as, in turn, the limsup of kit is independent of initial 
stocks, from equation (21), the result follows. 
Next, we must show that payoffs "converge" uniformly in the inital 
state, or more precisely that any subsequential limit of the average 
payoff converges to its limit uniformly in the inital capital stocks. 
For this, all we need show is that any convergent subsequence of r' it 
converges to its limit uniformly in the initial capital stock, k iO • 
This in turn requires that any convergent subsequence of kit converges 
uniformly in the initial capital stock. Without loss of generality, 
suppose that kit itself converges tCLa- lirnit,_k __ -Then for any ~~o, 
there exists a T such that Ikit(O)- kl ( £/2 for all t) T. Rut as 
Ikit(O) - kit(kio))1 ( (1-6)t.b, where b is the upper bound on 
initial capital stocks, one can choose a T' such that 
Ikit(O) - kit(kio))1 ( £/2 for all t ) T'. Therefore, 
f or all t ) rna x ( T, T') , a 11k i 0 (27) 
so that kit converges uniformly in the initial stocks, as required. 
As (27) holds along any convergent subsequence of k i t' the analogue 
of (27) will hold both for any convergent subsequence of [it and hence 
also for any convergent subsequence of per period and average 
payoffs. Furthermore, we already know that the lirnsup of the 
average payoff is independent of the initial state. We can put these 
facts together to deduce that equation (17) in the proof of theorem 2 
is valid for this model. 
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Conclusions 
The major limitation of these results is that they only apply to 
games without discounting. Also, we know from 1.1. that a completely 
different approach is required to games with discounting - i.e. 
Abreu's approach. However, the main conclusion of this chapter is that 
the A-siR approach to repeated games without discounting carries over 
to a more general setting, in the sense that it can be used to 
identify necessary and sufficient conditions for individually rational 
paths to be perfect. 
In the same way, one might fruitfully search for necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal penal codes in 
dynamic games. This might be quite difficult, as the natural 
description of a penal code in a dynamic game would seem to be in 
terms of closed-loop strategies, rather than outcome paths, and one 
would have to show that the space of such strategies was compact if 
one wished to generalise Abreu's existence argument directly. However, 
this seems a line of thought worth pursuing. 
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2. Long-Term Contracts 
Introduction 
This chapter draws on the methods and results covered in the 
first chapter in investigating some aspects of the theory of long-term 
contracts. 
As Hart and Holmstrom (1985) point out, the theory of contracts 
essentially deals with economic transactions which have the character 
of a relationship-specific investment - once the investment is made, 
it is worth more to the two parties than it would be outside. For 
example (and this is the kind of example we have in mind in what 
follows) the "investment" may be the acquisition of firm-specific 
human capital by a workforce, or the accumulation of mobility costs, 
so that after a certain point, the firm and worker are "locked in" 
together. 
In these circumstances1 (and only with such a lock-in effect) 
there is a rationale for signing explicit contracts, for two reasons. 
This first is risk-sharing i.e. the locked-in partners may be able to 
achieve a reallocation of risk bearing that cannot be achieved by the 
market, and such risk-sharing contracts have overwhelmingly been the 
preoccupation of the literature, as explained in the introduction to 
the thesis. The second, which has only recently been investigated see 
e.g. Grout (1984) is that if the relationship involves investment, in 
the absence of binding contracts concerning the level of investment, 
(more exactly, if the level of investment is chosen prior to the 
decision on the division of the surplus), the level of investment will 
be inefficient. 
This chapter is concerned with risk-sharing contracts. The 
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interest of such contracts, both from a theoretical point of 
view and from the point of view of applications, is in the conflict 
between risk-sharing and asymmetric information between the 
contracting parties. Two alternative types of asymmetric information 
structure have been extensively analysed, and have recently been 
dubbed "hidden action" and "hidden information" problems respectively 
by Arrow. 
The former covers cases where the agent takes an action which is 
unobservable, by the principal, although to make the problem 
interesting he must be able to observe some stochastic consequences of 
the agent's action. Such unobservability is usually referred to as 
moral hazard. The problem of risk-sharing in a static setting with 
moral hazard has been intensively investigated, notably by Mirrlees, 
Holmstrom and Grossman and Hart, among others and most general 
features of the optimal contract are now known (see Hart and Holmstrom 
(1985» • 
The second kind of informational asymmetry, hidden information, 
is where the agent observes the value of a random variable which is 
relevant to the risk-sharing problem, and which is unobservable to the 
principal - hence hidden information. Starting with the work of 
Grossman and Hart(1981), most of the attempts to modify the 
Azariadis-Baily implicit contract model have made use of this type 
informational asymmetry - see for example, the 1983 Quarterly Journal 
of Economics Supplement. For example, the firm may observe a 
productivity shock that is unobservable to the worker. In this case, 
the first-best risk-sharing contract is no longer 
incentive-compatible, as the same wage were paid in all states, 
the firm would always wish to announce the highest realisation of the 
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shock, as this wuold elicit the largest labour supply under th~ terms 
of the first-best contract. (see also Azariadis(19R3)). 
Alternatively, the firm may not be able to observe the opportunity 
wage available to the worker if he leaves the contract, or perhaps the 
worker's valuation of leisure. Moore(1985) argues that the former is 
the relevant opportunity cost if layoffs are permanent, and the latter 
if layoffs are temporary, and shows that in the former case, there is 
overemployment relative to the first-best, and in the latter , 
underemployment, and in addition, layoffs are involuntary. 
To conclude, we see that with hidden information, there will be 
inefficiencies relative to the first-best, but the direction of these 
inefficiencies depends on the structure of the particular problem at 
hand. 
Attention has naturally turned more recently to the 
risk-sharing/asymmetric information tradeoff where the relationship is 
repeated over a sequence of dates. Four questions naturally arise 
here: 
(a) is it possible to improve on a series of short-term contracts 
i.e. introduce history-dependence into the contract; 
(b) what is the structure of the optimal contract; 
(c) what is the asymtotic behaviour of the optimal contract e.g. as 
the time horizon goes to infinity or the discount rate goes to 1; 
(d) what are the observable consequences of the long-term contract 
(over and above the predictions of the short-term contract? 
Perhaps the most fundamental of these questions is part (a), but there 
l"s a yet no complete answer, and several contributions seem to be ,s , 
in conflict with one-another. First, in an important paper, Townshend 
(1982) argued that one motivation for history-dependence was improving 
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risk-sharing. What his paper also made clear however, was that in an 
intertemporal setting one role of the contract was to act as a vehicle 
for the agent to save or dissave, and a "pure savings contract" where 
the agent just saved at a given rate of interest was also "historv 
dependent" i.e. the repayment in period 2 depends on the amount saved 
in period 1. He was also able to show that in his paticular 
model, which was quite special, the optimal contract was not 
simply a savings contract One can interpret this as showing that the 
optimal contract history-dependence over and above that induced by 
savings. 
A recent paper by Manning (1985) sheds some light on this issue. 
He assumes that the payments of principal and agent are quasi-linear 
in income, and shows that in this case, history-dependence is 
desirable if and only if the participation constraints take a certain 
form. (With quasi-linearity of course, both the savings and insurance 
motives for history-dependence are absent.) 
Finally, Roberts (1982) presents an alternative argument that 
asserts that history-dependence is always desirable, but he specifies 
the agent's participation constraint in a rather different way to the 
rest of the literature. 
What we do in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 is integrate and reconcile 
these contributions (especially Roberts and Manning) and also present 
some new arguments. The central conclusion is that there are two 
conditions, which without savings by the agent are individually 
necessary and sufficient for history dependence. 
The first is that the utility of income of either principal or 
agent be non-linear; and the second, roughly speaking, is that the 
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d i i t "1 "h h ec s on 0 eave t e contract, or c oose a status quo payoff, be 
rt-versible. 
We now turn to the question of the structure of the optimal 
contract. A fundamental problem of definition arises here; optimal 
relative to what? In general terms, optimal relative to the behaviour 
of the agent, so that the optimal contract, in a static context, can 
be thought of as a Stackleberg equilibrium in the game where the 
principal moves first and chooses the contract, and the agent then 
responds. The game-theoretic viewpoint is not very illuminationg in 
the static context, precisely for the reason that there is effectively 
"one" Stackleberg equilibrium i.e. all Stackleberg equilibria give the 
principal the same payoff. 
Whether this simple picture generalises to the many-period case 
depends on whether it is assumed that the principal can precommit to 
carry out the terms of the contract in future periods or not. 
If he can, then there is no ambiguity in the notion of an 
"optimal" contract - it is, again, one of the Stackleberg equilibrium 
contracts in the normal form of the contracting game - all of which 
give him the same payoff. 
If he cannot, then one must view the contracting game as a 
repeated game. With a finite horizon, the only equilibrium is a 
sequence of (static) Stackleberg equilibria, but in the more 
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interesting case of an infinite horizon, there may be many equilibria 
even if a perfectness (or similar) condition is imposed, as we have 
seen in 1.1. 
The implication is that the "optimal" contract may not be well 
defined, as Radner (1985) points out; there may be many different 
Stackleberg equilibrium contracts, which yield the principal different 
payoffs. 
It was Radner's considerable achievement in the same paper to 
explicitly construct such an equilibrium, involving quite a simple 
and plausible strategy for the principal, called a review strategy, 
which is discussed further below in 2.6. Radner recognised, 
furthermore, that his review strategy equilibrium was in general, not 
Pareto efficient (see Radner (1985) Section 8.2). 
To find the all the Pareto-efficicent equilibria of the contracting 
game without precommitment is, of course, a very difficult task, and 
it is not attempted here. What we do is much more modest; we suggest a 
way in which one of these equilibria - the one which gives the 
principal the highest payoff - may be characterised. The argument is 
based on the fairly obvious fact that if the principal does not wish 
to renage on the precommitment equilibrium contract ( or one of 
them, if it is not unique) then this contract is also an equilibrium 
contract in the non-precommitment game and is furthermore, 
Pareto-efficient. ( see 2.1 beloW). Then, assuming that we can find 
such a precommitment contract, we will have also found an 
efficient non-precommitment contract. (Whether we can do so is 
discussed in greater detail in 2.6(b)). This provides a link between 
Radner's approach to the problem and the more orthodox (i.e. non-game 
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theoretic approach. 
The properties of the optimal precommitment contract are the main 
focus of the second half of the chapter. The contract has an extremely 
simple structure; it decomposes into a series of contracts at each 
date, linked only by a state variable, w , which is the expected 
t 
discounted utility of the future contract seen from time t onwards. 
At each date, the principal chooses, in addition to income/action 
pairs, w. 1, which is the expected discounted utility of the agent It+ 
from t+1 onwards, given an "announcement" of type i. 
Thus, history dependence works entirely through the w
t
; if w ci: 
ti 
w ., then the payments and actions on offer at t will depend on the 
tJ 
past history of types. We find also that in each period, the same 
incentive constraints bind as in the static problem, and that the 
history-dependence serves precisely to relax these constraints (this 
is the important insight of Roberts (1982)). This is not terribly 
surprising. What we do find is several interesting intertemporal 
features of the optimal contract. 
First, we find that Rogerson's (1985) intertemporal marginal 
utility of income condition also holds in this model - this is just an 
expression of the condition that the principal is "saving" optimally 
on behalf of the agent. 
Second, and more importantly, we obtain a new and ~eneral result; 
that the marginal utility of income of the agent is positively 
correlated over time. (This is true whether it is the upward or 
downward incentive constraints that bind in the optimal contract.) 
Under some simplifying assumptions, we show that this result implies 
posi ti veerial correlation of wages in labour contracts. 
Finally, we deal with two other issues. The first is the 
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asymtotic behaviour of the infinite horizon contract as the discount 
factor goes to unity. We show that in the limit, the first-best 
payoffs can be attained as equilibrium payoffs. The reason for this 
has already been established by Radner (1981); without discounting, 
the principal can, by monitoring all the announcements of the agent 
can determine whether he is lying a positive fraction of the time to 
any desired degree of accuracy. As long as the monitoring period is 
finite, it has zero cost to the principal, so that the principal can 
costlessly detect deviations, and so can enforce the first-best. 
However, the argument we use to establish this is quite different 
we show that the cost, in terms of the adjustment of the w. , of lt 
making the first-best contract incentive-compatible in each period 
becomes negligible as the discount factor goes to unity. 
The second issue is the use of an additional instrument, the 
threat of terminations, which is dealt with in 2.7. We show that 
terminations are of no help in relaxing incentive-compatibility 
constraints, even without history-dependence in the rest of the 
contract. We relate this to the recent literature which explains 
involuntary terminations, and hence involuntary unemployment, as an 
incentive device (Shapiro and Stiglitz(1984)). 
63 
2.1 The Model and a Characterisation of Efficient Equilibria of the 
Contracting Game 
This section is divided into four parts. In the first, we present 
a general formulation of the risk-sharing problem in a static context. 
In the second, following Radner(1981), (1985), we formulate a model of 
the dynamic contracting problem as a game, where the principal's 
strategy is to choose a contract, and the agent's strategy is to 
decide on announcement of a type from a given set at every date and 
contingency. The reason for approaching the problem in this way, is 
because(as we argued in the introduction), if the principal cannot 
precommit it is the only way of formulating the problem. Having done 
this, we obtain a simple but extremely useful characterisation of 
(some of the) efficient equilibria, which enables us to analyse the 
structure of these efficient equilibria only by considering the 
equilibria of the contracting game where the principal can precommit; 
the latter have a much simpler structure. 
In the third part, we analyse precommitment equilibria. The first 
step is to prove a revelation principle; for the class of 
precommitment equilibria that we are interested in, it is possible to 
assume that the agent is using truth-telling strategies. Using this 
fact we show that the conditions for a (Nash or perfect) precommitment 
equilibrium are in fact equivalent to a sequence of easily understood 
dynamic incentive-compatibility constraints. We can then express the 
principal's choice of optimal strategy as a dynamic programming 
problem, and the details of this are covered in the latter half of the 
third section. The fourth section presents some sufficient conditions 
for existence of a solution to the optimal contracting problem. 
(a) The Static Contracting Problem 
We start by describing a conventional static (possibly risk-sharing) 
problem, the elements of which are as follows. The utility of the 
principal, vex, y) depends on the "action" , x, taken by the agent and 
on the income transfer, y, between agent and principal. Here, the 
word "action" denotes any variable apart from income, which affects 
the income of both parties and is part of the contractual agreement. 
The utility of the agent, u(x, y, e) depends on x, the action taken, 
on the income transfer y, and also his type e. drawn from a finite set 
1 
o = {el ••• e }. We order the e. so that el < e2 
n 1 
< e • 
n 
A (static) 
contract,c, is a 2n-tuple of actions and payments conditional on types 
f xi' y.} t; 1· 
. 1 1= 
Before choosing an action/income pair (xi' Yi) the agent will 
observe his type, some e. in 0. The principal, by contrast, does not 
1 
observe the agent's type, but knows that he is drawn from a 
distribution over the types which is common knowledge. Suppose that 
the probability that the agent is of type i is 71:. • 1 Given this 
asymmetry, it is well-known that attention can be restricted to 
contracts that satisfy the self-selection constraints 
(1) u(x., y., ei ) ~ u(x., y., e.) 1 1 J J 1 all e. * e .. J 1 
Furthermore, we require feasibility (or participation) 
constraints to be satisfied to ensure that the principal and agent are 
both willing to take part in the contract. 
These latter constraints can have several different 
specifications, depending on whether or not the agent is assumed to 
observe his type before or after a contract is made, and depending on 
whether the payoff to the agent in the event of no contract being 
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signed depends upon his type or not. Suppose first that the "no 
contract" payoff to the agent is independent of his type. 
Then, in the case where the agent observes his type before the 
contract is signed, feasibility for the agent requires 
If it is assumed that that u(x, y, e) is increasing in e, then 
(2) can be simplified to 
If, the other hand, the agent observes his type only after the 
contract is signed, then feasibility for the agent requires simply 
that 
(4) Ln.u(x., y., e.) ) u. 
1 111 
In the event that the "outside" payoffs of the agent do depend on 
his types, then (2) must be modified to 
( 5) u. , 
1 
where tl. is the outside opportunity of a type i, and cannot 
1 
necessarily be simplified to u(xl, Yl,el) ) ul. By contrast, 
constraints of the ex ante type still take the form (4) with the 
modification that u = L n . • u .. 
1 1 
The choice of participation constraint depends, of course, upon the 
problem analysed. For example, in the theory of non-linear pricing, 
it may reasonably be supposed that the consumer has knowledge of his 
"type' (i.e. his income, or preference for the good) before buying 
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and so the ex post constraints of type (2) are appropriate. In this 
case, however, the assumption that the no contract option yields all 
types an equal payoff may be unreasonable - for example, if the 
consumers who differ in initial incomes. In contracts whose rationale 
is risk-sharing, however, such as the Azariadis-Grossman-Hart model 
of labour contracting, or Townshend's (1982) model, the ex ante 
constraint is obviously appropriate. 
It is important to note that the problem with ex post constraints is 
not a risk-sharing problem - what makes it non-trivial is the conflict 
between asymmetric information and the desire by the principal to 
extract all the surplus from the agent. (Nevertheless, as we show 
in 2.2. and 2.3, history-dependence is desirable under exactly the 
same conditions as with the ex ante constraints.) 
For completeness, in what follows we consider multiperiod contracts 
with both ex ante and ex post participation constraints. Our 
results apply a fortiori to the case where both sorts of constraints 
are in operation (as in for example Manning(1986) ,Manning and Lockwood 
(1985)). For analytical tractibility, we suppose that if the 
constraints are ex post that the agent's outside payoff is 
type-independent. 
Finally, we do not bother with an explicit specification of a 
participation constraint for the principal, as none of the results 
below are substantially affected by its inclusion. 
The most general form of optimal contract is any feasible contract 
(i.e. satisfying (2), (3) and/or (4)) which maximises the weighted sum 
of utilities of both principal and agent. However, we restrict our 
analysis to contracts which maximise the utility of the principal, 
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;,n i .v(xi , Yi) • This rules out application of our results to 
multiperiod optimal taxation problems, but covers the non-linear 
pricing problem for a discriminating monopolist, and labour contracts 
with asymmetric information as should be clear to those acquainted 
with the literature (see for example, Spence (1980) on monopoly 
pricing, or Hart (1983) on labour contracts). 
(b) The Dynamic Contracting Problem 
Here the principal and agent contract over a sequence of 
time-periods t = 0, 1 ••• T. This sequence may possibly be infinite, 
i.e. T = roo The per-period payoffs are as before in static case, and 
the sequence of random variables {9t}~=Ofollows a specified 
stochastic process. We shall be exclusively concerned with the case 
where the 9t are independent over time, and this assumption is in fact 
crucial for our approach to the problem. 
At this point, we will formalise the contracting problem as a 
non-cooperative game, following Radner (1981), (1985), for reasons 
already discussed. In this context, a strategy for the principal is 
just a sequence of per period contracts {Ct}~=O' where 
c = (x. , Yi )i- 1 , where the choice of c is of course t lt t - ••• n t 
conditional on the information available to the principal at the 
beginning of period t. 
What is this information? The principal has, at this point, 
observed the past choices of strategy of the agent, so his information 
at this point will be a history of these past choices. What these 
choices are depends on the strategy set of the agent. We have some 
discretion in specifying this strategy set. One possibility is that at 
each t, the agent simply announces a type 9t £ e· Another is that he 
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reveals his type indirectly by a choice of income/action pair. In the 
event that for some t, xit = X jt ' Yit = Yjt i :f. j (Le. "bunching") 
then the second type of "indirect" strategy reveals less information 
that the first to the principal. It turns out that as the e
t 
are 
oJ. independent, it makes no difference to the form of the equilibrium 
which strategy is available to the agent and so we will assume the 
former specification. Then the principal's information at 
t when he chooses c t is simply a history of announced types a t - 1 = 
(aO, a1 ••••• a 1), with at E 0, and a history of per period t-
contracts, c t - 1= (cO,c1"'C 1) that he himself has previously t-
offered. 
We are now ready to give a slightly more formal description of 
the principal's strategies. At any t = 0, 1 ••• T, contingent upon 
A strategy for the principal is then a sequence of functions g = 
( go, g 1 ••• gT) • 
The agent's strategies are similarly defined. First, let () t = 
e ) be any history of realised types. At each date t, Then, 
t 
contingent upon his information at this point, which may be 
(an option which we denote by CD) or stay in the contract. If he stays 
in he makes an announcement at' once he has observed his current type, 
e • Hence, this announcement will be a function of (at-1,et,c t ) ; i.e. 
t 
a = f (a t - 1 e t c t ) • Bv a slight abuse of notation - because we are 
t t " ~ 
not writing down the participation decision formally - let the 
sequence of f t be f, the agent's strategy. 
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Outcome paths in this game are sequences of income/action pairs 
{xt ' Yt}' One can, in the usual way, construct mappings from 
strategies (f, g) to outcomes. Given the stochastic nature of the 
problem, these mappings are random functions. Finally, payoffs over 
outcomes are discounted sums of expected utilities for each player 
i.e. E I yt·u(x, Yt' 8t ) and t=O t 
unless the agent terminates the contract, in which case he gets u and 
-t 
the principal gets v • Note that y and 6 are the discount factors of 
-t 
the agent and principal. In what follows, we assume 6 = y unless 
something explicitly to the contrary is said, and denote the common 
discount factor by 6. 
The game is technically one of incomplete information, because the 
principal cannot directly observe the past history of types. Hence, it 
is essential to introduce the idea of a probability assessment, m
t
, 
which is a probability measure over all possible histories up to that 
point viz. et - 1 , and represents the principal's probability 
assessment at the beginning of t that a particular history has 
occurred. Where applicable, (i.e. on the equilibrium path) it should 
be consistent with the principal's own information and knowledge of f 
off the equilibrium path it can be arbitrarily defined. 
Given such an assessment, it is now possible to define a sequential 
equilibrium in the Kreps-Wilson (1982) sense for this game. We call 
such an equilibrium simply an equilibrium. 
It is worth pausing at this point to observe that there is no wav 
in which one could hope to characterise the equilibria of the 
contracting game in general. Radner managed to construct one type of 
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equilibrium, an equilibrium in review strategies, only with a good 
deal of ingenious argument and by drawing heavily on the notion of a 
trigger strategy equilibrium in the theory of repeated games. 
Unfortunately, as there are many types of equilibria in repeated games 
with complete information, there will be many types of equilibria in 
this game. However, of particular interest are those equilibria whch 
are efficient in the sense that there exists no other sequential 
equilibrium which gives both players a strictly higher payoff. 
These are interesting not least because as Radner points out, 
his equilibria in review strategies are not efficient, so 
the structure of efficient equilibria is an open question. 
What we argue now is that it is possible to characterise one of 
the efficient equilibria of the contracting game. First, formally 
define a precommitment equilibrium to be a sequential equilibrium of 
the contracting game where the principal can precommit to g at time O. 
The connection between precommitment equilibria and efficient 
equilibria is the following. 
Theorem 1 
If (f*, g*) is a precommitment equilibrium and generates an 
outcome path that is also the outcome path of a (sequential) 
equilibrium, then this outcome path is also the outcome path of an 
efficient sequential equilibrium. 
Proof 
Suppose to the contrary that the outcome path of (f*, g*) is not 
the outcome path of an efficient sequential equilibrium. Then there 
. ** **) hI· 1 exists an equillbrium (f ,g which gives bot payers strlct y more 
* *) than (f ,g • But then as the principal could precommit to the 
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contract implicit in g** and do better than g*, this contradicts the 
definition of (f*, g*). 
Although the proof is simple, this is a result of great importance, 
as it means one can hope to characterise one of the efficient 
equilibria of the contracting game by doing something very much 
simpler - i.e. characterising "the" precommitment equilibrium 3 • 
If one can then demonstrate that the principal, if threatened with 
a credible punishment - such as reversion to the static contract -
would not wish to renage on this contract, then one has, by Theorem 1, 
a contract which is part of sequential equilibrium of the game. 
In the next section, we investigate precommitment equilibria. 
(c) Precommitment Equilibria 
It is useful to start by showing that in any equilibrium of the 
contracting game, neither player will wish to condition their actions 
at each date one t-I. First, the principal cannot condition the 
contract at any date t on et - 1 ; and one would then conjecture that as 
preferences are separable over time and the e are independent, then 
t 
the agent cannot do any better by such conditioning either. }fore 
formally, let Ft+(c t - 1 , et - 1 , a t - 1 ;g) be the set of strategies from t 
onwards for the agent that are best replies to g, conditional upon 
(c t - 1 , et - 1 , a t - 1), then there is an element of Ft+ that is 
independent of et - 1 at every date. This is in fact easily proved in 
the finite-horizon case by backwards induction. 
To make the point, consider a two period exa~ple pictured in 
partial game-tree form below. There are two possible types in the 
first period, and the principal expects the agent to tell the truth. 
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Hence, at the end of the first period, the principal's information 
sets are as shown, and he will offer the same contract in the second 
period contingent upon either node in any given information set. In 
the second period, it is clear that as the game is now one-shot, there 
is a best reply by the agent to either c or c' that does not depend nn 
the particular node in either of the two information sets. 
Figure 2.1.1 
\.-
\ 
/ 
/ 
-' 
This property can be extended to the infinite-horizon case by 
arguing by contradiction, if we suppose that the agent's per period 
payoff is bounded. Suppose to the contrary that given g, there 
was at some date t, continuation stategies ft+ * ft+* such that ft+ 
" h" et - 1 and ft+* ~as strl"ctl\" best was strictly best agalnst g on lstory w _ 
on history et - 1*, other components of the histories being the same. 
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Then, as discounted payoffs go (uniformly, by boundedness of the per 
period payoffs) to zero, there exists a long enough finite horizon 
such that the same is true over this finite horizon, which contradicts 
the earlier result. 
We can therefore restrict ourselves, without loss of generality, to 
stategies where neither principal nor agent condition upon et - I • Note 
that this does not rule out Radner-type review strategies - for 
example, the principal could treat the agent if he were truth-telling, and 
punish him if the average of the at fell too low below the population 
mean. 
While not of great interest in itself, this fact enables us to prove 
the following; 
Theorem 2; The Dynamic Revelation Principle 
Suppose that f* is a best reply to * g of the contracting game. 
(f**, **) ** is a best reply Then there exists a pair g , where f to 
and which yield each player the same payoff, where f** is 
** (ct,et,at - I ) histories. truthtelling i. e. f t = et , all t and on all 
Proof 
Consider the initial equilibrium. One can think of the strategy 
** g 
of the agent at each date as choosing, contingent upon (c t , at-I), a 
permutation function 0 :8 + 0 which may not be the identity function, 
and need not be even one-to-one. 
* * I ** Let c = g (ct-I,at - ). Now construct at each date a new contract c t t t 
* from c
t 
by 
** * ** 
xit = Xo (i)t' Yit * = Yo (i)t' all i, t. 
Then it is easily established that if f* is a best reply to g* 
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contingent on any history observable by the agent, then f** is a best 
** reply to g on any such history. By construction, both pairs of 
strategies yield both players the same payoffs. This completes the 
proof. 
Unfortunately, the revelation principle does not go the other way 
i.e. if (f*,g*) are an equilibrium, it does not follow that g** as 
constructed above is a best response to truthtelling. The reason for 
this is that the initial equilibrium may have the agent behaving in a 
"hostile" way to the principal, and switching to truthtelling may 
create an incentive to the principal to redesign the contract (rather 
than jus t "garble" it, to get more out of the agent. For example, 
consider a one-shot game with two states, and suppose the initial 
"equilibrium" involves the agent picking the worst element for 
the principal from c, the contract, whatever 9. Then it is best for 
the principal to offer a contract (x,y) that is constant across both 
states. Now suppose the agent switches to the truthtelling strategy -
then the principal can do better by not offering the same contract, 
but the first-best. This example is contrived, for neither the first 
nor the second strategy ascribed to the agent can ever be an 
equilibrium strategy for him in the one-shot game - the only 
equilibrium strategy is myopic optimisation against c i.e. choosing 
the best element of c for any realisation of 9. However, we cannot 
rule such strategies out in the repeated game. 
This asymmetry in the revelation principle is important - if 
the argument went the other way as well, we could conclude that 
all sequential equilibria were truth-telling which (as we shall see 
below) would enforce a particular structure on them. 
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We now have a very useful corollary of Theorem 2. 
Corollary 
If there exists a precommitment equilibrium of the contracting game, 
(f*, *) h h ** g ,t en t ere exists another precommitment equilibrium (f , 
g**) where f** . h II' lS trut -te lng. 
This follows immediately frow, Theorem 2, and is extremely useful; it 
means that in analysing the precommitment equilibrium, we can replace 
the standard "best reply correspondence" of the second mover (i.e. 
the agent) on each subgame with a a series of conditions on g (one on 
each subgame (at-I, c t - 1)) which guarantee that truthtelling is a best 
response to g from then on. 
We are not yet home and dry, however, as these conditions are 
potentially very complex; they should ensure that all (possibly very 
complex) sequences of deviations from truthtelling do not pay. The 
following Lemma, proved in the Appendix, tells us that it is 
sufficient to consider "one-shot" deviations, if (i) the time horizon 
is finite, or (ii) the agent has a positive discount factor strictly 
less than 1. Note that by precommitment, we do not have to index the 
subgames by c t - I , as it is not neceesary to specify the behaviour of 
principal or agent in the event that the principal offers the "wrong" 
contract at some date. 
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Lemma 1 
Assume either (i) T < 00, or (ii) T = 00 and 0 < 6 < 1 ,and u(x, y,9) 
is bounded. 
Then truthtelling is a best response to g in all subgames a t - i 
if and only if 
( 6) u(g (a t - i 9) 9) 
t 't' t 
00 
+ E j 
't"=t+l 
> u(g (a t - 1 a) 9) 
t 't' t 
00 
all at * 9t ' and also at each date and contingent upon each 
a t - i , the agent does not wish to choose 00 i.e. leave the contract. 
The constraints (6) are clearly generalisations of the incentive 
constraints in the static problem. The additional term on either side 
reflects the "long run" effect of announcing a type at. As they stand, 
constraints (6) are still very complicated, but they can be 
considerably simplified by defining the following expected discounted 
utility variable; 
00 
(7) w 1(at - 1 a) 
t+ 't 
This is the expected future discounted utility of the agent from 
t+l onwards if he announces a type at at t, conditional upon a historv 
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of announcements at-I and 1f he tells the truth from then on. 
Note that the w
t 
satisfy the recursion relationship 
(8) 
+ 6.wt +2(a
t
-
1 
, a , a 1) 
t t+ 
Notice also that this is the only definitional constraint that the w
t 
must satisfy. Therefore, we can think of the w 1 functions as 
t+ 
chosen by the principal, along with gt at each t subject to (8) 
lagged one period and (6) , and the participation constraints. The 
exact form of the participation constraints depends on whether the 
decision to leave the contract is irreversible or not. Suppose that 
it is for the moment. Then the decsion to stay before observing at 
requires the following ex ante constraint to be satisfied; 
and similarly the ex post constraint is 
(EP) u(gt(a t - 1 , a ), a) + 6.w (at-I, at) ~u , all et • t t t -t 
Finally, the maximand of the principal is of course, 
CD 
E Y 6~-t.v(g~( at )). 
~=t 
Now by the principle of irrelevant information, or Bellman's 
principle of optimality, (see e.g Whittle(1983)) the optimal gt and 
w ] are not directly conditioned upon at-I; they only depend upon 
t+ 
at and the state variable w
t
• Thus, the optimal contract 
(x. ,y ). 1 at any date t must solve the problem 
1t it 1= •• n 
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Vt(wt ) = sup E [v(xit , Yit ) + O,Vt+l(Wit+l )] 
(xit 'Yit ,Wit+l) 
subject to; 
(F) = 
and either 
or 
(EP) u( x. , y. 
lt lt e.) + O.w. +1 1 lt 
if the constraints are irreversible, and 
(EA' ) E u( x. , Yi ,e.» u lt t 1 -t 
or 
(EP') 
) u 
-t 
if the constraints are reversible, and finally 
, all i. 
all i 
Thelast constraint, which we have not met before, embodies the 
consistency requirement that the principal cannot commit himself to 
offer a contract which offers the agent less than his participation 
level of utility in the next period. 
We know that such a valuation function exists if either the time 
horizon is finite or v, the principal's utility is bounded, but we do 
not yet know whether we can replace the sup by the max operator i.e. 
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whether there exists an optimal contract. We defer discussion of this 
question to the next section. 
The dynamic programming formulation makes clear the nature of the 
history dependence in the contract - it works only through the (F) 
constraint, and so the structure of the optimal contract, as already 
remarked, is much simpler than Radner's review contracts. In 
particular, there are no separate punishment phases, and the evolution 
of the whole contract over time is as a series of static contracts 
linked by the state variable w which follows a Markov process. 
t 
Finally, we note that the participation constraints can be 
simplified somewhat in the irreversibility case. First, (F), in 
conjunction with the (a) constraint wt '~Ut in fact implies (EA) at 
time t, so that (EA) can in fact be dropped. Second, if u
e 
'~O then 
(EP) can be replaced by u( X1t ,Y1 t , e1) + w1 t > Ute We shall use 
these simplifications in what follows. 
(d) Existence of the Optimal Contract 
It is quite possible for an optimal contract not to exist, even in 
the finite-horizon case. For example, Manning(1985) has shown that 
when the preferences of both principal and agent are quasi-linear and 
the income transfer y. is unbounded, then no solution exists when the lt 
discount factor of the agent exceeds that of the principal, 
essentially because the principal can borrow an unlimited amount from 
the agent at favourable terms. This situation is not consistent with 
our assumption that u and v are bounded. However, boundedness itself 
is not sufficient to guarantee a solution. Sufficient conditions are; 
(AI) 
(A2) 
c lies in a compact set, C. 
t 
both u and v are continuous in x and y. 
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In addition, we need a condition which says that the u are not so 
-t 
high that the feasible set at any date is empty. Such conditions are 
fairly straightforward but tedious to formulate in the finite-horizon 
case. In the infinite horizon case, where it is necessary to impose 
stationarity on the u t (i.e. u t = u all t), a sufficient condition 
would be for example, that there exists a c in C such that u(x.,v. e ) 
1 ~l i 
> u all i. 
Given these two assumptions, and a non-emptiness condition, it 
is possible to show that a solution exists in both the finite and 
infinite horizon cases. In the finite horizion case, using the 
terminal condition VT+l = 0, it is possible to show by induction and 
the Theorem of the Maximum that each Vt is continuous, and that each 
w must lie in a compact set, and so existence follows immedately. In 
t 
the infinite-horizon case, it is easy to see that the wit+l lie 
in the compact set [u/(1-6), b/(1-6)] where b is an upper bound on u 
which exists by (AI) and CA2), and then one can show that V is 
continuous , and the existence of a solution follows. 
Therfore, (AI) and (A2) are jointly sufficient for existe~ce. 
81 
2.2 Ouasi-Linearity, Participation Constraints, and History-
Independence; a Reconciliation of Some Recent Results. 
In this section, we present and reconcile the results of Manning 
and Roberts on the question of history-dependence. In particular, 
while Manning shows that with quasi-linearity of both principal 
and agent's preferences, the contract is history-independent, 
Roberts presents a labour contracting example with quasi-linear 
preferences, where there is history-dependence. 
Our argument is that Robert's model is only consistent with a 
version of our model where the participation constraints are ex post 
and at least some of them are also reversible. We then show that in 
the context of his example, if they are replaced by irreversible 
constraints, the resulting contract is history-independent. 
This means that Robert's general, "marginal improvement" argument 
estaQlishing history-dependence is not valid unless at least 
some of the participation constraints are reversible, and we 
explain why this is so. Thus, the current literature leaves 
one important question open; is non-linearity in the utility 
of income sufficient for history-dependence? We deal with this 
question in the next section, 2.3. 
We begin by reviewing the result that if the payoffs of both 
principal and agent are linear in income, and the participation 
constraints are of the irreversible type, then the optimal contract 
does not exhibit any history-dependence. By "linear in income", we 
mean that u(x, y, Q) = u(x, Q) + Y and vex, y) = v(x)-y. Given our 
characterisation of the optimal contract in 2.1.(c) above, we know 
that the past history of e only affects the current contract through 
• Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition 
the state variable, wt 
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for history-dependence is that the w 1 be independent of i, for all 
it+ 
i and all t. 
In the case of an ex ante participation constraint, the argument is 
straightforward - with quasi-linearity, the efficient, or first-best, 
contract is incentive-compatible in the static context 3 • Therefore, 
the optimal multiperiod contract will simply be a sequence of static 
contracts. In fact, this is also true if the constraint is ex ante and 
reversible. 
With the ex post participation constraint, of course, the optimal 
static contract is no longer efficient. However, Manning (lQR4) has 
shown for the finite-horizon case that the history-independence 
property still obtains. One advantage of the dynamic programming 
approach developed in Section 2.1(c) is that it allows a very simple 
proof of this result, and indeed its generalisation to the infinite 
horizon case. 
Consider the constituent problem at time t in the infinite horizon 
case. Assuming that the valuation function V(w) is differentiable 
(we prove this in 2.4 below) the first-order conditions for Yit 
and wit+l are , with Quasi-linearity; 
(9) 
and 
-rr i + 'ITi · u + rtJ i 
+ I )i' - I \'i = 0 , all i 
.... J .... J 
1+-J J+-1 
~1' .V'(Wit+l) + 'IT 1·• U + ~1' + ri + L A •• - l ) .. = 0 all i ii-j 1) joti J1 
where u is the multiplier on (F), ),. the multiplier on (IC .. ), ~, 
11 1J 1 
the multiplier on (EP), and r, the multiplier on (N). It follows from 1 
(9) and (In) that if r i = r = 0, V'(Wit+1) = VI(W. 1). Now it is j ]t+ 
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possible to show that V(w) is concave (see Lemma n below) so this 
implies wi 1cw 1. If on the other hand both Cry) constraints t+ jt+ are 
binding, we have again w l=w 1 The final case is where ~ is it+ jt+' i 
binding but rj is not. Then from (9) and (In) v'( Wjt+l) = -1 > 
V'(wit+1) = -(I+r i ), so by concavity of V, wit+l < wit+1' which is a 
contradiction so w =w ft 11 
, it+1- jt+1 a er a • Thus, we have demonstrated, 
conditionally on some facts about V, that we get history-independence 
even with ex post constraints. 
Manning (1985) also examines in some detail the structure of the 
contract in the quasi-linear case, and shows that while it is history 
independent, it is non-stationary, or time-dependent. In particular, 
all per period contracts except the first period's are efficient. 
This is achieved by offering a high enough w or level of expected 
t 
discounted utility to the agent in t = 1, 2 etc. to achieve the 
first-best, and recouping this excess of w over the participation 
t 
level, u, by an income transfer in the first period, period O. (For 
this to be optimal, the principal must discount the future (weakly) 
less than the agent - if the discount factors go the other way, then 
there is no solution.) Therefore, we know that although 
history-independent, long-term contracts with quasi-linearity 
exhibit a front-end loading property reminiscent of Holmstrom's 
although it arises for different reasons. 
Clearly, we must reconcile the history-independence result with 
Roberts (1982) who presents a general argument to show that 
history-dependence pays. The difference is in the specification of 
the participation constraints in the two models. Roberts does not 
have participation constraints explicitly as such, but rather a 
status quo choice of action by the agent, which he may choose for some 
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realisations of 0. 
However, it will be argued here that the example of labour 
contracting Roberts presents in the paper makes it fairly clear that 
the only "participation" constraint consistent with his model is a 
period by period or reversible , one,and this accounts for the 
difference in results - Manning (19~5) has shown that even with 
quasi-linearity, one has history-dependence with period-by-period 
participation constraints. We begin by presenting Roberts example, and 
arguing that it can only be interpreted as a case with period by 
period participation constraints. We then show that if one changes 
the participation constraint in the example to an irreversible one, 
history-dependence is no longer deSirable, and in fact the optimal 
contract takes on the form predicted by Manning (19~5) - the static 
(inefficient) contract in the first period, followed by an efficient 
contract in the second, with an income transfer to the principal in 
the first period recouping the higher payoff he must allow the agent 
in the second, in order to achieve efficiency. 
Roberts example concerns a firm and a worker contracting over 
two periods. The firm observes a random productivity shock A 
(distributed uniformly on the unit interval) which is unobservable to 
the worker. Output is the product of A and labour input. Roberts 
assumes that the labour input can only take on two values 0 and 1 
(unemployed and employed). Given the informational asymmetry the agent 
is consequently the principal. 
Finally, payoffs are linear in income i.e. the worker gets 
W(A) - R·L(o) where w is the wage, R < I, and the firm gets 
A·L(A) - w(A). The ex post constraints require the latter to be at 
85 
least zero in every contingency. Now consider the static contract. 
Now the wage can only be conditioned upon employment - wee) - or 
unemployment - w(u). The ex post constraints require w(u) ) 0 and in 
any optimal contract w(u) = O. Hence, the firm will choose to employ 
the worker only in those states where A ) wee). Consequently, the 
payoff to the worker is (1 - w(I))(w(l) - R) which is maximised by 
wee) = 1 + R > R so the contract is inefficient. 
2 
Roberts considers this one-shot contract situation repeated 
twice, and allows second-period wa~es to depend on employment or 
unemployment in the first period. Again from the ex post constraints, 
second-period transfers in unemployment states will be zero. Hence, 
let wI(u), wl(e) be second period wages in second-period employment 
states, given unemployment and employment respectively in the first 
period. 
Then second period expected profits to the firm will be either 
1 1 
(11) J (s - wI(u))ds 
wI (u) 
or J (s - wI(e))ds 
wl(e) 
depending on which first-period contingency has occurred. 
Now let wo(e), wO(u) be first-period income transfers to the 
worker in employment and unemployment states respectively. Then 
from (11) the marginal first period A above which the firm will employ 
the worker, 60' is determined by 
(12) 
1 
= wo(e) - wo(u) - J (s - wIe))ds 
wI (e) 
1 
+ J (s - wI(u))ds 
wI(u) 
If the participation constraints are of the irreversible type, it 
86 
requi res 
1 
(1') WO(u) + J (s - wI(u)) ds ) 0 
wI (u) 
1 
(14) e - wo(e) + J (s - wI(e))ds ) n ,C) AO' 
wl(e) 
or that the expected (discounted) utility over both periods always be 
non-negative. In fact, (12) and (13) imply (14). 
If on the other hand, the participation constraints are of the 
period-by-period type, they require 
(15) - wO(u) ) 0 
(16) e - wO(e) ) 0 
The problem that Roberts analyses is in fact "mixed"; that is, he 
implicitly assumes (15) and (14) He in fact sets wo(u) = 0, 
which yields the same outcome as (15). To derive the solution in this 
case, note that the maximand, or expected payoff to the worker over 
two periods, is 
(17) (1 - 90)(wo(e) - R) + eo'wO(u) + (1 - 90)(1 - wI(e))(wI(e) - R)) 
+ 90(1 - wl(u)).(wl(u) - R)). 
Maximising this with respect to first and second-period wages, and 
AO , subject to (12), and (15) yields 
(IR) w1(u) = 1 + Ao·R 
1 + AO 
wl(e) = R, wO(u) = 0, wo(e) ( 1 + R. 
2 
As w1(u) ~ wI(e), there is history dependence in the optimal 
contract. It serves to improve first-period efficiency, as one would 
expect; as wI(u) > wl(e), and wO(e) ( (1 + R)/2, from (12) it follows 
that AO is less than (1 + R)/2, its value in the static contract. 
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If one examines the constraints, the cause of history-dependence 
of the solution (IR) with wl(u) t wl(e) becomes more apparent. The 
worker would like to set w1(u) = w1(e) = R, and recoup the surplus 
this gives the firm in the first period, as Manning has shown. By 
choosing wO(e) appropriately, he can do this following an employment 
state, so wl(e) = R; but as wO(u) is effectively constrained to be 
zero he cannot do this following an unemployment state. 
One can confirm that this line of argument is correct by solving 
the problem with the irreversible participation constraint (13) 
replacing (15). Then, as wO(u) can now be freely varied, we find that 
the solution has second-period efficiency in both contingencies i.e. 
wl(u) = wl(e) = R, and in the first period, eO is at the same value as 
in the static contract, viz eO = (1 + R)/2. 
This argument suggests that Roberts general argument in the first 
part of the paper is crucially dependent on the period-by-period 
nature of the participation constraints. 
His argument, in the context of this example, is as follows. 
Suppose the long-term contract consists of static contracts, i.e. with 
wO(e) = w1(e) = wl(e) = (1 + R)/2, wO(u) = O. Then there is a gain to 
first-order from lowering eO of (wO(e) - WO(u) - R), which, calculated 
at the static contract values, is strictly positive. Now, by 
definition, this gain cannot be realised by lowering wo(e), as it is 
already chosen optimally.) However, it ~ be achieved, for example, 
by lowering wl(e) slightly, and as wl(e) is optimally chosen this 
will have zero cost to first order. 
In the case with irreversible participation constraints, however, 
this argument does not conclusively establish the desirability of 
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history-dependence, for the simple reason that this same ~ain can also 
be realised by raising wO(u), the first-period layoff payment from 
zero (this is possible from (13)); in addition, this change will ~ive 
the worker a direct gain to first order of AO' and so is actually a 
preferable method of lowering °0 than introducing history-dependence. 
We can conclude then, that Proposition 2 of Roberts(1982) is limited 
to contracts with period-by-period participation constraints. This 
raises two issues. First, how reasonable is it to formulate 
contracting problems in this way, and second in contracts with 
irreversible participation constraints, what are the (sufficient) 
conditions for history-dependence in the optimal contract? 
It is a major objective of this chapter to deal with the second 
Question, and we discuss this at some length in 2.3. To answer the 
first question, it is helpful to consider the intermediate case 
in between full irreversibility and full reversibility - partial 
irreversibility. That is, the agent, by leaving the contract must pay 
a fixed cost, c, and forfeit some fraction y of expected discounted 
payoffs, these may represent legal costs, cost of strikes, scrapping 
costs etc., which gives rise to the constraints; 
(19) U(X.,y.,A i ) + ~.y .w + c ) U 1 1 i 
Now consider the FOe for wand y with (EP) replaced by (19), it+l it 
retaining the assumption of quasi-linearity of payoffs. One then gets 
after some manipulation; 
(20) VI(W 1) + 1 + ~i.(A-l)/~. = 0, it+ 1 
so that unless ~ = 1 there will be history dependence, in general. 
Therefore, the history-independence is not robust to changes in the 
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participation constraints, which to some extent vindicates Roberts' 
approach. 
To summarise, the results of Manning and Roberts are displayed in 
the following table; 
Both parties 
linear utility 
of income 
At least one party 
non-linear utility 
of income 
irreversible 
EA EP 
I I 
? ? 
reversible 
EA EP 
I D 
D D 
Here, I and n denote that under the stated conditions, the contract is 
history-independent or dependent resectively. Note that it has not 
been established whether non-linear utility is sufficient for 
history-dependence under irreversible constraints, and this is what we 
turn to next. 
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2.3 Non-Linearity as a Sufficient Condition for History-Dependence 
In this section, we show that is if that the utility of income of 
either the principal or agent or both be everywhere non-linear, 
then this sufficient for long-term contracts to exhibit 
history-dependence, if the reservation utilities are low enough. 
In fact, this condition alone is sufficient for the Pareto-frontier 
associated with the long-run contract to lie outside the 
Pareto-frontier associated with a sequence of static contracts -
and this is really the essence of history-dependence. 
The argument that establishes this is a two-stage one. The first 
stage uses Robert's insight that a small degree of history-dependence 
can be introduced into the contract at zero cost, to first order, 
(although in our framework this is done by changing the w. slightly 
1 
from a position where wi=w all i), and can be used to relax the 
incentive-constraints. 
The second step is to exploit this relaxation to make one or both 
of the principal and agent strictly better off, by improving the 
insurance offered by the contract. This can only be done 
if the marginal rate of substitution between incomes in some pair of 
states differs between principal and agent. This condition in turn, 
will hold at the second-best static contract if and only if at least 
one of the parties has a non-linear utility of income. 
To make the point as clearly as pOSSible, we specialise the 
general model to a special case that can be interpreted as modelling a 
risk-sharing contract between firms and workers (see e.g. Grossman and 
Ha r t (I 981) , Azariadis (1983)) and which we call from now 
on the GRA model. Also, we assume two states and two periods, and no 
discounting. The participation constraint is ex ante. 
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We suppose that the payoff to the firm is just profit, f(P,l)-y where 
I is the labour input and w the real wage, with fl > 0, fll (0, 
f lp > 0, and that the payoff to the worker is just u(Yi) -1. We 
assume u is increasing and strictly concave. 
The first-best risk-sharing contract involves a constant real 
wage (i.e. 100% risk-bearing by the firm) and employment strictly 
increasing in Q. As P is only observable by the firm, therefore, this 
constract is not incentive compatible - the firm would always wish to 
announce the highest Q. 
Let the static second-best Pareto-frontier be described by 
V=vs(w), where V is the principal's (here the workers) expected 
payoff, and w is the agent's here the firm's payoff). Then we know 
from 2.1 that the Pareto-frontier for the two-period contract is 
described by 
V(w) = max 
w. ,1. ,yo 
1 1 1 
s.t. (Ie .. ) 
1J 
(F) 
«(Y) 
2 
I '1T.(u(y.) 1 1 i=1 
f(e.,l.) 
1 1 
w. ) u 
1 
- y. + 
1 
- 1 + VS(w.)) 
i 1 
w. ) f(8.,1.) - y. + w 
1 1 1 1 j 
i=I,2 
( 21) 
Recall that the u in the «(Y) constraints is next period's reservation 
level of utility, and also that constraint (EA) can be dropped from 
the problem (under the assumption that w is greater than the agent's 
reservation utility over two periods.) Finally, we note that the 
equality constraint (F) can be replaced by an inequality constraint, 
as the constraint will always bind at the solution to (21). 
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Our argument is now 8S follows. First, and most importantly, we 
show that in the solution to (21) without the Wi) ~ constraints, we 
will have history dependence i.e. wI ~ w2' This shows that the Pareto 
frontier for the entire contract lies above the sum of the static 
Pareto frontiers for the two periods i.e. v(w) > 2vs (w) and is really 
the essence of history dependence. Whether we have history dependence 
in the actual contract depends of course, on whether or not the w ) u 
i 
constraints are violated at the solution to (20) without these 
constraints. It seems likely that if ~ is low enough, they will not 
be violated, and history-dependence will occur. However, this is 
essentially a technical matter and is related to other interternporal 
features of the contract, such as the evolution of wa~es over time and 
so we defer discussion of this to the next section, which is more 
technical. 
Assume then to the contrary that wI = w2 • Then the (1. ,y.) i=1,2 1 1 
that solve (11) is the second-best static contract, and it is easy to 
show that in this case, only the upward constraint, (lC I2 ) is binding 
and also that Y2> YI, so that there is incomplete insurance. By 
raising wI by F/~I and lowering w2 by F/~2 the principal can relax 
this constraint, without affecting the (F) constraint as an inequality 
constraint. Assuming Vs(w) is differentiable (which follows from 
differentiability of f and u) the cost of doing this, to first order, 
is zero. 
Now the principal is in a position to exploit the slight 
relaxation in the incentive constraint, by using the fact that his own 
marginal rate of substitution between YI and Y2 is -~lu'(YI)1 
~2U'(Y2) which is less than -~1/~2' whereas the agent's is exactly 
_~l/~2. The principal can do this by raising yl by (/n l and lowering 
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Y2 by ~/~2 leaving the expected utility of the agent unchanged and 
without violating the upward incentive constraint. This change will, 
to first-order, make the principal better off by an amount 
u'(YI)-u'(Y2) > 0 thus contradicting the hypothesis that w1=w 2 can be 
optimal. 
This argument can be compared to Townshend's (19R2) analysis of a 
pure insurance contract. He argues that introducing history 
dependence (over and above optimal saving) can lead to an improvement 
as the agent can be insured against an income fluctuation in the first 
period. This is similar to what is going on here; however, here it is 
the principal who can be better insured against profit fluctuations by 
introducing history-dependence. Also observe that the argument is 
symmetric; that is, history dependence can also be shown to be 
desirable if the agent has non-linear preferences over income. 
More importantly, exactly the same arguments apply if the 
participation constraint is ex post; again, the principal improve his 
own insurance slightly. This seems quite surprising, as in the ex 
post case, the contract is not a risk-sharing one. What is giong on, 
in fact, is that he is risk-sharing with himself - when WI = w2, he is 
fully insured with respect to the w., but faces considerable income 
1 
risk. As the Wi and Yi can be traded one for one without affecting 
the constraints, there is clearly scope for intertempora1 allocation 
of risk. 
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2.4 A Characterisation of the Optimal Contract 
The "local improvement" argtnnent of the last section suggests that 
in the optimal long-run contract, the upward incentive constraints 
will still be binding, and the choice of the w, will be such as to 
1 
relax these constraints i.e. This is in fact the 
case under certain conditions, but the argument is not entirely 
straightforward, mainly because it requires that V be concave. This 
t 
in turn will be the case if one third cross-derivative of f, f
l18
, is 
non-positive. 
Nevertheless, the main message is that under certain conditions, the 
structure of the static contract largely carries over to the long-run 
contract. This is, of course, also true of the class of problems where 
the downward constraints bind in the static second-best contract 
(i.e. the downward constraints continue to bind in the long-run 
contract, and w.> w. 1), and this can be proved using the arguments of 
1 1-
this section. 
The class of problems we prove results for are those problems where 
by a suitable redefinition of variables, the principal's payoff can 
be written as a linear function of both action and income variables, 
and where the agent's payoff can be written as additively separable 
function of both variables, satisfying certain conditions, viz., 
vex, y) = -(x+y) 
(A3) 
u ( x , y e) = f ( x , 8) + g ( y), wi t h f , f 8' f 8' g :> 0 , 
x x y 
f g < o. 
xx' yy 
Such a specification is in fact consistent with a wide class of 
problems - the main restriction implicit in (A3) is that of additive 
separability. For example, the GRA model of labour contracts presented 
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in 2.3 above can clearly be put into this framework, by defining 1 = 
x, and redefining variables with y = -u(z), and g(y) = -z, so g(y) 
-u-1(-y). (It is easy to check that g is increasing and concave if u 
is.) 
In addition, we will require that the marginal utility of income be 
unbounded, as y approaches its lower bound, (which, by (AI) above, is 
in the consumption set) and which, without loss of generality, we can 
take to be 0; 
(A4) lim u' (y) = +roe 
y-+O 
This is, of course, to ensure an interior solution for all the y. , 
1t 
which simplifies the proofs, although it is not essential. 
We begin by restating the general per-period contracting problem 
faced by the principal which was derived in 2.I(b) above, assuming now 
that (A3) holds. l.J"e consider only the case with ex ante cons t raints, 
but stress that the results obtained in this section apply equally to 
the ex post case. 
max \n.(6.V (w.) - (x
1
·+ Yi » 1 t 1 
(x. ,y. ,w.) 
111 
s. t. 
( Ie. .) f ( x. , e .) + g (Yi ) + w. ~ f (x . , e .) + g (y.) + w
J
' 
1J 1 1 1 J 1 J 
( a) w. ) u 
1 
j1i , 
~ote that for simplicity, we drop the time subscripts on the choice 
variables, but in what follows it is important to remember that w is 
the expected discounted utility that the principal promised the agent 
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in period t onwards, and is therefore not a choice variable of the 
principal, whereas the wi are the expected discounted utilities 
promised to the agent from t+l onwards. 
We can now state the main result of this section; 
Theorem 3 
Suppose that (A3) and (A4) hold, and in addition that f ( O. 
xxe 
Suppose also that (x. y. ,w')'_l solves (P t )· Then 1, 1 1 1- ••• n 
(a) w. 
1 
> w. 1 1+ all i= 1,2 •• n-l; 
(b) x i + i > Xi ' Yi > Yi+1 all i= 1,2 •• n-l with at least one strict 
inequali ty; 
(c) only the upward incentive constraints bind at the solution. 
Parts (b) and (c) state precisely the extent to which the long-run 
contract inherits the features of the static contract. Part (a), by 
contrast, is the main result concerning the direction of 
history-dependence. Unfortunately, for a fixed discount rate, it is 
impossible to give conditions under which any of the inequalities in 
(a) are strict. The reason why one cannot say anything in general is 
that if one of the inequalities were strict, then the principal 
prefers to give the agent some rent from the contract, (i.e. set w. > 
1 
u , some i) even though this is costly to him, because of the benefit 
of being able to meet the incentive constraints at lower cost in terms 
of distortions in the per period contract. One cannot in general say 
anything about the relative magnitudes of these costs and benefits. 
What can be shown (and is shown in 2.6 below) is the discount 
rate is high enough, and w > u , then at least one of these 
inequalities will be strict i.e. there will be history-dependence in 
the infinite-horizon case, so that for 0 high enough, the benefits of 
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history dependence outweigh the costs. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for w > ~, furthermore, is that there be a 'lock-in' effect, 
i.e. that by entering the contract for one period, the agent lowers 
the expected discounted utility of the alternative occupation etc. 
were he to leave. There are many different assumptions, in the 
context of specific models, that would generate this effect. 
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3 , which proceeds by a series 
of Lemmas. 
Lemma 2 
Assume (A3) and (A4) hold. If g is differentiable , V is 
t 
differentiable, and V' = -~, where ~ is the multiplier on (F). 
t 
Proof 
To prove differentiability of Vt ' let Yi(w) be the optimal 
choice of y, at w. Then define, for any h * 0, 
1 
~y,( h, w) _ g-l(g(y ,(w)) + h) - g.(w). 
111
Then l'f ( () y (w) w (w)) is a solution to (p ) at w, then xi w, i ' i i=l ••• n t 
(x.(w), y.(w) + ~y.(h, w) , w.(w)) is feasible at w + h. Therefore, 
111 1 
by revealed preference, 
Dividing (22) through by h and using the fact that 
lim 
h~ 
~g,( h, w) 
1 
h 
= lim 
h~ 
~g,(- h, w+h) 
1 
h 
= 
1 
g '(V,(w)) 
. 1 
(by L'Hopital's rule and the continuity of Yi(w)) we infer that 
98 
1 
• No",' by (At;) the Yi -arways have an interior g'(y
i
(",')) 
1 1 
solution, so that = ~ + Yc ~ij - ~ji)' where ~ ) n 1s j ti 1 j . g'(V
i
) 
the multiplier on (ICij ). 
Substituting in the expression for V~(w) and cancellinr, terms , ..... ( find 
that V'(w) = -~, as required. 
t 
The second step, and a standard one in analysing this kind of 
problem, is to note that the "global" incentive constraints (ICij ) 
jti, can be replaced by the "local" incentive constraints (Ir, 1) 
1,i-
and (IC i ,i+ l ) and an appropriate monotonicity condition. For 
completeness, we give a proof of this result, although similar results 
are available elsewhere (e.g. Hart(1983)). (Because of the 
dimensionality of the problem, with three variables instead of the 
usual two, such a property only holds if the payoff of the agent can 
be written in additively separable form.) 
Lemma 3 
In problem (P
t
) above, (IC, ,) jt i, i =1 •• n hold if and only if 
1J 
(IC i ,i_ l ),(ICi ,1+ 1 ) and xi ) Xi _l i = 1, •• n hold. 
Proof 
(a) We show that if the (IC,.) hold, then x, ) x. 1. For suppose to 
1J 1 1-
the contrary that x < x 1. Then (IC. l'i) implies i i- 1-
But Xi < xi_l and fxe > 0 imply that 
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and (23) and (24) together imply that (IC 1) is violated a i,1- , 
contradiction. 
(b) We show that if the (ICi i+ 1) constraints and the monotonicity , 
conditions hold, then the (IC i i+2) constraints hold. The lemma then , 
follows by repeated application of this argument. 
From (ICi ,i+1) we know that 
Then, as x, 2 ) x, l' and fX9 > 0 , it follows that 
1+ 1+ 
Now from (27) and (26), it follows that 
(28) f(x, 1, 9i ) + g(y,+I) +cS.W'+1 > f(X'--1_' e.) + g(y,+2) +6.w,+2 . 1+ 1 1 1,0/,. 1 1 1 
Finally, from (28) and (25), it follows immediately that (IC .. 2) 
1,1+ 
holds. This completes the proof. 
This means that we can replace the "global" incentive constraints in 
P
t 
with the "local" upward and downward constraints. The next step is 
to show that only the upward incentive constraints are bindin~ at the 
solution to (P
t
) as long as V
t 
is concave. 
Lemma 4 
Suppose V
t 
is concave. Then at the solution to (P t ), if xi > xi_l 
then (IC, , 1) is binding and (ICi ' 1) is slack. 1,1+ ,1-
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Proof 
(a) Suppose to the contrary that (IC 1) is binding and x > x 1. 
n,n- n n-
Then (IC 1 ) must be slack, as both upward and downward n- ,n 
constraints cannot bind when xi > xi_I. We argue that this implies 
that this implies that (IC 1) is binding all k , n. To see this, k, k- , 
suppose by contrast that (IC 1 2) is slack. Then from the FOC for 
n- ,n-
the problem P
t
, we find 
> (~ + ").. 1 / rr ) - 1 = gy ( Yn) 
n,n- n 
(30) f (x 1,9 1) = (~ - (b 1 2").. 2 l+b I."}.. 1)/rr 1)-1 
x n- n- n- ,n- • n- ,n- n-,n n,n- n-
>(~+b I.").. l/ rr )-I=f(x,e) 
n,n- n,n- n x n n 
where 
f (x., 9.)/f (x.,e.) > 0, so from g < 0 and f < 0 it follows 
x 1 J x 1 1 yy xx 
that y 1 < y and x 1 < x Next, 
n- n n- n. 
(31) 
V' (w ) 
t n 
= - ~ + (").. 2 1 + "}.. 1 - C
n
_l) / rr
n
_ 1 
n- ,n- n,n-
= - ~ + (").. 1- 1: )/rr • 
n,n- n n 
It can be shown from that as V
t 
is concave, either both (a) 
constraints are binding, or w 1 < w This implies,as x 2 < x and 
n- n. n- n 
Y 1 < y , that (IC 1 ) is violated, a contradiction. Thus, 
n- n n- ,n 
(IC 1 2) must be binding after all. Hence, repetition of the 
n- ,n-
argument implies that all the downward constraints must be bindi:lg if 
the topmost one is. 
But then an argument similar to the one above implies that xl < x , 
n 
and w ~ w , so that (IC ) is violated. Hence, ~e infer that 
y 1 < Yn' 1 - n 1 n 
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(IC
n 
n- 1) must be slack at the solution. , 
(b) There are now two possibilities; either (IC 1 ) is slac~ at the 
n- ,n 
solution or it is binding • If it is the former, the entire above 
argument is repeated, with n-1 replacing n, to infer that (IC 1 2) 
n- ,n-
must be slack. One can then infer from the FOC that x 1 < x , Yn- 1 < n- n 
y , w 1 ( w , so that (IC 1 ) is violated, a contradiction. Hence 
n n- n n- ,n 
(IC 1 ) must be strictly binding (i.e. y 1 > 0) at the solution. 
n- ,n '~- ,n 
(c) The final step is to show that if (ICi_l i) is strictly binding, 
, 
then (ICi _ 1 i- 2 ) is also strictly binding. The argument is along the , 
lines of part (a) above and is consequently omitted. 
The proof of this Lemma should make it clear that concavity of V
t 
is vital to ensure that the structure of the static problem is 
retained in the dynamic case. Next, we show that concavity of V also 
t 
allows us to establish the relationship between 
solution to (P
t
). 
Lemma 5 
the w. at the 
l 
Suppose that V
t 
is concave. Then at a solution to (P t ), wi ( wi_l 
i = 2 ••• n. 
Proof 
Suppose to the contrary that w. 1 < w. at the solution. Fro~ the 
- l- l 
all 
FOC to (p ) and the concavity of V , a necessary condition for this is 
t t 
that 
- A • 1 i)/n. 1 = Vt'(\>"l·) 1-, 1-
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As Ci _1 ~ 0, from the FOe for Yj and Yi _1 and the concavity of g, we 
infer that Yi _1 < Yi • As x i _1 ~ xi by Lemma 2, , (lei_I'i ) is 
violated, a contradiction. 
In view of these intermediate results, Theorem 3 can now be 
established simply by showing that V is concave if V 1 is (if the 
t t+ 
time-horizon is finite) or if the horizion is infinite, 
showing that the functional operator implicit in P preserves 
t 
concavity of V. This is easy enough to do. the first step is to 
define a less-constrained problem which is P
t 
with the downward 
constraints omitted i.e. simply retaining the monotonicity constraints 
x. ~ xi 1 and the (lei' 1). Let the valuation function for the less 
1 - ,~ 
constrained problem be v~ . 
Then we have the crucial result; 
Lemma 6 
Suppose that (A3) and (A4) hold, and in addition fe' O. Then, 
xx 
in the finite-horizon case, V~ is concave, all t, and in the 
infinite-horizon case, V* is concave. 
Proof 
We only give the proof for the infinite-horizon case; the proof for 
the finite-horizon case is almost identical, except it proceeds by 
induction. Say that a contract is feasible at w if it satisifes all 
the incentive-constraints, and the (F) and (a) constraints, and gives 
the agent at least w in expected utility. Then the lemma will be 
proved if for any w, w', we can find a contract feasible at p.~ 
+(l-p).w' which yields the principal at least p.V*(w) + (l-p).V*(~'), 
under the hypothesis that V* is concave. 
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We will in fact construct such a contract. Let (x , y ,w ) _2 
i j i i- ... n 
I I I 
and (x" Yi,wi )i- 1 be the optimal contracts at wand w' 1 - ••• n 
respectively. 
Now define a new contract as follows; 
(32) 
1/ 
and with the Yi defined implicitly by the condition 
I I I (34) p(f(xi , e,) + g(Yi) + <S.w,) + (l-p).(f(x" e,) + g(y,)+ <S.w,) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
II I,· II 
= (f(xi , ei ) + g(Yi)+ <S.wi ) 
Now from the concavity of f and g and (32) and (33), we can infer that 
p.y, + (l-p).y~ , so that if V* is concave, the entire contract 
1 1 
* will yield a higher payoff to the principal than p.V (w) + 
(l-p).V*(w'). Furthermore, by (34) the new contract yields the agent 
expected utility of precisely p.w + (l-p).w' and by construction 
satisfies the monotonicity and (a) constraints. 
Therefore, the proof will be complete if we can also show that the 
new contract also satisfies the upward incentive constraints 
(ICi ' 1). Let u, , = f(x" ei ) + g(y.) + <S.w,. Then we need to show ,1+ 1J J J J 
that II U •• 
1,1 
) U
ll 
1. Bu t) +.-')~ ( S If-)) i,i+ 
(35) II I, ui,i - ui ,i+1 
I 
= [p(u. i - u .. +l)+(l-P) .(u. , 
1, 1,1 1,1 
+ [p.u, ,+1 + (l-p) .u~ ,+1 
1,1 1,1 
Now the first bracketed term in (35) is non-negative by the 
incentive-compatibility of the original contracts, so we only need to 
show that the second term is non-negative. Now from (34), 
(36) 
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# 
- u 1 1 = i,i+ -
Now from (33) in turn, (36) will be non-negative if for any random 
variable x, the term Ef(x, e) - f(Ex, e) is decreasing in e, or 
equivalently, Efe(x, e) - fe(Ex, e) ( O. But this in turn states that 
fe is a concave function of x, or fxxe ( O. This completes the proof. 
The proof of Theorem 3 now follows directly from Lemmas 2-6 and the 
fact that the valuation function for the less-constrained problem is 
identical to the valuation function for the ordinary problem viz. 
V(w) = V*(w). This last fact follows in turn from the fact that at any 
solution to the less-constrained problem, the downward incentive 
constraints are also satisfied, so the solution to the 
less-constrained problem is feasible in the original problem. 
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2.5 The Intertemporal Structure of the Optimal Contract 
The previous section established, among other things, that the 
within period distortions of the long-term contract mirror those of 
the static contract i.e. there will be too much employment in all 
but the lowest productivity state, 01' and also incomplete 
insurance, with the worker's income being lower in low-productivity 
states. 
While it is certainly of some interest to know the nature of 
within-period inefficiencies of the optimal dynamic contract, it is 
perhaps more important to analyse the time-series behaviour of 
payments, actions, and payoffs in the optimal contract (Holmstrom and 
Hart (lQRS) identify this as a major rationale for investing long-term 
contracts). At a general level, the only result to date is Rogerson's 
(1985) characterisation of the time series behaviour of payments in 
the repeated-principal-agent model with moral hazard: he shows that 
the agent's average payment is either increasing or decreasing over 
time depending on whether the inverse of his marginal utility function 
is concave or convex. We are able to show that exactly the same 
result is true in our model. Furthermore, this is not surprising, it 
is a reflection of the fact that the optimal contract is a savings, as 
well as an insurance contract, and characterises the degree of 
equalisation of the agent's incomes over time, that is consistent with 
incentive-compatibility. Interestingly enough, the Rogerson condition 
is exactly the opposite of the one that would arise if the agent could 
independently save or dissave at a rate of interest equal to the 
discount rate, l/~ - 1. That is, standaed savings condition is 
that the marginal utility of income follows a martingale, whereas 
Rogerson's condition is that the inverse of the marginal utility of 
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income follows a martingale. 
~eca\lse we have characterised the within-period distortion and 
the direction of history-dependence, however, there is much more that 
we can say about the optimal contract. In particular, we can 
establish the signs of the serial correlations of some key variables 
in the contract. Our fundamental result is that the marginal 
utilities of income of the agent are positively correlated over time. 
It is important to note that this result holds true also in the case 
where the downward incentive constraints bind i.e. the case where f 
xA 
< O. Using this basic result, we can show that under certain 
assumptions,this implies wages are positively correlated over time. 
Thus, history dependence generates "persistence" of exogenous 
shocks in the sense that even if the e which represents exogenous 
t 
demand or supply shocks in the GHA model are independently 
distributed, the endogenous variables (e.g. wages) are serially 
correlated. While there are other perhaps more plausible, mechanisms 
which generate persistence, such as inventory accumulation, labour 
adjustment costs, or overlapping contracts, (see Sheffrin (lqR3) or 
Taylor (lQg0)), this work adds another possibility. 
We begin by establishing Rogerson's result on wage payments for 
this model. In the context of our multiperiod model, his result can 
be proved first by showing that the inverse of the marginal utility of 
income of the agent follows a martingale process i.e. 
(37) l/u'(y ) = Erl/u'(y )Iy 1 
t t+l t 
Then the result follows by observing that from ('H) , Yt is greater or 
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less than F(Yt+l) as u' 1s convex or concave respectively. 
We can, in fact, derive (37) under more general conditions than 
those imposed in (A3) and (A4). All that is required is an interior 
solution for the y , for which (A4) is sufficient, and for the 
t 
wt+l. For then the first order conditions for the Yit give 
Dividin~ (3R) through by u'(Yit ) and summing across all i gives 
n 
(3Q) I 
i =1 
'TT" ju'(y ) = 1111 • i itt 
Next, assuming also an interior solution for the wit+ 1 ' we have from 
the first-order conditions, 
But from Lemma 2 , we have that 
so combining (40) and (41) with (39) advanced forward one period, we 
get 
(42) l/u'(Yit ) = 
n 
~ 1T i I u' ( y i t+ 1 ) 
i=1 
which is (37) This completes the argument. 
We now turn to the question of intertemporal correlations. Let 
u be the utility of the agent at time t generated by the optimal 
t 
contract. 
108 
Theorem 4 
Assume that E[U'(Yt)2j <~. Under assrnptions (A3) and (A4) , 
u'(Yt) and u'(Yt_1) are positively correlated. 
Proof 
We already know from Lemma 2 and (3R) and (39) above that if the v 
- i t 
have an interior solution, then 
(43) E[u'(Y )Iw =w] = -1/V' (w) 
t t t 
But as V is concave from lemma 6, we can conclude that the left-hand t 
side is decreasing in w. Now as wand yare both 
t t-1 
monotonically decreasing in 9 1 by Theorem 3, we can conclude t-
that u'(Yt_1) is monotonically increasing in 9
t
-
1
• Therefore, 
is increasing in Q. Then as u'(y ) has finite variance by 
t 
assumption, by the result in Parthasarathy (1977) p 206 we have 
( 45) Eu' t + 
, 
cov( u ,u 1) r 1 t t- • Q - Eu' 
t-1 var(u~ ) 
As the left-hand side of (45) is increasing in Q, we conclude that 
cov(u' , u' 1) ) o. 
t t-
As the sign of the covariance is invariant to linear 
transformations of the variables, we can conclude that if marginal 
utility is proportional to total utility, then total utilities will be 
positively correlated. This will only be the case where utility is 
exponential. Hence, we have the corollary; 
Corollary 
Suppose u(y) is exponential. 
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Then cov(u , u 1) ) o. 
t t-
Now we can apply these results to the GRA model. Recall that when 
we transformed the GRA model into our canonical form, we defined the 
utility of income of the agent to be minus the real wage. Hence, we 
can conclude from the corollary that if the worker's utility is 
exponential, then wages will be positively serially correlated. 
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2.6 Asymtotic Results for Low Discount Rates 
We now turn to discuss the nature of the contract as the discount 
rate goes to zero. Although it is not our major purpose, a by-product 
of this analysis is a sufficient condition for history dependence 
which is easily interpretable without a particular model in mind -
viz. that the discount rate be low enough. Our main purposes, 
however, are two; (i) to attempt an analysis of the asymtotic 
behaviour of the optimal long-run contract and (ii) to show that if 
the discount rate is low enough, the principal will not wish renage 
from the optimal long-run contract - so that this contract is actually 
an equilibrium outcome of the contracting game without 
precornmitment. (Then, from the arguments presented in 2.1 above, it is 
an efficient equilibrium outcome.) 
The argument is in several stages, and in the course of it we prove 
that under certain assumptions, the first-best can be approximately 
attained by a feasible contract if the discount rate is lo~ enough, a 
result similar to Radner's results (Radner (1981), (1985)) although 
the argument is quite different. 
Our starting point is Radner's 1985 paper. There, he shows that 
for a principal-agent problem involving moral hazard, the payoffs from 
any optimal second-best contract actually tend to first-best payoffs 
for both principal and agent as discounting goes to zero. More 
precisely, Radner is able to show that for any given E > 0, there 
exists a contract which pays both parties within E of any point on the 
first-best Pareto frontier which is an equilibrium in the contracting 
game for & high enough. 
As we have already said, Radner characterises this contract as a 
particular kind of equilibrium in the contracting ga~e, where the 
III 
agent is assessed for a certain number of periods, and then his 
cumulative performance (sum of outputs) is reviewed. If it falls 
below a certain level, the agent is punished for a given number of 
periods by a reversion to the second-best static contract, and then 
the assessment starts again. If he passes the review, the assessment 
phase is repeated from scratch. 
Radner calls this an equilibrium in review strategies, but we can 
equally well call the principal's strategy in this equilibrium a 
review contract. 
We can make two observations at this point. The first is that using 
Radner's arguments, it is possible to demonstrate that in our 
asymmetric information model also a review contract can approximately 
attain the first-best as the discount rate goes to zero. This in 
itself is quite remarkable, considering the very different structure 
of the moral hazard and asymmetric information problems, and is 
explained by the fact that Radner avoids having to analyse the optimal 
response of the agent to a review contract. Rather, his method relies 
on finding upper and lower bounds to payoffs of the principal and 
agent from the review contract, and the arguments used to establish 
these bounds are extremely general. 
The second point is that (as we have noted in 2.1, and as Radner 
himself observes) the review contract is not the second-best 
optimal contract at any given discount rate. Hence, although Radner's 
results prove convergence of payoffs to the first-best, we cannot ~2ke 
any inferences from this about the structure of the optimal contract 
itself when 8 is close to 1. 
With our dynamic programming approach, it is possible to improve 
112 
substantially on both these limitations. First, we can provide an 
extremely simple and intuitive argument to show that the secon~-best 
Pareto-frontier converges to the first-best as the discount factor 
tends to unity. Second, we can deduce two important features of the 
limiting contract as 0 ~ 1. First, the sequence of expected discounted 
utilities generated by the contract, (w , v ) , t = 0,1 ••• tend to 
t t 
common limits w, v as 0 + 1, although they may not do so uniformly 
in t. This implies that as the contract in each period, t, only 
depends on past history through w 1, the contract becomes 
t-
"approximately" history independent as 0 goes to 1. It also 
implies that the per period contracts, (x, , y, ), 1 all tend to 
1 t 1 t 1= •• n 
* * the first-best contract (x, , y, ), 1 although again, they 
1 1 1= •• n 
may not do so uniformly in t. 
Third, we can show that for a high enough discount rate, this 
may be contract 
contract I an (efficient) equilibrium An the contracting game without 
precornmitment by the principal. 
We can conclude that at least one efficient contracting equilibriUM 
is not of the "review" type for a high enough discount rate; rather 
than being backward looking (i.e. rewarding the agent on the basis of 
the average of past performances) it is for~ard-looking, in that the 
optimal contract, as 0 ~ 1, exploits the fact that the "cost" in terms 
of the w,' of implementing any per period contract (x" Y1')l' 1 n goes 
1 1 = •• 
to zero as 0 + 1. 
We now turn to the analysis of the model as 6 goes to 1, and begi~ 
with the precommitment case. 
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(a) Convergence of the Pareto Frontier and the Optimal Contract to the 
First-Best 
In this section, of course, we are only concerned with the the 
infinte-horizon case. Let V(w, 6) be the principal's infinite horizon 
valuation function, where we note now the explicit dependence of the 
function upon the discount factor. In order to investigate the 
asyrntotic behaviour of this function, it is necessary to normalise bv 
premultiplying all per period payoffs by (1 - 6). Then it follows 
immediately that V(w, 6) < Vf(w), where Vf(w) is the first-best Pareto 
frontier. 
Next, in order to ensure stationarity of the problem, we need to 
assume that the (a) constraints are stationary. However, to get the 
result, we also need to assume some "lock-in" effect i.e. that in 
each period but the first, the payoff from the alternative 
occupation to the agent is lower than the pre contracting alternative. 
Let u be this alternative payoff to the agent. It seems that to obtain 
the convergence results, we need to assume that the lock-in effect is 
extreme i.e. 
(AS) u = -CD • 
Of course, (AS) is only consistent with certain specifications of 
preferences, such as g being logarithmic. 
Finally, we shall not assume (AI) and (A2), but make the less 
satisfactory assumption that an optimal contract exists. The reason 
for this is to make the following crucial assumption; 
(A6) u , u > 0, and x and yare unbounded above. 
x y 
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The implication of (AS) and (A6) is that the wit+l are defined on the 
whole real line, and this is crucial to what follows. given this, 
however, we can show that lim V(w, 6) = Vf(w). In other words, for 
6-+1 
low enough discount rates, payoffs arbitrarily close to the first best 
can be attained in the optimal contract. 
The argument is simple. Consider a contract which yields the agent w 
in expected utility, and where the actions and income transfers in 
the first period are those of the first-best static contract i.e. 
* * (x., Y.)._l , and in subsequent periods, contingent upon the w., 
1 1 1- ••• n 1 
the contract is the second-best optimal one. We choose for any w,the 
particular first-best contract which gives the agent w i.e. 
* * (46) Eu«x., Y., 9 i ) = w 1 1 
Now, given (AS) and (A6), there are no restrictions on the choice 
of the w., so it is possible to choose the w, to make this contract 
1 1 
incentive-compatible. The argument is exactly the same as the one 
that establishes that with an ex ante constraint, and linearity of the 
agent's payoffs in income, the first-best actions can be made 
incentive-compatible by unrestricted choice of the income variables -
the w, here just play the role of the y,. Also, from (46) and the 
1 1 
fact that the whole contract gives the agent w, it follows that E~, = 
1 
w. 
Now this contract just described satisfies the participation and 
incentive-compatibility constraints. By (AS), it also satisfies the 
(a) costraints (or more accurately, (AS) makes the (a) constraints 
irrelevant) the so that it must be (weakly) dominated by the optimal 
contract i.e. 
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* * ( 47) V (w , 6) > (1- 6) • E v ( xi' Y i) + 6. EV ( wi' 6). 
We can now prove the key result, which says that the cost of making 
the first-best static contract incentive-compatible, V(w, 6) -
EV(~ 6) divided by the normalising factor, (1-6), goes to zero as 6 i ' , 
Lemma 7 
If V(w,6) is continuously differentiable, and the wi are described 
above then for any E > 0 there exists 6° < 1 (possibly depending 
on w) such that 
EV(w., 6) > V(w, 6) - (1-6).E/6 
1 
Note that we know that V is continuously differentiable from Lemma 2 • 
Proof 
First, note that for a fixed w, the variation in the ~. 
1 
* * needed to make (x., y.) incentive-compatible is bounded - in fact, 
1 1 
(48) Iw. - w.\ < B.(1-6)/6 • 
1 J 
Now by the mean value theorem, 
( 49) 
EV(w., 6) - V(w,6) E[V'(w.,6).(w.-w)] 
1 1 1 
= 
(1-6) (1-6) 
where w. is between w. and w, so 
1 1 
EV ( w., 6) - V ( w , 6) 
1 
( 1-6) 
using Ew = w. 
i 
= 1='[(\T'('" 6)-V'(w,6)).(w.-'..')] '-- wi' 1 
(1-6) 
116 
Then using (48) , and the fact that V has continuous derivatives 
(with repect to w) we have for any E > 0 
E[(V'(~., 
1 0) - V'(w, 6)I.R.O-6)/6 
(50) 
> - E.(1-0)/6 
for 0 greater than some 00 , as the w. tend to w as 0 goes to 1. 
1 
It follows immediately from (49) and (50) that 
(51) 
EV(w., 0) - V(w,o) 
1 
( 1-0) 
< E/O for 6 ~ 60 , 
and the lemma follows immediately from (51) • 
Applying Lemma 7 to equation (47) , we find that for 0 ~ 00 , 
* * V(w,o) > Ev(x., y.) - E = Vf(w) - E. We have therefore proved; 
1 1 
Theorem 5 
Assume (A5) and (A6). ~or any E > 0, there exists a 60 < 1 such 
that V(w,o) > Vf(w) - E for all 6 ~ 00 • 
This is analagous to theorems 7.1. and 7.2 of Radner(1985); in fact, 
it is possible to show that the above arguments also apply to Raener's 
model, which is a "moral hazard" one Le. a contracting probleG with 
unobservable actions. We now turn to the behaviour of the optimal 
contract as 0 ~ 1. Recall that w is the expected utility that the 
contract must provide in the first period. Then we have; 
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Theorem 6 
Assume (AS) and (A6). Then as 6 goes to 1; 
(a)w
t 
goes to w, all t. 
(b) the per-period contracts, (xit ' y't),_1 , converge to the 1 l- •• n 
first- best static contract which pays the agent exactly w. 
Proof 
(a) First fix '¥.' • Then w, I::: w, (w ) goes to W itself as 6 goes to 
t 1 t+ 1 t t 
1. To see this, note that all the w, must converge to the saJ:1e limit 1 
as 6 goes to 1. For suppose not. Then as the w, lie in a compact set 
1 
for all 6 - this follows from the boundedness of u and the fact that 
the consumption set is closed - along some subsequence of 6, there 
exists a pair w., w, which tend to different limits w, < W .• Rut 
1 J 1 J 
then for 6 high enough, it follows that incentive constraint (rc . .) 
1J 
will be violated, contradicting the feasibility of the contract. 
Therefore, all the wi tend to a common limit. from the participation 
constraint (EA), this limit must be w itself. 
t 
It now follows immediately that for all possible histories at, wI 
tends to w, w2 tends to wI' and so on, as 6 goes to 1. Therefore, w
t 
tends to w for all t, although it may not do so uniformly in t. This 
proves part (a). 
(b) Suppose without loss of generality that the optimal contract at 
each dae is unique. By the stationarity of the problem, the opti~al 
contract at t (x y). I is a stationary function of ~ 
, it' it 1= ••• n t. 
Furthermore, it is a continuous function, by the Theorem of th~ 
Haximum. Hence, as all the W tend to a common limit, so do all the 
t 
per period contracts (x, , y. )i 1 • By Theorem S, this liIT.i ting 
1t 1t = ••• n 
contract must be a first-best contract that pays the agent an expected 
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utility of w. This completes the proof. 
(b) Renaging by the Principal when the Discount Rate is Lo~ 
We show here that if the discount rate is low enough, the optimal 
contract may be (part of) an equilibrium outcome in the contracting 
game without precommitment. By the results in 2.1, then, it must be 
an efficient equilibrium outcome, and hence the question raised by 
Radner concerning the nature of efficient contracting equilibria has 
been partially answered. 
It is very simple to show this. Consider a strategy for the 
principal where in the event of any deviation from the prescribed 
contract by himself, the principal plays the optimal static contract 
from then on, and where the agent optimises against the principal's 
strategy at all times and in all contingencies. This will be and 
equyilibrium in the contracting game without precommitment if and 
only if (a) the contract is optimal i.e. solves the dynamic 
programming problem in 2.1.(b) and (b) the principal does not wish to 
renage at any date. Given that the agent is himself always optimising, 
the best the principal can get from the latter course of action is 
VS(u). Then the no-renaging condition simply requires that 
(52) V(w. +1, 6) ) Vs (u), all t, all i • 
lt 
Now if all the w 1 are bounded above by B, it follows immediately 
it+ 
from (AS) and Theorem 5 that if Vf(B) > VS(-oo) there exists a 6° 
such that (52) will be satisfied for all 6 ) 6°. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear that Vf(B) > VS(-oo) can be satisfied 
under the same assumptions as those which make the preceeding analysis 
valid - in particular, (A6). 
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2.7 The Role of Terminations as an Incentive Device 
In the real world, it is common enough to see the threat of 
termination of a contract used as an incentive device, for example, in 
the labour market. Although fires constitute a small proportion of 
total job separations (Johnson and Layard (1984)), it is well known 
that this understates the number of separations that take place 
because of unsatisfactory performance. This is for two reasons; 
first, many workers quit because they anticipate being fired, and the 
latter would do more damage to their work record - it is notoriously 
difficult to separate fires and quits. Second, in the event of 
redundancies, employers have some discretion in deciding which workers 
to make redundant, even if most adhere to the "last-in, first-out" 
principle, in general terms, (see Oswald and Turnbull (1985)), and 
will use this discretion to lose unsatisfactory workers. 
Recently several papers (e.g. Malcolmson (1981), Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (198~), McLeod and Malcolmson (1985)) have attempted to model 
the connection between the role of involuntary terminations, or fires, 
as an incentive device, and involuntary unemployment. At the heart of 
the first two papers is a moral hazard problem where worker effort is 
unobservable. These papers suppose that firms offer "boundedly 
rational" or simple contracts, as an attempt to deal with this 
problem. 
They are simple in that wage payments cannot be contingent upon 
output; the only incentive device to induce effort is a probability of 
job termination (or more precisely, a decision to terminate if the 
worker's effort is found to be low in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model). 
Termination can only be effective if firms do not fullv insure their 
workers against fires; in fact, Shapiro and Stiglitz show that in 
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equilibrium these firms will offer no unemployment insurance. Thus, 
in equilibrium, unemployment must be involuntary. 
While the advantage of this work is that it provides a tt,eory 
of truly involuntary unemployment, it clearly rests on the 
"assumption" of simple nature of the contracts. This assumption will 
be critical if in more complicated unrestricted contracts, termination 
is not necessary as an incentive device. What we do in this section 
is show that in the context of our model, termination is of no use as 
an incentive device unless the contract is extremely restricted. In 
fact, we show that even if the per period contracts (xit ' Yit) 
i=l ••• n are restricted to be history-independent, so that the only 
possible intertemporal linkages in the contract are through 
probabilities of terminations being contingent upon last period's 
announcements, the optimal contract will not make use of these - the 
optimal contract will have all termination probabilities equal to 
zero. 
In fact, the only time when termination is a useful instrument is 
when income-transfers between principal and agent cannot be made 
contingent upon announcements, which is analogous to the 
Malcolmson-Shapiro-Stiglitz assumption that wages cannot be based on 
output/performance. This suggests that a flat wage schedule is really 
a very strong assumption. 
The second possible role for terminations is in the case where 
the principal cannot precommit to the contract. (This is the case 
considered by Radner (1985)). Here, it is on the face of it possible 
that certain long-term contracts can be sustained by the threat of 
principal (or agent) terminating if the principal rena~es on a per 
121 
period contract. What we show here is that this threat is only useful 
if the principal and agent must make the termination decision 
independently of one another i.e. move simultaneously, or if the agp~t 
decides to terminate first in any period. ~either of these correspond 
to the natural sequence of decision-making in our model, where the 
principal is first mover, as explained below. 
We begin with analysing the role of terminations in restricted 
contracts and for simplicity we work with the two period contracting 
problem presented in 2.3. Let Pi be the probability that the contract 
is not terminated in the second period, following an announcement that 
the agent is of type i in the preceding period, and let v be the 
payoff to the principal from the alternative occupation in the 
second period. With this additional instrument the two-period labour 
contracting problem becomes 
n 
max 
wi'~i' Yi,Pi 
I 
i=l 
TI.(u(y.) - 1.+ 
1 1 1 
P .• v S(w.) + (l-P.).v) 
1 1 1 -
s.t. fee. 1.) - y. + P.(w.-u)~ f(e.,l,) - y. + p.(u.-u) 
1 1 1 1 l-- 1 J 1 J J-
and 
n j ~irf(e. ,1.) - y. + p .• w. + (l-p.)u] > w 
- 1 1 1 1 1 l- -
i=l 
w. ) u 
1 
The first order conditions with respect to the y. and P. are, 
1 1 
assuming an interior solution for the y., 
1 
- A. 1 . + 'It •• 1-1) 
l- ,1 1 
o 
with complementary slackness for Pi in (54). Substituting (53) in 
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(54) we find that it becomes 
If there is any surplus to be had in the contract in the second period 
i.e. VS(u) > v, we know that at least one of VS(wi)-v and wi-u is 
strictly positive, and u'(Yi) is always strictly positive so (55) will 
also be strictly positive, implying p.=l, all i, or in other 
1 
words, there are no terminations in the optimal contract. Note that 
as the above argument does not rely on the first-order conditions for 
the w.; it also applies to the case when the contract is constrained 
1 
to be history-dependent, i.e. w.=w. all i, j. 
1 J 
(In this case, of 
course, the principal will set w. = u, all i). This establishes the 
1 -
claim that terminations are redundant as an incentive device, even if 
contracts are restricted to be short-term. 
The picture is different if income transfers also cannot be 
contingent upon announcements. Then if VS(w) - v is sufficiently 
small and w - u is positive, then by varying the p., the principal 
1 
can at minimal cost to himself, introduce self-selection into the 
contract. To ensure w> u, however, in the optimal contract, requires 
that the principal discount the future more than the agent, and some 
condition like this may be sufficient to prove formally that 
terminations i.e., Pi<l are used in the optimal contract where ~'i=w, 
We now turn to the use of terminations as a device to prevent 
renaging by the principal. The kind of renaging we are interested in 
is where the principal renages on an agreement to give the worker 
wit+1 
in the next period, but tries to reduce the agent's surplus. 
assume that the principal is trustworthy within the time period i.e. 
We 
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if he offers (xit ' Yit) i=l ••• n he can be relied upon to stick to the 
payments Yit at t. 
The issue is straightforward enough in broad terms; the principal 
will not wish to renage on the current contract (x , y )i=l .•• n if 
it it 
and only if the gains from doing so do not outweigh the punishment 
that ensues. Of particular interest are the worst punishments that 
can credibly be imposed on the principal, or what Abreu (1982) calls 
optimal punishments which are simply the (sequential) equilibria of 
the contracting game which yield the principal the lowest payoff. 
We shall not attempt to derive optimal punishments in our model, 
but merely show that optimal punishments do not involve terminations 
of the contract be either party. This raises the question of what the 
optimal punishment payoffs for the principal are - we argue, rather in 
formally, that they are the payoffs from the short-term contract, 
Consider first the timing of moves by the two parties in a 
typical time period when the principal cannot precommit to an entire 
contract in advance. First, the principal offers a contract (x. , 1t 
Y W ) 1·-1 n The worker decides whether to accept or it' i,t+l - ••• • 
reject it, (possibly before or after having observed 9f ). Then if he 
accepts, he makes a type announcement. 
We have not yet specified at what point the principal makes his 
termination decision, because if he can precommit, he will never wish 
to use it, as we have just shown. However, the only sensible ti~ing 
is if he decides to terminate prior to the agent, so that the 
sequence of events is as follows; 
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Figure 2.7.1 +-e.-nvt i V\O. +-e 
/ 
otfy (ont-yt.<.(t - a.\~nt-
\ 6.11 Y'O RrlCL -t 1f€.-
Because the principal is a Stackleberg leader, the threat of 
termination cannot credibly be used against him. For example, suppose 
the agent threatens to terminate the contract if the principal renages 
on a promise to offer a contract at t that gives the agent w > u. 
Would the agent actually carry this out? The answer is not, because 
the most he can get from this strategy is u, whereas if the principal 
renages by offering a contract that yields him strictly more than u in 
the current period, then he can always do better by accepting it, no 
matter what happens to him for not carrying out his own pubishment 
threat in t+1, t+2, and so on. 
This problem would of course, not arise if principal anc agent 
made the termination decision simultaneously - then termination is a 
credible threat, as termination decisions are mutual best responses, 
or in Nash equilibrium, on any game histories where tervination has 
not yet taken place (see McLeod and Malcolmson (1985)) - or indeed if 
the agent made the termination decision first in each period. 
The question remains as to what is the worst punishment that can 
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credibly be inflicted on the principal in the absence of ter~ination. 
(We have already discussed Nash punishments in 2.~(b)). In the 
complete information version of this game, i.e. where e is 
t 
observable by both parties; we know from the results of Fudenberg and 
Maskin (1983) that the principal can "near ly" be driven down to hi s 
security level, if the discount factor is high enough. His security 
level attained by the agent choosing the worst (for the principal) of 
the (x., y.) pairs in the static contracts, so the principal's 
1 1 
security level is in fact 
v. = max v(x,y) 
mln 
x,y 
s.t. either Eu(x, y, e.).:> u 
1 ~ 
depending on whether the participation constraint is either ex ante 
or ex post. The punishment which achieves the principal's security 
level is however, (a) not a best response to any possible contract 
offer (b) only yields the agent u. This raises difficulties. First, 
(a) implies that the agent will have an incentive to deviate from the 
punishment; these deviations can be detected to any degree of accuracy 
over a long enough time period, but once detected, the agent can only 
be "punished" by having u imposed upon him, which was what he was 
getting anyway. The conclusion seems to be that v. cannot be 
mln 
credibly imposed on the principal, but whether a punishment 
arbitrarily close to v. can be so imposed is an open questio~. 
mln 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter we have attempted a fairly thoroughgoing analysis 
of the nature of long-term contracts, with the exception that we have 
not made a systematic attempt to isolate the savings element of the 
contract from the risk-sharing element. This is important because one 
of the main conceptual issues in long-term contracts is whether there 
is history-dependence in the long-term contract over and above that 
implied by the savings component. 
There are two ways in which savings could be introduced explicitly. 
The first is to suppose that in each period, the principal offers a 
level of savings - at a given rate of interest - to the agent as part 
of the contract. The second is to suppose that the principal chooses 
the contract as above, subject to the condition that the agent is 
saving optimally with a third party. The first approach seems most 
appropriate for analysing the history-dependence question, as at 
allows a decomposition of the contract into a savings part and a 
within period transfer. This is the approach taken by }1alcolmson and 
Spinnewyn(1985), who show for the case of contracting with hidden 
actions, there is no residual history dependence over and above that 
implied by the savings part. 
It is an obvious topic for future research to see whether this 
result extends to hidden information problems of the type studied 
here· in view of Townshend's result that the optimal contract is not a , 
savings contract, it seems likely that it does not. 
In addition, it is possible to show that with savings contracts, 
the kind of history dependence studied by Roberts(1982) does 
not disappear even with quasi-linearity. The reason for this is as 
follows. The source of history dependence is equation (15) - comparin~ 
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it with equation (14), we see that the problem is that 
second-period profit cannot be transferred into the first period. 
This could of course be achieved by a zero interest rate savings 
contract which allowed, contingent upon unemployment, the agent to 
dissave by an amount JI (e - wl(u))de = k. 
wl(u) 
But then the agent would, in a period 1 unemployment state, have a 
payoff of -k < 0 i.e. would have to repay the loan, and so would 
prefer to leave the contract. In fact,one can show that allowing for a 
savings instrument in the contract changes nothing - the 
optimal contract is still as ddescribed in 2.2. Hence, the 
Malcomson-Spinnewyn arguments do not apply to this sort of history 
dependence. 
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3 Search Equilibrium with ex ante Heterogeneity: Efficiency and 
Screening via Employment Histories 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the consequences of differences in 
skills between workers (or the productivities of firms), both 
observable and unobservable to the other side of the market, for 
labour markets where search for trading opportunities is costly. 
Our major aims are two first, to demonstrate that the presence of 
such ex ante differences, search equilibrium displays a kind of 
inefficiency which has not been noted in the literature before. 
Furthermore, the direction of this inefficiency is unambiguous - in 
equilibrium, both output and employment, are lower than is socially 
optimal. Our second aim is to analyse the nature of equilibrium 
in the case where worker skills are unobservable by prospective 
employers. In particular, we show that equilibrium in this case must 
often be characterised by informational externalities, in that certain 
elements of an individual worker's employment history, (e.g. duration 
of last spell of employment or unemployment, number of different 
jobs), convey valuable information about individual worker's skills. 
In this case, we show that, in equilibrium, firms may want to make 
their hiring decisions contingent upon these employment histories 
(e.g. reject applicants who have had too many jobs, or who have been 
unemployed too long). 
There is some direct evidence that such hiring policies are pursued, 
and it is certainly a widely held belief among the unemployed that 
such practices are in operation (see the discussion in 3.3. below). 
Also, there is some statistical evidence consistent with such 
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policies, especially for the duration of unemployment, where it is 
very clear that at an aggregate level, re-employment probabilities 
decine with the duration of unemployment. However, there are a number 
of competing explanations for this latter phenomenon, and so we defer 
detailed discussion of the evidence to a separate section. 
The models presented to discuss these issues are of the 
stochastic search, or matching type, pioneered in economics by 
Mortensen, and since much developed by Diamond and Pissarides, among 
others. This type of search model is not the only one available, but 
seems much superior to the alternatives, both because it provides 
a coherent and well-understood framework in which to discuss questions 
of efficiency, and because it arguably provides a better description 
of the kind of search behaviour that actually goes on, at least in 
unskilled labour markets, than other available models. 
We begin with a more detailed discussion of the relative merits of 
the various types of search models in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we 
survey the Mortensen-Diamond-Pissarides (MDP) model, and also the 
results on the inefficiency of equilibrium obtained by these authors 
and others. The ex ante heterogeneity model with symmetric information 
is presented in 3.3 and the basic inefficiency result in 3.4. In 
Section 3.5 we discuss evidence suggesting that screening via 
employment histories may be common. Equilibrium concepts for the 
model with asymmetric information are presented in 3.6, and pool\ng 
and separating equilibria are analysed in Sections 3.7 - 3.10. In 
3.11 we attempt to reconcile the predictions of the model with the 
evidence, and we conclude by discussing possible shortcomings and 
extensions of the analysis. 
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3.1 Sampling vs. Matching Models of Search Equilibrium 
There is a vast and diverse literature on equilibrium in markets 
that are not "frictionless". Even the notion of "friction" is not 
unambiguous. It can mean either that information about agents on the 
other side of the market can only be acquired at some cost, either in 
money or time, or that the action of pairing, or matching, with a 
particular agent on the other side of the market is itself costly, in 
the sense that if the match is rejected, it takes time or money to 
consummate another match. Any information that is then exchanged is 
between matched partners. These two kinds of friction are not 
identical; in the former, information flows are independent of the 
process by which e.g. buyer and seller are eventually paired, whereas 
in the latter they are inherently constrained by the matching 
process - any information exchanges take place between matched 
partners. 
Consider for example, the Salop-Stiglitz (1977) model of bargains 
and ripoffs. Here, consumers simply choose whether or not to become 
informed of the location of low-price shops at a cost, (e.g. by 
buying a local newspaper)and then go to such a shope e.g. by choosing 
a shop at random). Hence, the information is obtained before (and 
independently of) the match being made. 
On the other hand, models such as Diamond (1982) or Pissarides 
(1984) have firms and workers, (or sellers and buyers) first being 
stochastically matched, and then if the match is accepted the wage 
(price) being determined as a function of the productivity or value of 
the match. The probability that a match takes place over a unit time 
period may be either exogenous or under the control of the agent. 
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Now from the point of view of the agent, a match is a sample from 
the equilibrium distribution of wages and prices. However, his 
sampling problem differs from the standard one (as exposited for 
example, in Morgan and Manning(1985)), as the agent (e.g. the worker) 
cannot choose the number of firms to sample in any given time period -
he is effectively constrained to follow a sequential search strategy. 
(This is inherent in the assumption that matches follow a Poisson 
process, and time periods are very short, so that the probability of 
several matches in a unit time period is negligible.) 
Hence, in sharp contrast to the Salop-Stiglitz type of model, 
sampling and matching are constrained to be identical acts. 
One important consequence of this is that if the sample/match is 
rejected, the whole process starts again, so that this type of model 
is inherently dynamic, (although assuming stationarity makes it 
analytically quite tractable). This is an additional difference from 
Salop/Stiglitz type models, and in fact points to an inconsistency in 
the latter - although their consumers follow a fixed-sample-size 
search rule, this is not the optimal rule under their assumptions: 
as Reinganum(1979) points out, the optimal rule is seqential 
sampling. But then an explicit time-scale must be introduced into the 
model. 
It is convenient then , and not too unreasonable, to call models 
such as the Salop-Stiglitz one sampling models, where the timing of 
events is 
buyers - acquire information 
sellers - set price 
> match 
By contrast, it is natural to call models of the other kind 
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matching models, where the sequence of events is 
buyer 
seller 
> 
accept - set price 
matched - exchange information < 
reject 
Models where the matching process is not stochastic, but where agents 
sample sequentially, such as Reinganum's model, occupy an intermediate 
position in this schema. For example, in her model, sellers set price 
before being matched. 
One important implication of the differing structure of the two 
models is that the price and wage setting rules must often differ. In 
the matching model, matched partners are in a situation of bilateral 
monopoly, so that unless binding price or wage contracts can be 
signed, the price or wage must be determined by bilateral bargaining 
(for an explicit model of such a process, see Rubenstein and 
Wolinsky(1985». If one side or the other had the ability to set 
prices in advance (as is commonly assumed in sampling models), this 
would make little difference, as this agent could not use the 
price/wage to affect the flow of matches that he encounters - all that 
would happen is that he could appropriate all the surplus from the 
match. By contrast, the trade-off between price set and the flow of 
customers is fundamental to sampling models - this trade-off will 
depend on the distribution of search costs in the population, and 
depending on this distibution, various equilibrium price 
configurations can arise (single-price equilibria, price-dispersion, 
etc) as Braverman(1980) shows. 
As well as differing in these essentials, these models differ in 
the emphasis they place on various different features. For example, 
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sampling models stress how equilibrium differs with different 
assumptions about buyer sampling behaviour (e.g. Burdett and Judd, 
(1983)) whereas in the matching model, agents are compelled to 
"sample" sequentially. 
For our purposes, the choice made here between matching and 
sampling models is on both grounds of realism, and analytical 
richness and tractability. 
On the first, the choice between them depends largely on what 
control workers actually have over the search process. Sinfield (1981) 
argues that this differs considerably between skilled and unskilled 
workers. The former are more in demand, and so skilled jobs are much 
more frequently advertised; in addition to which, as Sinfield says; 
"there are certain known places to look for notification of jobs 
besides the job shop and an efficient job seeker who inteds to stay 
within a certian range of jobs may save himself the tedious and 
depressing trudge from factory to factory that generally still has to 
be made by those without a skill." This suggests that skilled wokers 
have considerable control over the sampling process - in particular, 
they may be easily able to vary the intensity of search. By contrast, 
Sinfield arues that for the unskilled, job search is highly random; 
vacancies are rarely advertised, and they rely to a great extent on 
word of mouth and the reccommendation of friends and relatives. 
Hence, one could argue that the MDP model is more applicable to 
unskilled rather than skilled labour markets. 
On the second, the matching model is vastly preferable. It has 
been developed, principally by Mortensen, Diamond and Pissarides, to 
the point where there is a single commonly accepted, plausible, and 
easily understood notion of equilibrium. In addition, it has been 
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shown that the equilibrium is inefficient on several important margins 
of decision-making, worker mobility, search intensity, and job 
acceptance, and the reasons for this inefficiency are well understood 
(see especially Pissarides (1983». In addition, it is also on the wav 
to becoming an alternative "microfoundations" which can account for 
some macroeconomic phenomena which are beyond the market-clearing or 
fixed-price approaches (see especially Pissarides(1985». By contrast, 
there are few common themes in the sampling model literature, and even 
conditions under which wage (or price) dispersion occurs are not fully 
understood. 
For these reasons, we choose to work with the MDP model in 
examining issues raised by transferable (and possibly unobservable) 
skills. While it is probably possible to construct a sampling type 
model where unemployment histories convey useful information, it 
would no doubt be extremely difficult. 
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3.2 A survey of the literature 
The various inefficiencies that can arise in the MDP model have 
been intensively investigated over the past few years. The current 
state of knowledge is thoroughly exposited and surveyed by Pissarides 
(1983). It seems that there is no version of the model where firms or 
workers have inherently different skills or productivities which 
they bring to a match, although one version of the MDP model allows 
the productivity of the matches to be stochastic, or ex post 
heterogeneity. Similarly, there is no analysis of the implications of 
asymmetric information about match productivities - although Jovanovic 
(1979), (1984) has analysed the case where both firm and worker have 
common, but incomplete, information about match productivities, and 
learn about these by observing the cumulative flow of output over 
time. This yields some interesting predictions about the relationship 
of wages and separation probabilities to job tenure. In particular, 
he is able to show that job separation hazard rates (the conditional 
probabilities of moving from one job to another or from a job to 
unemployment), depend on the length of job tenure as a result of 
optimising behaviour on the part of workers and firms. Furthermore, 
they do so in a way that is consistent with the empirical evidence, 
first rising and then declining (e.g. Jovanovic (1979), p. 981). 
Therefore, Jovanovic's work is quite close in spirit to my 
attempt to model duration dependence, although our approaches differ 
substantively both in the assumptions made and in the issues 
addressed. 
I conclude this section by describing the inefficiencies arising 
in the MDP model in some detail, in order to set the stage for my 
inefficiency results with ex ante heterogeneity. 
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To do this, I begin by sketching a few features of the MDP model. 
Suppose that the labour market is composed of L workers and J firms , 
which are identified with jobs. U of these workers are unemployed 
and V of these jobs are vacant. The number of matches per unit time 
period is x(u, v) with ox/au, ox/Ov > 0 (and u = U/L, v = \'/L ). When 
a firm and worker are matched, they must decide to accept or reject 
the match. If the productivity of the match is stochastic, this is a 
non-trivial decision - both parties must decide on a reservation 
productivity, below which a match is rejected. If, on the other 
hand, all matches have the same productivity, all matches will be 
accepted in equilibrium. The wage is then set to share out the 
surplus from the match in proportion to the bargaining strengths of 
the two parties. 
Apart from the choice of the reservation productivity, there are 
two other margins of decision-making in the model which may give rise 
to inefficiencies - mobility, (or freedom of entry and exit of firms 
and workers) and choice of search intensity (advertising) by workers 
(firms). 
What Pissarides shows is that in successive versions of the model 
where only one of these three margins of decision-making is operative, 
the equilibrium will be inefficient, although the direction of the 
inefficiency - i.e. whether output and employment are too high or too 
low - is ambiguous, unless additional assumptions are introduced. 
In the case of mobility, for example, by entering the market both 
firms and workers incur costs (i.e. the cost of opening up a vacancy 
for firms the cost of returns from alternative activities for , 
workers) and obtain the potential benefit of a flo~ of output from a 
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match, and in addition raise the numbers of job matchings by ox/~v 
and ox/ou respectively. 
To put it another way, a small increase in v will increase the 
matching probabilities of workers x/u slightly, and reduce the 
matching probabilities of other firms x/v. A small increase in u will 
have the opposite effect. Therefore, the direction of the externality 
- whether it leads to under- or over-employment - is not clear. 
Furthermore, calculation of the marginal external impacts is 
complicated by the frictional nature of the market; agents 
do not simply equate flow costs and benefits (typically, the costs and 
benefits are discounted by different factors, as in Pissarides (1983) 
equations 5 and 9), whereas in determining socially efficient levels 
of the labour force, unemployment, and vacancies, flow costs and 
benefits are simply added together (c.f. Pissarides (1983) equation 
25) • 
For these reasons, it can be shown that the inefficiency centres 
round the relationship between the marginal impacts ox/ou, ox/ov and 
the firm and worker matching probabilities, x/v, x/u. In fact for 
ox ox 
efficiency, ov = (1-~) x/v, ou = ~.x/u is required. At best, with 
free entry and exit for one side of the market, these conditions can 
only hold by accident; at worst, with free entry for both sides, they 
are incompatible with equilibrium, as a necessary condition for them 
to hold is that x(u,v) exhibit constant returns to scale, and the 
latter leads to non-existence of equilibrium (Pissarides, Ope cit p. 
16) • 
A very similar kind of inefficiency arises when match 
productivities are stochastic. A decision to break up a match 
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nx + nx 
increases the number of matches in the economy by au ?Iv, an effect 
which is external to the matched parties. Efficiency requires B.x/u + 
(l-~).x/v = ox/oLl + OX/ av, a less stringent requirement than for the 
mobility case. The only case where it will be satisfied (except by 
accident) is where x(u,v) has constant returns to scale and u = v. In 
this case, x/u and x/v are independent of small changes in u or v so 
match break-ups can have no external effects. 
Finally, decisions about search and advertising may also lead to 
inefficiencies for much the same reason; for example, increaSing search 
intensity may decrease other workers' matching probabilities, and 
raise those of all firms, effects which are not internalised. 
More recently, McKenna (1985) has presented a model which 
essentially extends the Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1983) analysis 
of mobility to allow for mobility costs that differ between 
individuals; as one would expect, the inefficiency results are very 
similar. McKenna calls these costs search costs which seems a little 
misleading; as they are presented, they are not the flow costs of 
search, but the discounted present value of these search costs. This 
DPV then is the "fee" a potential entrant must pay to make a once and 
for all entry into the labour force. 
What is common to all these external effects is that they work 
through the matching probabilities; all the decisions have marginal 
impacts on these probabilities that are not internalised. This is an 
important point to note, as the inefficiencies that arise as a 
consequence of ex ante heterogeneity arise in an entirely 
different way. 
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3.3 A MDP Model with Transferable Skills 
It has been argued in ~.2 that a major limitation of the matching 
type of search model is that the implications of ex ante heterogeneity 
have not been explored. In this section we present a simple MDP type 
model where workers have transferable skills, and derive socially 
optimal rules for match formation. The model is in fact a 
generalisation of the one set out in Pissarides (1984), and so allows 
for total match productivity to be composed of the sum of a 
match-specific component, 9, and the transferable ability of skill of 
the worker, a., where i indexes the worker's type. 
1 
We allow a match-specific component for two reasons; first, it 
enables us to compare our results with the literature on matching with 
ex post heterogeneity, especially Pissarides(1984), and second, it 
provides a certain amount of "noise" in the model, which mitigates a 
"discouraged worker" effect which arises if 9 is constant. 
We now set out the model formally. 
The Model 
The economy is composed of workers and jobs. Firms are identified 
with jobs. There are L workers who are independently drawn from a 
discrete distribution of abilities a1, •• a , a. > 0, with probabilities 
n 1 
n1 ••• n , and J identical jobs. A worker of ability a. when matched n 1 
with a job can produce y = &+a.. Both 9 and a. are common knowledge. 
1 1 
The mat,ch specific productivity element, 9, is distributed 
continuously on [0,00) with density function f(9). Thus output to 
depend both on a match-specific component, 9, and the transferable 
skill of the worker a and is the distinctive feature of our , , 
analysis. 
Jobs and workers are brought together by a matching technology 
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in which the number of matches ina given uni t time period, X( l', V) is 
a function of unemployment and vacancy numbers. We follow the rest of 
the literature in not trying to model the matching technology 
explicitly. Rather we just assume that the number of matches is 
increasing in the numbers of both vacancies and unemployed. To 
abstract from the externalities arising from job and worker rejection 
investigated by Pissarides(I983),(I984) we assume that L=J (i.e. 
there is no excess demand or supply in the labour market), and that X 
exhibits constant returns to scale. From the previous discussion in 
3.2, we know that this implies that the matching probabilities X/U and 
X/V are constant and independent of U and V •• 
Finally, jobs break up at an exogenous rate s per period. We 
shall only be concerned with steady states in the model i.e. where 
flows into and out of unemployment are equal for each ability type. 
The expected flow into unemployment for each type is (Li-Ui)s, or in 
per capita terms, (I-u.)s. The flow out of unemployment is calculated 
1 
as follows. The probability of any unemployed worker making a job 
contact is X(U,V)/U = X(I,I) ~ x by constant returns to scale and U=V. 
The probability of such a match being accepted is qi' There are Di 
such workers, so the total expected flow is qi.x,Ui' or in per 
capita terms q.x.u., with u. = Ui/L .• By the law of large numbers, 
1 1 1 1 
actual and expected flows per capita can be taken to be equal, and so 
we can write the flow equilibrium conditions 
(1) (1 - u.).s = q. x u 
1 l' • i' i = 1,2, •••• n. 
Solving for the equilibrium unemployment levels, we have; 
(2) ui = s 
s+ q .• X 
1 
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Efficiency 
We are now in a position to derive the efficent, or sociallv 
optimal, rules for match formation. As both firms and workers are 
assumed to be risk-neutral and there are no vacancy costs or 
unemployment costs and benefits, the maximand is the discounted flow 
of output per capita, which by the law of large numbers is non-random. 
There is no real loss of generality in taking the maximand to be the 
steady-state flow of output, as in what follows steady-state optimal 
rules are either identical to the rules which maximise discounted 
flows, or correspond to the special case where the interest rate is 
set to zero. This can either be checked directly, or by using the 
formulae of Diamond(1980). 
First, observe that from the law of large numbers, output per 
capita can be written 
(3) y = 
where u. is 
1 
(4) y~ = 
1 
n y 
i=k 
as in 
a i + 
'Jt. (1-u. )y~ 
111 
(2) , and 
e 
J ef ( e) de / (1-F ( e. ) ) • 
e 1 
1 
Hence, form (2) u. depends on q .• In turn, q. is determined by a 
111 
critical reservation index of ability k, and job specific 
productivity, e., such that the match is rejected if i < k or 9 < 
1 
9!. In other words, qi = x.(1-F(9 i )) if i ~ k, and 0 otherwise. 
We show in this section that the efficient reservation values 
(i.e. those that maximise the steady-state flow of output) have two 
properties. First, matches should be formed whatever the ability of 
the worker (i.e. k=l) and second, the reservation job-specific 
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productivity, 8i depends non-trivially on i. 
It is immediately obvious from (3) that k=1 maximises the flow of 
output as long as Y~ > ° , and the latter holds by assu~ption. 
In other words, no matches should be rejected solely because the 
worker's ability is too low. 
Next recalling the definition of u. from (2), and using the fact 
1 
that qi = x.(I-F(8i )), if the 8i maximise Y, then it follows that each 
8i maximises 
8 
(5) r f 8f( 8)d8 + a( I-F( 8i )) ] 8. 
1 
six + (I-F(8.)) 
1 
This implies, from the first order conditions; 
(6) 9. :::: 
1 
where 8e i 
e (I-F(8i ).x.8. - s.a. 1 1 
s + (l-F(8.)).x 
1 
8f( 8)d8/(l-F( 8.)). 
1 
When a=O, (6) reduces to formula (29) in Pissarides with b=k=O, using 
the fact that X(I,I) = oX + oX from Euler's theorem. 
OU ov 
In addition, from (6), 
(7) de. = 
da l 
-s 
s + (l-F(8.)).x 
1 
d . . h 1 a s ~ > 0 He nee, for so that 8i is strictly ecreaslng Wlt a as ong -i • 
high enough ability types, the match should be accepted for any 
realisation of the match-specific shock. 
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3.4 Equilibrium and Inefficiency 
In this section we describe the equilibrium of the transferable 
skills model and explain how and why it is inefficient. 
Any equilibrium is fully described by a wage function w(e,i) 
which specifies the wage to be paid to a type i worker in a match with 
match-specific productivity e, and reservation job-specific 
productivities e i ' and an ability k such that a job match is rejected 
if and only if e < ei or i < k. Of course, these reservation values 
will in general be different to the socially optimal ones - that is 
the whole point of this section - but the context should make it 
sufficiently clear which is which, without having to index them 
differently. 
What we will show, in fact, for the case where e is not 
"very" random is that if the firm has some bargaining power over wages 
- i.e. appropriates some of the surplus - then the equilibrium 
marginal, or reservation type, k, will be strictly greater than 1. In 
other words, the equilibrium will be inefficient, and output and 
employment will be too low relative to the optimum. 
Furthermore, (unlike the congestion inefficiencies surveyed in 3.2?) 
the cause of this inefficiency is transparently simple. From the point 
of view of the firm, worker ability is a random variable, so that if a 
worker's ability is too low relative to the mean, the firm will reject 
the match in the hope of being matched with a better worker. However, 
from the point of view of the whole economy, worker abilities are 
fixed; - per capita, there are TIi workers with productivity a i - so 
there is nothing to be gained by breaking up a match with a low 
productivity worker. 
We turn now to a description of the equilibrium. The equilibrium 
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wage and reservation values are determined by asset equations 
implicitly defining net worths, or asset values, for both firms and 
workers, and a rule for wage determination. 
Let W
e
(9,i) be the net worth of an employed worker of ability a i in 
a match with productivity 9, and W (i) be the net worth of an 
u 
unemployed worker of type i. Similarly, let Wf (9,i) be the net worth 
of a job with a match of productivity a. + 9, and W the net worth of 
1 v 
a job vacancy. 
These values must satisfy the standard asset equations that the 
rate of return times net worth equals flow income plus expected 
capital gain. For the workers, these asset equations are; 
(8) 
(9) 
with 
and 
(11) 
r.W (9,i ) = w(9,i) + seW (i) - W (9,i» 
e u e 
r.W (i) = q .(We(i) - W (i» 
u Wl e u 
we (i) = 
e 
9 f W (9,i)f(9)d9/1-F(9i ) 9 e 
i 
Analogous equations for jobs as assets are 
(13) r. W = 
v 
n * e ) TIi.q .(Wf . - W ) Wl 1 v i=l 
(14) 
* 
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e 
= [ f Wf(e,i)f(e)de]/(l-F(ei )) ei 
where ~i is the probability that the worker matched with the firm is 
of type i, and is in fact an endogenous variable, being ~i times the 
unemployment rate of type i workers, apprpriately normalised; 
* (15) 1(. = 
1 
n 
ui·~i/ )ui·~i· 
i=1 
The reservation e. are now determined by the condition that each side 
1 
of the market must be indifferent between rejecting and accepting the 
match, given that the worker is of type i i.e. 
(16) 
(17) W (e. ,i) = W (i). 
e 1. u 
The precise definition of the reservation ability index k is given 
below. 
Although at first sight it is possible that (16) and (17) give 
different answers, the rule we adopt for wage determination 
ensures that there is no inconsistency. Following Diamond and 
Pissarides, we suppose that the total surplus from the match, 
W (e,i ) + Wf(e,i) - (W + W (i) is divided up according to a 
e v u 
generalised Nash bargain, so that the worker receives a fraction e of 
it. Then the wage is implicitly determined by 
(18) W (e,i) - W (i) = 
e u 
8 !Wf(e,i)-W
v
] 
l-~ 
It should be clear from (18) that (16) and (17) are in fact identical 
equations. 
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To bring out the issues clearly, we first examine the special 
case where there is no match-specific element to productivity. We 
show that for this case, matches involving low ability types may be 
rejected, implying that the equilibrium is inefficient, and output and 
employment are too low relative to the social optimum. 
Case 1; 9=0 
In this case, ~i=x if i is an ability type that is employed 
in equilibrium, and q .=0 otherwise. In this case, if k is the 
W1 
critical index, simple manipulation of (8)-(15) and (18) imply that 
the equilibrium wage, as a function of i, is 
(19) w( i) = [a. -
1 
qf.(l-S*).ae ] • S(r+s+x) 
r+s+8.x 
r + s + qf 
where ae = ~ 1t ~ .a. ~ ~ 1t ~ is the (conditional) average 
. k 1 1. k 1 1= 1= 
productivity of a worker drawn from the pool, qf = x • n * )' TI. is the 
. ··k 1 1= 
probability of the firm filling the vacancy in a unit time period, and 
finally s*= S(r+s+x)/(r+s+(l-S).qf+S,x). Note that as long as S < 1, 
the wage of a type i worker depends on the productivities of other 
types in the economy, a phenomenon not apparent in the 
Diamond-Pissarides model. 
As W (i) - W (i) = w(i)/(r+s+x) from (8) and (9), it follows 
e u 
immediately from (16) that the critical index k is the smallest index 
such that w(k)~O, or, from (19), the smallest k such that 
(21) ~ ~ 
r + s + qf 
The first thing to note is that if S is small (i.e. worker 
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bargaining power 1s low) k > 1, so that the equilibrium will be 
efficient, as claimed. It is also apparent that as S~l, eventuallv 
k=l, so that if worker bargaining power is high enough, the 
equilibrium will be efficient. 
To understand the cause of the inefficiency, consider (21) with 8 
< 1. Here the firm compares the productivity of a prospective match, 
ai' with the average productivity of another "draw" from the worker 
population a e • If the former is low enough relative to the latter, 
the match is rejected. 
However, from the point of view of the economy as a whole, worker 
ability is not a random variable. Human capital per capita is fixed 
n 
at) ain., and hence aggregate output cannot be increased by 
. 1 1 1= 
rejecting any job-worker match. 
There is one problem with this equilibrium, however - workers of 
types below k, the critical index, will never be employed. Hence, 
there is no return to search, and so if there were even the slightest 
cost to search, they would drop out of the search process, which 
would have an impact on the matching probabilities of firms and the 
remaining workers. To model this "discouraged worker" 
effect, therefore, means endogenising the matching probabilities, 
which would be rather complicated, while the basic inefficency result 
would not change i.e. the equilibrium would now have low-productivity 
types quitting the market, which would not be socially optimal, as 
long as search costs were low enough. 
We now turn to the case where the match-specific productivity is 
genuinely random. 
Case 2' e random , 
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To keep the algebra simple, we only deal with the polar cases 
where either firm or worker can obtain all the surplus i.e. either 8=0 
or S=l. We show that in the former case, the reservation values e, 
1 
are not the efficient ones, whereas in the latter case, they are 
efficient. Consequently, one would expect that in any equilibrium 
where both parties obtain a strictly positive share of the surplus 
(O<S<l) will be inefficient also, and this is in fact the case, 
the demonstration is tedious and unrewarding, and is consequently 
omit ted. 
Here, the only possible equilibrium wage function is W(e,i) = 0 for 
all e,i. In this case, from (12) and (13), we obtain; 
(22) 
- W = 
v 
n * e ~ TI i · q ( a i +8 i ) 
'1 w 1= 
r + s + qf 
n * 
qf = )' TI .• q . 
. 1 1 WI 1= 
with e~ defined as in (6). 
1 
Substituting this back into (13), 
solving for Wand then rearranging (12), we can find an explicit 
v 
expression for Wf(ek,k)-W
v
• Setting this equal to zero in accordance 
with (16), setting r=O for purposes of comparison with the efficient 
case) we obtain n-k-1 simultaneous equations implicitly defining the 
equilibrium reservation values; 
(23) a. + 9. = 
1 1 
n * 
)TI .• O-F(8 j ) j=kJ 
e 
(a + eJ' ) • j 
s 
n * 
+ tTI .• O-F(e.)) 
. 'kJ J J= 
The critical index k is now determined as the smallest index such , 
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that the n-k-l equations (23) have solutions 9i ) 0, i=k ••• n. 
first that if A = e then ( 23) Note j 9 j =0, reduces to ( 21) 
with s* = o. Therefore, the underlying inefficiency discussed in the 
previous section is still present, and so output and employment will 
still be too low, as long as the variability of 8 is low enough. 
However, for a given distribution for 8, it is impossible to say 
anything in general about the direction of the inefficiency i.e. 
whether the 8i will be greater or smaller than their socially optimal 
counterparts defined by (6). Note also that if there is only one 
ability type, (23) reduces to (6), confirming Pissarides' result that 
the equilibrium will be efficient. 
Here, the only possible equilibrium wage function is w(8,i) = ai +8 
for all 8,i. In addition, as Wf (8,i) = Wv = 0, firms are indifferent 
as to which types they employ. Simple manipulation of the asset 
equations then implies that 
1 
(24) W (8,i) - W (i) = 
e u 
r+s 
. r a .+8 -
1 
x.(l-F(8.)).(a. + e.) 
1 1 1] 
S + r + x.(1-F(8.)) 
1 
Setting (24) to zero in accordance with equation (17), we obtain an 
equation for the equilibrium 9. which, for r= 0, is identical to the 
1 
socially optimal equation (6). 
To summarise; we have demonstrated that the presence of ex ante 
hetereogeneity in search models generates an inefficiency that is 
conceptually distinct from, and in some ways easier to understand, 
than inefficiencies of the "congestion" type which have been analvsed 
before in the literature, and which arise from individuals ignoring 
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the external impacts of their own actions on matching probabilities. 
Furthermore, as we shall see in what follows, these inefficiencies 
can persist with asymmetric information. We will analyse a rr.odel of 
asymmetric information in some detail in 3.5 - 3.10. However, we can 
note one interesting fact now, which is that the introduction of 
asymmetric information can improve efficiency. Suppose for simplicity 
the firm has monopoly power, and cannot observe the type of the worker 
when the hiring i.e. matching decision is made. Then the only 
possible equilibrium is where the wage is identically zero and all 
types are hired. Thus, if e is non-random, full efficiency is 
restored , and even if it is random, inefficiency may be alleviated. 
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3.5 Evidence for Discrimination on the Basis of Unemployment Histories 
There are essentially three kinds of evidence that one can appeal 
to. The first kind is individual testimony from the unemployed that 
aspects of their employment history count against them in looking for 
work. The second is direct evidence that such discrimination is taking 
place. The third is statistical evidence concerning re-employment 
probabilities. 
As for the first, the interviewees reported in Sinfield Ope cit. and 
Harrison(1976) say that histories of short job tenure and (especially) 
a long current duration of unemployment count against them. In 
addition, unemployed young people clearly recognise a "Catch-22" of 
no job without experience. In spite of this, there seems to be little 
direct evidence that such discriminatory pratices are going on -
Harrison cites only one NEDO study which found that "the long term 
unemployed may not even get as far as seeing any employers.Those on 
the register a long time were much less frequently submitted for jobs 
than the new arrivals." This lack of direct evidence is not really 
surprising, however; it is unlikely that firms would be explicit about 
a practice that appears as discriminatory. 
The third type of evidence is far more indirect. First, at 
the aggregate level, the probability of re-employment falls with 
unemployment. The evidence is quite unambiguous on this; the average 
duration of completed spells of unemployment (as measured for example, 
by the ratio of the unemployment stock to flow) is much lower than the 
average duration of current uncompleted spells. The former has 
consistently been 2-5 times the latter for both Britain and the tiS 
over the last twenty-five years (see Johnson and Layard (1984)). This 
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means as Salant (1977) shows, that duration data cannot be generated 
by a process whereby the probability of any individual unemp10yec 
worker leaving unemployment is constant both across time and across 
individuals - either re-employment probabilities must differ 
significantly across individuals (heterogeneity) or the probabilities 
must be genuinely duration-dependent, and decline with time 
unemployed. 
Much recent work, e.g. McGregor (1978), Nickell (1979), Lancaster 
(1979), Lynch (1985), has examined the question of how much of this 
effect can be attributed to observed differences between workers (e.g. 
age, marital status, skills, education, place of residence), and find 
that conditional re-employment probabilities still decline, sometimes 
sharply over the duration of the unemployment spell. However, both 
Nickell (1979) and Lancaster (1979) pointed out that this may be due 
to unobserved (by the econometrician) heterogeneity among workers. 
Even with adjustments for such unobserved heterogeneity, however, both 
Nickell (1979) and Lynch (1985) find that such a duration effect still 
persists. 
The problem with interpretating such results is that there are 
several other explanations for them, besides that of employer 
discrimination. We can divide them into three types; 
(i) human capital; adults may lose valuable skills, and youths may 
never have a chance to acquire them, over lengthy spells of 
unemployment; 
(ii) search intensity j loss of morale may cause the unemployed to 
search less intensively; 
( . ) ','age . the min1'mum acceptable wage ma\.· rise 1ii a rising reservation w ) 
as unemployment duration increases. 
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There is evidence that the first two kinds of effects occur in 
practice, whereas both the evidence and theoretical reasoning are 
against the third; i.e. reservation wages should, and do, fall over 
time. 
As regards (i) and (ii), much of the evidence on the psychological 
effects of long-term unemployment (Harrison(1976), Sinfield(1981)) 
shows a pattern of initial optimism about re-ernployment, followed by a 
more pessimistic re-evaluation when decisions e.g. to look for less 
skilled jobs are made, followed finally by fatalism. Interviewees 
say that they search less intensively as time goes on. In addition, 
they become apprehensive about taking on jobs that require them to 
use their former skills (and may of course have skills that are fast 
becoming obselete), although there is little evidence that long 
unemployment irreversibly destroys an individual's ability to work. 
As for the reservation wage, one would expect it to fall over time 
on theoretical grounds because (a)unemployrnent benefits either 
decline, or certainly do not increase, over time, (b) finite 
search horizons, and (c) learning effects- those who do not leave 
unemployment are those who recieve relatively low wage offers, and 
these offers are likely to cause their beliefs about the wage 
distribution to become more pessimistic. On the empirical side, 
reservation wages are not directly observable. However, as Keifer and 
Neumann(1979) have shown, it is possible nevertheless to estimate the 
effect of various parameters, including the duration of unernplO~went 
on the reservation wage. For U.S. data they show that the reservation 
wage significantly declines with time. Narendrathan, Kickell, and 
Stern(1985) , using different methods, also conclude that the 
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reservation wage for U.K males declines with duration. 
To summarise, then, there seems to be considerable evidence that 
then duration of individual spells of unemployment adverely affects 
those individual's reemployment probabilities. There is also anecdotal 
evidence that other aspects of individual work histories affect 
reemployment, although thre is very little econometric work relating 
to this. Heckman and Borjas(1980) provide methods for estimating 
and testing for such relationships, but their own empirical 
results are inconclusive. 
Therefore, we concentrate on modelling the duration effect, although 
the approach used could easily be adapted to model other aspects of 
I h · 1- I h . discrimination via unemp oyment lstory. n t e next sectlon, , we 
give a general description of the modelling strategy, and then 
layout the model and discuss possible equilibria. 
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3.6 A Model of Screening via Unemployment Duration: Modelling 
Strategy,Equilibrium Concepts, and an Overvie~ of the Main Results 
The evidence suggests that employers, if they are rational, construe 
the duration of unemployment as conveying information that the worker 
posesses some undesirable characteristic (e.g. low abilitv or 
- , 
reliability, high propensity to quit) that is costly in terms of time 
or money to observe directly. 
Now, the duration can only convey interesting information if workers 
of different "types" (i.e. who differ in some payoff relevant way to 
the firm) have different re-employment probabilities. There are 
several different ways in which this could happen. Suppose, for 
example, more highly productive workers searched harder, and firms 
simply hired all workers they were matched with at the same 
wage. However, this ( and other similar devices) are ad hoc in the 
sense that there are no differential incentives for productive workers 
to search harder - all workers get the same wage. It is fairly clear, 
in fact, that the only way that a relationship between productivity 
and re-employment can be generated which is not ad hoc in this sense 
is to suppose that firms get some "noisy" signal about worker 
productivities when they are matched - i.e. they test workers. Then if 
productive workers are more likely to do well at the test, any 
sensible hiring rule based on test results (only hiring workers who 
tlpass" or do well on, the test) will automatically embody information 
in the duration. This is the reasoning behind the model. 
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This line of reasoning really establishes the first important 
()..... 
result; viz. that\necessary pre-condition for screening via 
duration is the presence of informational externalities; (some of ) 
the information gleaned by individual firms by testing is embodied in 
the duration. 
Thus, duration conveys information about workers rather like the 
price in an asset market does about asset returns. However, there are 
interesting differences. In Walrasian rational expectations models, 
it is well-known that, generically, equilibria exist where the price 
effectively reveals all private information to each agent. This is not 
the case in this model - the equilibrium is not fully revealing. More 
precisely, the durations of individuals who have taken (and failed) 
one or more tests do not fully reveal this information. 
This has the important consequence that firms may still find it in 
their interests to gather information about workers privately, even 
when the duration carries some information, and so the 
--
Grossman/Stiglitz existence problem need not arise. In fact, there 
may be multiple equilibria; in particular, pooling equilibria, where 
the duration conveys no information and screening equilibria may 
co-exist at the same parameter values. 
Also, we are able to obtain several interesting comparative statics 
results. First, we show that the level of screening will fall 
following a positive shock to productivity, as long as the wage does 
not fully adjust to the shock. (Pissarides(1985) argues that in a 
search framework, this lack of full adjustment is the only way in 
which the business cycle can impinge on the labour market). In turn, 
a fall in the level of screening reduces unemployment. Thus screening 
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provides an alternative channel through which aggregate demand shocks 
can affect unemployment, the more usual channel being through an 
increase in the proportion of job matches that are accepted 
(Pissarides(1985)). The reason for the fall in screening is that the 
benefit from screening, as measured by the ratio of net profits from 
employing high and low productivity workers, falls in a boom, 
as long as wages do not fully adjust. 
Second, an increase in excess supply in the labour market will lead 
to a worsening of the screening effect. This works through the cost 
side; an increase in labour market slack makes it easier for employers 
to find job matches, and so one of the costs of screening (the waiting 
cost incurred by a job match) goes down. 
We now set out the model rather more formally. 
The Model 
We suppose an economy with equal numbers of jobs, J and workers, 
L. Firms are comprised of large numbers of jobs. It is useful to 
think of jobs as machines which can only be operated by one worker. 
All jobs are identical, but workers may be of two types, 1 and 2, so 
that L = Ll + L2' A worker of type i and a job can produce Yi units 
of output with Yl>Y2>O, so that type 1 workers are more productive in 
every job match. This is in contrast to the standard MDP model, where 
productivities pertain to matches, not workers. 
The matching process is a Poisson one, with workers encountering 
a single job with probability x and a job "contacting" a worker 
w 
with probability xf in any "short" unit time period. In general, \.: 
and x f will depend on the numbers of unemployed of each type, Pi and 
th b f . V ( D'a ond (1982)) and will so be e num er 0 vacanCles, see e.g., 1 m 
endogenous. However, we wish to abstract from this complication to 
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begin with as we did in 3.3.and 3.4. We know this can be done by 
assuming that the matching function X(U1+U2, V) has constant returns 
to scale and that there is no excess supply of, or demand for jobs 
on aggregate, i.e. L1 + L2 = J. Then xf = Xw = x. 
We depart from previous analyses of models of this type by 
assuming that firms only have partial information about the type, or 
productivity of any particular worker. In particular, we suppose that 
each firm can test at zero cost a prospective worker that it is 
matched with, but the test is an imperfect sorting device in that the 
more productive type 1 workers always pass the test, but type 2 
workers also pass with probability ~. We also assume that the wage 
is exogenously given at a level b, equal perhaps to an opportunity 
wage or benefits. Given that in a search framework, matched partners 
are in a situation of bilateral monopoly it would be more satisfactory 
to adopt the Diamond-Pissarides wage bargaining approach, where the 
wage is determined by the condition that the surplus from the match is 
divided between the parties in proportions corresponding to their 
bargaining strengths. The problem with this arises in our "screening" 
equilibrium below, the wage must there depend on the duration of 
unemployment of the worker, and the analysis consequently becomes very 
complicated. 
Finally, we suppose that workers are finitely lived - they have a 
transition probability of entering retirement of 6 from either 
employment, or unemployment. Hence,we must suppose that there are ~Lj 
"births" or flows of new workers of each type per period in order to 
offset retirement flows. We suppose new workers enter into the 
unemployment pool. 
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While it is possible (and desirable) to ring changes on the basic 
model, it seems unlikely that the qualitative conclusions (existence 
and multiplicity of equilibria and the main comparative statics 
results) would change a great deal. In spite of this, it would be 
very interesting to model the worker's decision-making explicitly, 
especially the reservation wage and search decisions, and we discuss 
these matters in the conclusion to this chapter. 
It is apparent, upon reflection, that there are potentially three 
c:L 
types of symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in the model above, 
depending on firms hiring policies and the information generated by 
these policies. The first possibility is that all firms decide not to 
test workers, but simply hire every worker that they are matched with. 
It is usual to call such an equilibrium a pooling equilibrium. If all 
other firms are behaving in this way, then no particular firm can 
glean any information about the productivity of any particular worker 
from his duration in unemployment, and so the firm's hiring policy 
cannot be dependent on unemployment duration. Hence, the sole 
condition for equilibrium is that every firm finds it too costly (in 
terms of a probability of a match foregone) to test workers. 
Suppose now, by contrast, that this is not the case - i.e. firms 
test all workers and hire only those who pass the test. By doing so, 
they create an informational externality; the duration of an 
individual worker's unemployment duration will now convey information 
about his type. In particular, if all firms have such a hiring 
policy, the longer a worker has been unemployed, the more likely he is 
to be of low productivity. 
Therefore, if other firms choose to make use of this informa~ion, 
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it can be shown that they will do so by operating a "cutoff" hiring 
rule i.e., only hiring workers with a duration less than some critical 
value, t*, given that all other firms are also operating cutoff 
rUles3 • We can show that in some circumstances, such an equilibrium 
in cutoff rules exists. 
The third possibility is that firms do not wish to make use of 
this information, even when it is available, i.e. where all firms test 
workers, but their hiring rules do not depend on the duration of 
worker unemployment. Such an equilibrium musts, in fact, be a special 
sort of cutoff rule equilibrium where t* = +roo We call such aan 
equilibrium a trivial cutoff rule equilibrium. The possibilities are 
depicted below: 
Testing 
No testing 
t*<co 
cutoff rule 
equilibrium 
t*=co 
trivial 
cutoff rule 
equilibrium 
pooling 
equilibrium 
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3.7 Pooling Equilibrium 
As argued above, this equilibrium 1s characterised by the 
condition that individual firms do not find it profitahle to test 
workers. We have assumed that the direct cost of testing is zero, but 
in a search framework there is, of course, an implicit waiting cost of 
testing, which is that the match may be rejected and the firm must 
therefore wait for another suitable match. 
Let Ai L./(L1 + L2) be the fraction of type i workers in the 
1 
population. In a pooling equilibrium, the fraction of the employment 
pool which are type i is also Ai. Therefore, the expected flow of 
profit from a match if the firm does not test is simply 
If the firm does test, it is 
(26) 
'A .( Y I - b) + ¢. A 2 ( y 2 - b) 
~ 1+ ¢A2 
by Bayes' rule. 
Now a simple dynamic programming argument establishes that the 
hiring policy is the one which gives the firm the greatest expected 
capital gain from hiring. In turn, as there are no flow costs to a 
vacancy, the expected capital gain is simply the expected flow of 
profit from a match, (multiplied by Al + ~.A2' the probability that a 
matched worker passes the test in the testing case) divided by the sum 
of the effective discount rate, (r + 6) (where r is the rate of 
interest) and the probability of a sucessful match: in the case 
without testing, this is simply x, and with testing, this is X(\1 + 
Hence, the firm will wish to test a given worker if and only if 
162 
r + 6 + x 
~ 0 
Note first that as (r + 6) ~ 0, it always becomes profitable to test 
as the implicit cost of waiting goes to zero, and the flow of profit 
under testing, (26) above, is always greater than the flow of testing 
without, (25) above. 
Also, lim f( A2) = 0, as when A2 is very low, there is very 
A2~0 
little to be gained or lost from testing, and lim f( A2) < 0, as 
A2~1 
when A2 <:$ 1 , the gain from testing (i.e. (26) - (25)) is negligible, 
whereas the cost (i.e. a hiring probability of approximately ¢·x 
rather than x) is strictly positive. Finally, f can be shown to be 
quasi-concave+ and f'(O) > O. 
Putting these facts together, we conclude that there is a unique 
value of A2, A~ , such that a pooling equilibrium is possible if and 
only if 1 ~ A2 ~ A~ • 
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3.8 Cut-off Rule Equilibrium 
We will define here the conditions which define an equilibrium in 
cut-off rules, and also consider questions of uniqueness and 
stability. Recall that this equilibrium is described by (a) a cut-off 
* time t such that only workers with unemployment duration ~ < t* are 
tested, and (b) the condition that only workers that pass the test are 
hired. 
To see why a cut-off rule may be part of an equilibrium, suppose 
to the contrary that all firms are testing workers, no matter what 
their unemployment duration, and only hiring those who pass the test. 
Then, as the transition probability out of unemployment is lower for 
type 2 workers, the probability that any worker who has been 
unemployed for exactly time ~ is of type 2 is increasing in ~, and in 
the limit, as ~ ~ 00, approaches 1. 
Assume now that if a firm was sure that a worker was of type 2, 
it would not wish to employ him. If the worker's unemployment duration 
was high enough, the firm could be almost sure that he was of type 2. 
Therefore, the firm could do better by not bothering to test him i.e. 
practice a cutoff rule. 
This argument, of course, is not sufficient to establish the 
existence of a cutoff rule equilibrium, but it gives an indication of 
how to proceed. 
First, we know already that the firm encounters a worker with 
probability x per unit time period. If the worker has been unemployed 
for ~ periods, there is a probability P.(~; t*) that he is of type i, 
1 
given that all firms (except possibly the firm under consideration) 
are following a cutoff rule with cutoff time * t • Note that the 
viability of such a definition requires that firms are small relative 
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to the market, or equivalently, that Land J are large. Note also 
* that for ~ > t , both types exit with equal probability, 6, from 
* unemployment, so then Pi (~; t ) is independent of t. 
Then write 
( J) j = * ~ > t • 
At this stage it is not necessary to give an explicit formula for 
Pi(~; t*) - we can write down the equation characterising t*, and 
also the testing condition, without it. 
(a) Characterisation of Equilibrium 
The first step is to write down equations for the asset values of 
vacant jobs, and also jobs filled with a worker of duration~. Let 
the latter be * Wf(~; t, t ) where t is the firms own cutoff time, and 
t* that of the market, and similarly W (t, t*). (Note that the state 
v 
space is v x (f, ~), ~ E (0, 00), and does not include t or t*.) Then 
we know that the return on each asset must be equal to the flow of 
profit plus expected capital gains, or 
Pl(~; t*)(~l - b) + ¢·pl~; t*)(~2 - b) 
P1(~; t*) + ¢p.;;..(~; t*) 
for a filled job, and for a vacancy; 
( 30) 
~f 
r·W (t, t*) = 
v 
t 
J (w ( * ) W (t t * ) ) (p A ( ~ ., t * ) + ¢. P '"\ ( ~ ; t *) ) f ( ~; t ) d -: x • f ~; t, t - v' ~ a-
o 
* t ( t, and. 
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t 
J (w ( t ,t*) W ( *) ) (p (*) * x. f 1:; - v t, t '1 1:; t + ¢'P~(1:; t ))f('t; t)d't 
o 
* * * +* * +* + (F(t; t ) - F(t ; t ))·(Pl(t ; t ) +~·P2(t ; t*)). 
(W+(t*; t, t*) - W (t, t*)) 
v 
if t > t* , 
where F(1:; t*) (f(1:; t*)) is the distribution (density) function of 
exit times from unemployment averaged over all workers. Also, it 
follows from (~) and (~q) that ~(1:; t, t*) is independent of 1: for all 
* ~ * * 1: > t , so we set it equal to .~.(t; t, t ). The optimal cutoff 
rule for the firm, t, maximises (3~, where the dependence of W on t 
v 
5 is not taken into account. Given this, the first-order necessary 
condition is that 
( '\ ( *) ( *) +( * t*) ~I) Wf 1:; t, t > Wv t, t > Wf t ; t, 
at 1: :;:: t = t* , and the sufficient condition is that Wf (1:; t, t*) is 
decreasing in 1:. But by inspection of (~), it is clear that the 
* latter is satisfied - recall that P~1:; t ) is increasing in 1:. 
We now solve explicitly for the asset values. First, setting 
t t *· :;:: ln (~4) and (30, we find that 
where 
t 
J W ( t t *) W (t t*))(P ( t*) + .+. P",,(1:", t*))f(1:; t*)d1: f 1:;, - , '1 1:; 'l' '" V -o 
= 
Ql(t, t*)(Yl - b) + cP Q2(t, t*)(Y2 - b) 
r + 6 + X(Ql (t, t*) + ~.Q2(t, t*)) 
t 
Qi (tt t') = J Pi(1:; t') f(1:; t')d1:. 
o 
(3l)gives an equation for the expected capital gain from following 
cutoff rule t - not surprisingly, it is equal to the (discounted) 
expcted profits form doing so. 
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Then, setting t G t* in (3~, and using (~~ and (30, we find that 
capital gains are 
(33) (r + <5)(Wf ( 't; t* t*) - W (t*, t*)) = , v 
Pl('t; * - b) f· P2 ('t; * t ) (Yi + t ) (Yol.. - b) 
t*) t*) 
- a, 't ( t* 
11~'t; + ¢ P2('t; 
P+l (t *; *) ( b).rl + (* *) ( t Yl - + 1.P2 t; t ~~ - b) 
- at> t* 
where a = 
X·rQl(t*, t*)(Yl- b) + ~.Q2(t*, t*)(Y2- b)l 
r + <5 + x( Q 1 ( t *, t *) + ~. Q 2 ( t *, t *) ) 
Note that for 't > t* (33) is the capital gain accruing to a firm which 
(accidently) tested a 't > t* worker, given that it was following a t* 
- cutoff rule - an "off the equilibrium" path event. It follows 
immediately from (3J) and (33) that (30 can only be satisfied if 
* t* t*) + * t* * * t* t*) Wf(t ; > Wf (t ; t ), or equivalently, P 1 (t ; > , , , 
+ * Pl (t ; t*) • We show in the appendix that the latter inequality holds 
automatically. In fact, as the conditional probabilities are 
discontinuous from the right at t*, we have some latitude in our first 
equilibrium condition and (arbitrarily) take t* to be defined by 
W
f
( t*; t; t*) = W
v
( t*, t*). Let Q: = 0 i (t*, t*). Then condition (3!) 
becomes 
( 34) 
= 
r + 
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Put in this form, the equilibrium condition is somewhat more 
transparent. On the left-hand side is the expectd profit from a 
* "type" t worker. On the right hand side is a constant between zero 
and one, which represents the costs of waiting, times the expected 
profit from a random draw from the unemployment pool i.e. an "average" 
worker. 
()~) therefore states that the firm is indifferent between 
* accepting a type t worker now and waiting to make another draw from 
the pool of unemployed. This is analagous to the condition determining 
the reservation productivity in 3.4, and arises for the same reason. 
Finally, we must deal with the condition that ensures that firms 
wish to test workers that pass the cutoff rule. For simplicity we 
suppose that the decision to test does not depend on the particular 
duration of the worker. This could be justified in several ways, and 
in any case, no result of importance hinges upon it. 
Suppose that all other firms are testing workers and have a 
cutoff rule, t* satisfying (3<V. The alternative policy for the firm 
** is not to test, and choose another cutoff rule, t • 
By the preceeding arguments, t** must in fact satisfy an analogue 
of (3~) with ¢ = 1. The testing condition then requires that the 
expected capital gain (taken over workers of all durations) frOD 
testing exceeds that from not testing. This is, using (30) 
Ql (t*, t*)(Yl - b) + t. Q2 (t*, t*)(Y2 - b) 
r + 6 + X(Ql(t*, t*) + ~.Q2(t*, t*» 
** * ** *) ( b) Ql (t , t ) (Yl - b) + Q2(t , t Y2-
> 0 
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It is of particular interest to know if this condition can be 
saatisfied simultaneously with condition (~~which guarantees the 
existence of a pooling equilibrium. Because one cannot compare t* and 
t** in general, this cannot be done analytically, but it should be 
possible to check for particular numerical examples. 
(b) Existence and Multiplicity of Equilibrium 
At this stage, we calIon some explicit formulae for the 
conditional probabilities which are derived in the appendix to chapter 
3. First, 
( 3£) * P.(-r; t) 
1 
= 
* * f.(-r; t ) 7t.(t ) 1 1 
2 
)' f.(-r; t*) 7t.(t*) 
. 1 1 1 1= 
* by Bayes' rule, where 7t.(t ) is the firm's prior belief that 
1 
the worker is of type i, and so is the fraction of the unemployment 
pool made up of type i workers i.eo 
* 7t.(t ) 
1 
= 
* u.(t )0"-. 
1 1 
t u.(t*)o,,-. 
. 1 1 1 1= 
where u.(t*) is the equilibrium unemployment rate for type i workers 
1 
which can be computed as; 
( 38) * u.(t) = 
1 
= 
0+ h.o(l - exp(-(h.+ 6)t*) 
1 1 
(hi + 6)oexp(-(h i + 6)-r ) 
* -r <; t 
* + ~)t*) ooexp(-6(-r - t )) 0 exp(-(h i -r > to 
A number of properties of the conditional probabilities follow fro: 
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this definition. 
so that type 2's suffer relatively more unemployment. It is also 
simple to establish 5 that P~(~; t*) is strictly increasing in l, as 
* claimed, for ~ ( t • This means, that viewed as a signal about 
productivity, -r is "bad news" in Milgrom's(l98l) sense - that is, a 
higher ~ implies that for any prior 'ITl , 'IT 2 , the posterior probability 
that the worker is highly productive is lower. 
I ( 3lf ) 
with 
Using 0(.) - (set), (l'f} becomes, after some rna ni pula t ion, 
g(t*) = 
* x. ~(t ) 
= 0 
a = ¢. 
yet) = ~. 
(Y2 - b) + a(t*)(Y2 - b) 
1 + a(t*) 
• 
(Yl - b) + y(t*)(Y3 - b) 
1 + y(t*) 
(1 - exp(-(6 + h2)t)) 
(1 - exp(-(6 + h1)t)) 
We can now establish rigorously the conditions under which (3t) has a 
* b that as t ~ 00, aCt) ~ 00 whereas solution 0 < t < 00. First, 0 seve 
1 ., limits~, y, so tha~ ~(t) and yet) tend to finite, strict y pos1t1ve 
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if Y2 1s small enough relative to Yl, then lim 
t+co 
get) is strictlv 
negative (see condition (A) below for a precise statement). 
On the other hand, as t ~ 00, aCt) and yet) tend to the same limit 
(using L'Hopital's rule) so that as long as r + 6 > 0, get) will 
become strictly positive, so by continuity of g, there will be at 
least one non-trivial cutoff rule equilibrium. 
There may, of course, be more than one, as shown. 
Figure 3.8.1 
k * d t*** It is apparent that equilibrium Ii e t an , where g'(t ) < 0 are 
stable, whereas equilibria like t** are unstable. The reason for this 
is as follows. Take any t * < t < t**. Then by definition of get) 
(see (~3») Wf("C; t, t) - Wv(t, t) < 0 at "C; t. Hence, fron 0·), 
each firm could do better by reducing t slightly, so that the economy 
will eventually move to t*. (Note that the same argument cannot arply 
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for t at which get) > 0, as Wf is discontinuous in ~ at that point). 
Finally, it is fairly apparent that if lim get) ~ 0, there 
t+O 
exists a trivial cutoff rule equilibrium, with t* = 00. To see this 
note that lim get) ) 0 implies W (00' 00 00) > W (00 f ' , = v ' 00) • Then as 
Wf(~; 00, 00) > Wf(oo; 00, 00) for all ~ < 00, it always pays any firm to 
test any worker of whatever duration, as long as all other firms are 
doing the same. 
It turns out that this limiting value of get) has an interesting 
interpretation. In fact, consider the condition 
(A) lim get) = 
t+ro 
x(TIl + ~.;rr2) TIl (Yl - b) + ~:TI2(Y 2 - b) 
Y2 - b < O. 
r + 6 +x.(nl +tTI2) TIl + ~.:rr2 
This is precisely the condition that says that the firm should not 
hire a type 2 worker, but should wait and draw another worker from the 
pool, if the proportion of type 2 workers in the population is 
Tt:2 = lim TI2 (t) • 
t- oo 
We summarise; 
Theorem 1 
Assume that (11) holds. Then if condition (A) holds, a non-trivial 
cutoff rule exists. If condition (A) does not hold, a trivial cutoff 
rule equilibrium exists. 
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3.~ Equilibrium with an Endogenous Unemployment - Vacancy Ratio 
So far we have assumed that the labour market Is in equilibrium 
in the sense that the number of jobs equals the number of workers. 
This is highly restrictive, both because its lack of realism , 
and because it prevents us from ascertaining changes in the working 
population or jobs on the cutoff rule. 
In this section we define equilibrium for the more general case 
with an arbitrary J/L ratio. Recall that the number of matches per 
unit time period is x(Ul + U2, V). Hence, the probability of any 
unemployed worker matching with a firm is 
(41) = 
where v = V/L, and assuming constant returns to scale for x. Let 
u = ~ul + A2u2, the average unemployment rate. Then it is easily seen 
that v = u - s, where s = (L - J)/L is a measure of excess supply in 
the market. Therefore, the probability for a worker of a match is 
x(1, 1 - s/u). A similar argument establishes that the probability of 
a match for the firm can be written 
u 
(42) = x( 1) 
u - s 
Now a cutoff rule equilibrium is characterised by the testing 
condition (35) as before, and two simultaneous equations in t and u, 
the aggregate rate of unemployment. 
First, from (34), we have 
u 
(34' ) g( t, x( , 1» = 0 
u - s 
where the dependence of g on x is now explicit. 
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Second, we have from (38), 
(43) u-
o + x(l - s/u)(l - exp(-(x(l - s/u) + o).t)) 
+ 
o + ¢x(l - s/u)(l - exp(-(¢·x(l - s/u) + o).t)) 
= h(u, t) = o. 
We now have two equilibrium conditions, (34') and (43). It is 
possible to show that this system has at least one solution (t*, u*) 
under a condition similar to condition (A) above~ 
The stability condition is, however, slightly different; it 
requires the total derivative of g with respect to t to be less than 
zero i.e. 
og og ox s oh oh -1 
(44) + < O. 
ot ox ou ot ou 
? ? + + + 
The signs of the partial derivatives are as indicated, so as long as 
there is excess supply in the labour market (i.e. s > 0) at least one 
of og/ot and og/ox must be negative for stability. We argue that it 
is reasonable for og/ot and og/ox to have the same sign in the next 
section, so that under this "reasonable" condition, og/?'>t is again 
negative for stability. 
It is worth remarking at this point that our way of relaxing the 
condition that the number of jobs and workers are equal is somewhat ad 
hoc. In particular, it is possibly more desirable to suppose that the 
number of jobs is determined endogenously, by profit-maximising 
behaviour. In fact, Pissarides (1985) argues that if the capital 
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stock is perfectly flexible i.e. there are no delivery lags then 
profit-maximising implies that the asset value of a vacancy should be 
zero. Imposing this condition on equilibrium clearly represents the 
opposite extreme to our approach. 
We defend the option taken here on three grounds. First, by 
making the J/L ratio exogenous, we can evaluate directly its effect on 
the cutoff time and on unemployment. The second reason is technical. 
Imposing W = 0 as an equilibrium condition, as Pissarides suggests, 
v 
would lead to entirely different equilibrium conditions to the case 
wi th L = J. 
In particular, if t* < 00, t* would be defined by the condition 
Pl(t*; t*)(Yl - b) + t.P2(t*; t*)(Y2 - b) = 0, which requires Y2 < b, 
or that less productive workers should actually have negative net 
products, if b is the shadow price of leisure. 
Thirdly, instantaneous adjustment of capital is highly 
unrealistic, and so our approach can at least capture the short-run 
implications of changes in the labour force. 
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3.10 Comparative Statics 
In this section, we analyse the effect of changes in the 
parameters on both the equilibria with symmetric and asymmetric 
information. The main focus of interest is on the screening 
equilibrium - in particular, how productivity shocks and the 
excess supply of labour affect screening - and so we start with 
this cas e. 
(a) The Asymmetric Information Model 
We shall concentrate exclusively on the screening equilibrium, and 
will analyse the effects of changes in the wage, b, excess supply, s, 
and aggreagate and relative productivity changes (equiproportionate 
changes in Yl and Y2, and changes in their ratio) on the equilibrium. 
In addition, we examine the impact of changes in some parameters on 
the "informativeness" of unemployemnt duration as a signal. 
We begin by reparameterising; set Y2 = y, Yl = ey, 8 > 1. Then 
changes in y can be interpreted as aggregate output shocks, and 
changes in e as changes in relative productivity. We begin with the 
effect of small changes in parameters on t*, the cutoff time. Under 
the assumption that the equilibrium is stable,we obtain the following 
results. 
u/v 
ratio 
constant 
variable 
ot*/oy ot*/o8 ot*/ob ot*/ox ot*/cs 
Inot I 
? Idefinedl 
I I + 
- ? 
+ ? 
Inot I I 
Idefinedl -? I 
I I I 
First, ot*/oy > 0 indicates that an aggregate productivity increase 
. es it decreases screening and converselv a wage increase Increas • , ., , 
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In fact, it is possible to show (c.f. equation (34)) that 
equiproportionate changes in y and b, leave t* unchanged, so that as 
long as an aggregate productivity (or demand) shock is not fully 
matched by the wage, it will reduce screening and reduce 
unemployment. This provides an alternative channel by which 
aggregate demand shocks might affect the labour market to the one 
outlined in Pissarides (1985), where an increase in aggragate demand 
lowers the productivity of the marginally acceptable match. 
One would expect that an increase in 9, increasing the relative 
value of more productive workers, would be a stimulus to screening, 
hence lowering the cutoff time, and this is in fact the case if the 
discount rate is low enough. In fact, 
ot* yl (1+a) x.~.y/(r+6+x.S).(1+y) 
(45) = 
09 D 
where D > 0 by stability considerations. As a > y in equilibrium, this 
will be negative if r+o is low enough. 
We now turn to effects of changes in the matching technology. The 
most straightforward case is when u = v , for then this is simply a 
question of the effects of changes in x, the per period matching 
probability. One might suppose that this model exhibits a homogeneitv 
property in that a doubling of the expected waiting time to a match 
( Le. a halving of x) would lead to a doubling of t*. For this we 
1 
-og/o - og/ox.x 2 = og/ot. require that = 
x 
Inspection of (34') indicates that, in general, this is unlikely to 
be true, although one cannot say whether the effect is greater or less 
1 
than proportional i.e. whether ot*lo-
x 
is greater or less than 1. 
1 
It does seem plausible, however, to assume that is greater 
x 
than zero. This in turn requires og/ox and og/ot to have the same 
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sign, so from the stability condition (44) they must both be negative. 
If we make this assumption, it is possible to show that dt*/ds < 0, 
i.e. that an increase in labour market slack makes screening more 
severe. The explanation for this result is as follows. First an , 
increase in s will have both a direct effect and an indirect effect , 
via u, on the probability that the firm gets a match, x(u/(u-s), 1). 
In fact, 
( 46) = 6x [ u s dUJ dU (u-s)~ - (u-s).:)..· ~ • 
dx 
ds 
As oxfOu > 0 , an increase in s will have a positive (negative) 
effect on the firm's matching probability as the elasticity of u with 
respect to s is less than (greater than) unity. Now it is possible to 
-, 
show that this elasticity is less than or greater than 1 as '0 g/~t is 
less than or greater than O. Hence, dx/ds has the opposite sign to 
o g/O x. Finally, from (34') 
dt* 
- og/ox.dx/ds 
(47) = 
ds og/Ot 
As we have just established that dx/ds has the opposite sign to ) g~x, 
and Og/~t is less than zero by stability, dt*/ds must be negative, as 
claimed. 
h " 11 " This argument could be put less formally by saying t at norma Y 
( i.e. when ~g/~t < 0 ) an increase in slack improves the matching 
probability of the firm, thus reducing the waiting cost of rejectin~ 
any worker of any given duration of unemployment. Hence, as the 
expected profit for the firm from any worker employed is decreasing in 
his or her unemployment duration, it pays the firm to reduce the 
cutoff duration below which it is willing to test workers. 
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One important consequence of this effect 1s that 1t enhances the 
effects of labour market slack on unemployment i.e. th 1 e tota effect 
of s on u is 
du 
( 48) = + • 
ds ~s 
const. ~t* ds 
where the indirect effect dt* is positive. One implication of 
~t* ds 
s du 
this is that it is possible for the total elasticity • to be 
u ds 
greater than unity (see footnote7) whereas the elasticity of u with 
respect to s for a fixed t* is always less than unity8. In other 
words, the screening effect may mean that a 1% increase in labour 
market slack leads to a greater than 1% increase in unemployment. 
We now turn to the question of the informativeness of duration as a 
signal of productivity. The natural measure of informativeness is the 
the greater this ~is in absolute 
difference from 1, the greater is the difference between the 
firm's prior and posterior assessments of the worker's type. We shall 
be concerned with the impact of exogenous variables on this ratio. 
To begin with, any increase in t* will inccrease this absolute 
difference for any 0 < ~ < 00, as long as f2(t*;t*)/fl(t*;t*) > 1. 
Th "h f If d "l"n t*", l"ndependent of t* for e reason IS t at 2 1 non- ecreaslng 
~ ~ t*, and is proportional to exp( (l-¢).t*) for ~ > t* • 
In other words, an increase in either the cutoff time can increase 
the informativeness of the signal. This shows that the fundamental 
positive informational externality on which this model is based- i.e. 
that testing creates information for other firms - may be mitigated 
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by the fact that in trying to take advantage of it, firms reduce it's 
quality. 
It is also possible to show9 that f2/fl is increasing (decreasing) 
in in x as long as ~ > «) O.[(x+O).(¢.x+o)]-l • Armed with these 
facts, it is possible to deduce the effects of various parameters on 
the informativeness of ~, but the picture seems inconclusive. We 
consider only the example of excess labour supply. We know that this 
reduces both t* and x (for the workers). Then the increase in swill 
reduce informativeness via the effect on t*, but its effect via x will 
be indeterminate. 
A final result worth noting is the effect of changes in parameters 
on the ratio of unemployment rates, * * u2(u,t )/u (u,t ). 
We can show lO that for this ratio will be increasing in t* - for a 
fixed u - and x, as long as ¢, the probability that type 2's pass the 
test, is low enough. Then the effects of a change in any of the 
parameters on the ratio can be deduced via their effects on u and t*. 
We will only do this for the most important of these i.e. changes in 
labour excess supply. We already know that an increase in s 
decreases t*; it will also decrease the worker matching probability 
xCI, l-s/u) as long as the unemployment elasticity with respect to s 
is less than unity. Therefore, an increase in s tends to equalise the 
rates of unemployment. As u2 > ul, it could be argued in the case 
that Ai = 1/2 that this reduces the prior information available to 
firms concerning worker's types. 
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(b) The Symmetric Information Model 
In this section, we consider the impact of tax parameters and other 
exogenous variables on the symmetric information equilibrium, and in 
particular determine how the inefficiency of the equilibrium mav be 
alleviated by government intervention. 
From the arguments of section 3.4, it is clear that for the case 
where A is not very variable the degree of inefficiency of equilibrium 
turns on (a) the relationship between the profit to the firm of 
employing a given worker, a i - wi' and the expected profit it can get 
from another random draw, ae - we, and (b) the degree of worker 
bargaining power, O. We have already remarked that one way of 
achieving efficiency of equilibrium is to raise worker bargaining 
power so that workers appropriate all, or nearly all, of the surplus. 
Another way of achieving complete efficiency is to impose a InOr 
profit tax, combined with lump-sum redistribution of the proceeds, as 
this would equalise the firms' after-tax profits from each type at 
zero, and it would therefore be indifferent about whom it hired. 
One might conjecture from this that introducing a profit tax of 
less than 100% will improve efficiency from the no-tax status quo. 
It is also of interest to know more generally how in equilibrium, 
taxes interact with worker bargaining power to affect efficiency. It 
turns out that these two questions are closely related. An increase in 
a profit tax is (partially) shifted to workers by a lowering of the 
* e * e) workers' share of the average product, ~ (recall that w = O.a , 
* and the tax rate affects the reservation productivity only through 0 
as we show below. Therefore, we have the striking result that the 
imposition of a less than 1007- profit tax decreases efficiency, 
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whereas a Inn~ tax will restore full efficiency - that is, there is a 
discontinuty of the equilibrium matching rules in the tax rate at this 
point. 
The introduction of a wage tax will also have perverse effects, for 
the same reason; some of the tax will be shifted onto the firm bv an 
* increase in effective worker bargaining power, P , so the efficiency 
of equilibrium will rise. Finally, it turns out that if the proceeds 
from the tax are distributed to either firms or workers not in a 
lump-sum fashion, but in a way that varies with the state that they 
occupy, then this discontinuity may be eliminated. For example, if 
some positive fraction of the proceeds is redistributed only to firms 
who are currently employing a worker (i.e. a firm employment subsidy) 
, or only to workers that are currently employed (a worker employment 
subsidy) then equilibrium becomes efficient as the profit or wage tax 
rate goes to unity. 
It is worth noting that such discontinuity of equilibrium in the tax 
parameters does not arise in Walrasian models, except in pathological 
cases. Our results would seem to indicate that such discontinuities 
are the norm in matching models, and so one should be cautious in 
applying arguments derived in a Walrasian setting to these models. 
We now turn to a formal analysis of the effects of profit and 
wage taxes. Let T.
f 
be the profit tax rate, so the firms' net profit 
from employing a type i worker is (l-l f ).(a i - wi)' and T.w the wage 
tax rate, so that the after-tax wage is (l-T.
w
).wi • Then it is simple 
to show that if the proceeds from the taxes are distributed in a 
lump-sum fashion, (21) becomes 
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r + S + x. q f 
(49) 
where 
First, from (50), it is apparent that for ~ strictly between 0 and 
* 1, e (Tf , ~w) is decreasing in T f and increasin~ in TW. The reason for 
this is quite simple. For a ~iven profit tax rate, (1-~*).(I-Tf) is 
the firms' equilibrium post-tax share of the average product of the 
worker, a e • As I-Tf falls with an increase in the profit tax rate, 
(l-r*) rises to compensate the firm for this, so ~* must fall. An 
exactly similar argument explains why ~* is increasing in Tw. Next, it 
is possible to show that the index k is non-increasing in ~ (we have 
already argued intuitively that this is the case in the previous 
section). Therefore, by the previous ar~ment, k will be 
non-increasing in a wage tax, and non-decreasing in a profit tax, so 
that the former will improve, and the latter worsen, efficiency. 
Now, suppose that some of the tax revenue is redistributed as 
lump-sum payments to firms whose vacancies are filled, and also 
lump-sum payments to workers who are currently employed. Let these 
payments be band b respectively. Then the net profit from a filled 
f w 
vacancy is (I-Tf ).(ai -wi ) +bf , and the net income for an employed 
worker of type i is (I-T ).w.+ b • It is then easy to show that (~q) 
w 1 W 
becomes 
x·qf·(l-Q*(T f , Tw))·a
e 
r + s + x. q f 
+ 
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1: )) 
W 
( 51) 
b 
w 
1 - T 
Wi 
...l 
As the coefficient on bf /(1-1: f ) + bw/(l-'tw) is negative, it follows 
that an increase in bf or bw from zero will improve the efficiency of 
the eauilibrium. The relative effectiveness of these two instruments 
depends on the relationship between the tax rates - if T > 
f 
bf is relatively more effective, and vice versa. 
1: , 
W 
then 
In fact, for any positive firm (worker) employment subsidy there 
exists a critical tax rate, T* 
f 
* * (TW ), such that for all 1:f ) T f ' 
* (T ) T ) the equilibrium is efficient. The reason for this is 
w w 
simply that as lon~ as bf is strictly positive, the ri~ht-hand side of 
( 51) goes to minus infinity as 'tf ~oes to 1, and similarly for 
This has the following policy implication; it is possible, by an 
T • 
W 
appropriate choice of profit tax and firm employment subsidy (bf > 
O),to run an unemployment benefit scheme (b < 0) which has almost no 
w 
negative effect on output or employment. The intuitive explanation for 
this is simply that by making the profit tax arbitrarily large 
relative to the wage tax, the incentive effects of an firm employment 
subsidy relative to unemployment benefit can be made arbitrarily 
large. 
Finally, it is worth comparin~ these results to those obtained by 
Pissarides(lQRSa) for a stochastic matching model with an endogenous 
unemployment vacancy ratio, but where workers and firms are 
homogenous, and where vacancies are determined by a zero profit 
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condition. In this setting, employer subsidies and unemployment 
benefits have very similar effects to the ones noted above; the former 
increases output and employment, and the latter decreases it. The 
mechanism by which this occurs is however, completely different. 
In the case of unemployment benefit, for example, an increase in 
unemployment benefit raises the wage, so the profitability of a 
vacancy falls below zero, so vacancy numbers fall also to restore 
equilibrium. This lowers the matchin~ probabilities of workers, and 
so raises unemployment. 
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3.11 Theory and Evidence 
In this section, we try to relate the predictions of the 
model to the available evidence. 
The data mentioned in 3.5 was the ratio of the average duration 
of current uncompleted spells to the average duration of completed 
spells for males in the U.K. over the period. Recall that the higher 
this is, the less likely it is that the data are generated by a 
process where unemployment exit times are both independent of duration 
and the same across individuals. 
The behaviour of this ratio for males in the U.K. is intriguing -
it has shown a secular decline over the period 1962-1983 from a level 
of about 4 to 5 in the early '60s to around It in the early eighties, 
(Jackson and Layard (1984)). Furthermore, large increases in the 
percentage rate of unemployment (e.g. in 1975, and 1979-81) cause 
sharp falls in the ratio, which are subsequently partially offset. 
Unfortunately for our purposes, there are several possible 
explanations for these trends. First, and most importantly, it is 
possible that a rising rate of growth of unemployment produces this 
effect, in that compared to the case where the rate of growth of 
unemployment is constant, there will be proportionately more recent 
entrants into the unemployment pool as time proceeds. This will 
lower the average current uncompleted spell, even if the expected 
completed spell length remains constant Conversely, as the rate 
of growth of unemployment falls, the ratio should rise.(see Main 
(1981) for a more detailed discussion of this). 
" d h . " f t-he This argument implies that we should see un ers ootlng 0 ~ 
ratio following particularly sharp rises in unemployment, and this is 
precisely what we do observe. In 1980, for example, with unemplo~~ent 
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at 8.3%, the ratio was 1.74; in 1981, when unemployment had jumped to 
13% the ratio declined sharply to 1.09, and recovered to 1.2~ and 1.~ 
in the following two years as the rate of unemployment slowed. 
Unfortunately, this effect is likely to swamp anything else that 
could have led to such a fall. For example, there may be changes over 
time in the distribution of characteristics across the workforce 
affecting re-employment probabilities. Or there may be changes in 
other factors truly affecting duration dependence e.g. search 
intensity declining less rapidly over the unemployment spell. 
There seems no real way of assessing the relative importance of 
these other factors, and especially whether they provide a complete 
explanation of the movements in this ratio. It would be much more 
desirable to have cross-section data on this ratio, perhaps by 
occupation or region, but this does not seem to be available. 
However, assuming (without much justification, it must be said) that 
these other factors do not fully explain the fall in the ratio then 
changes in screening must be such as to decrease it. Now, Salant(1977) 
shows that if ~ is the random exit time from unemployment, , this 
ratio is in fact equal to 
1 var(~) 
(54) + 1 
2 
If we calculate var(~) and E(~) explicitly from the aggregate 
density function, f(~;t*) and substitute into (54), we find that the 
ratio is a rather complicated, non-monotonic function of the cut-off 
t* t* it is greater than unity, and at t* = time, However, at = ~, 
0, it is equal to unity, and so must be at least somewhere decreasin( 
in t*, as one would expect - recall that increases in t* correspond to 
187 
a lessening in screening, which should decrease the ratio. 
Thus the data is, very roughly speaking, consistent with an 
increasing * t over time, which is in turn not really consistent 
with the prediction of the model, which is that increases in 
* unemployment should reduce t • However, this inconsistency merely 
highlights the fact that the model is a steady-state one; it seems 
plausible that a large increase in the aggragate unemployment rate 
will reduce the informativeness of duration, and so lead to a 
reduction in screening. The investigation of the dynamics of the model 
is certainly a topic for future work. 
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Conclusions 
As remarked in the previous section, the most serious li~itation of 
the duration dependence model is that it is a steady-state model, 
and so it is very difficult to compare its predictions directly ~ith 
the evidence. However, relaxing this assumption would be extremely 
difficult, as the conditional probabilities would then depend upon the 
entire time path of past unemployment levels for the two types, ~~ich 
would in turn depend upon the past values of the cutoff time (the 
latter would themselves depend on calendar time). However, even if 
analytical results are not possible withoL~ simplifying assumptions 
outside the steady state, the general picture would seem to be as 
follows. Suppose that initially, unemployment is below its 
steady-state level; then flows into unemployment would exceed flows 
out, which would tend to to lower the proportion of type 2's in the 
unemployment pool, therefore possibly making screening less attractive 
and thus raising the equilibrium cutoff time. It wo~ld be interesting 
to try and make this argument more rigorous. 
The other possible extension would be to model screening on other 
elements of an individual's unemployment history, for example the 
duration of the last spell of employment. Whether this would be worht 
while is another question; this rather depends on whether employers 
actually make use of this piece of information. It seems more likely 
that they would be concerned with the reason why the worker lost the 
last job, rather than the length of the last employment spell. 
1 
2 
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Footnotes 
Chapter 1 
This is also true of finitely repeated games and the demo t . f 
. " ' ns ration 0 
this involves similar sorts of trigger"strategies. Of course th 
equilibrium outcomes will be affected by "endgame" considerat~ons: for 
example that the outcome in the final period must be a constituent 
game equilibrium. 
The exceptions are games where the payoffs of some Nash equilibrium of 
the constituent game coincides with the minimax payoffs for all 
players e.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma. 
3 To complete the description of the strategy, we suppose that if two or 
more players deviate simultaneously, play returns to a* form the 
beginning. 
4 By the compactness of the space of outcomes, and the continuitv of 
payoffs (in the product topology) such a sequence exists. See 0 
Abreu(1982) for a more detailed exposition of this point. 
5 In the theory of average-cost programming, which is the single-person 
analogue of a dynamic game without discounting, continuity of minimal 
average cost at infinity certainly holds if the state-space is finite, 
although this is no longer the case if it is infinite (see 
Whittle(1983), p.132 and 147). 
Chapter 2 
1 It is fairly easy to show in a one-period context that if there are no 
mobility costs incurred by workers moving from one firm to another ex 
post - i.e. after contracts have been "signed" and the exogenous shock 
is realised - then risk-sharing contracts cannot co-exist with a spot 
market for labour. The reason for this is that the contract must pay a 
wage at least equal to the market wage in every state to prevent 
workers leaving, and must also pay the worker an expected utility 
equal to the expected utility obtainable on the spot market, in order 
to attract workers to "sign" contracts in the first place. Hence, the 
contract must pay the spot-market wage in every contingency. ~ith many 
periods, on the other hand, this is no longer true, as Holmstrom has 
"f dId'" shown; contracts may co-exist with spot markets by ront-en oa lng 
i.e. paying a wage below the spot-market level in the first period, so 
that (by equality of lifetime expected utility) the average contract 
wage will be above the spot market average in the second, thus 
allowing for risk-sharing. 
2 This follows from the result established in 2.1(c) that there is 
always a precommitment equilibrium where both principal anc agent do 
not condition their actions on past values of 9, so that it does not 
matter to what extent this information is revealed. 
3 Recall that all precommJtment equilibria yield the same payoff to the 
pri~c~pa~ in every 5ubgame, 50 it does not matter which of the 
eqUilibria we analyse. 
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r( ~J <ll'(cl hy )(~/~-~, 1). 
t 1 ' . l t ~. d I J :: ;>., r / ~-\ t -+ :' 
f.., T:,h is proved as fono\o.'s. fro:;- (43), 
s • (\u =-
h OS 
s • oh I oh 
u os Ou 
(oh - l)/oh. 
ou ru 
As oh > 1 again from (43) it follows that 0 < s.ou < 1. 
ou n os 
9 This is easy enough to establish, as from equation (39) we can deduce 
that 0(f 2/f 1)/ox is proportional to (1-¢)r(x+6)(¢x+6)~-oJ. 
10 First, let u2/u1 ~ k. Then ok/ox has the sign of 
* (1-a1)+ x.t .a1 
~(1-a2)~2x.t*.a2 
with a1 = exp(-(x+6)t*) 
* a2 = exp(-(4x+6)t ) 
It is apparEnt that as (-+ 0, this expression goes to +co, e.o t},at ·'_'f 
C lev; enough, o('/:-x > O. 
\,.'( turn 
)(. ( x+ t) . a 1 
;:.' ,. * t () (f:'/ ct. T" • .1 r.1S 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Here we give a formal definition of a subgame-perfect equilibrim o~ 
the contracting game with precommitment by the principal described in 
2.1(b), and then prove Lemma 1. 
It will simplify the exposition considerably, and does not alter the 
basic argument, if we ignore the fact that the principal and agent can 
terminate the contract. In this case, recall that a strategy in the 
game for the agent is, at each t, to announce a type a , conditional 
t 
upon a past history of types and announcements;i.e. at = ft(a t - 1, at). 
Now define the history of announced types at contingent upon a 
particular et, a~, (~ < t) and f recursively as follows; 
and a~(a~ ,a~ , f) _ a~ , 
Next, define 
so that g ( at , fla~) is the contract on offer at t given that 
t 
at occurs, and that at follows a~ up to ~ < t and is generated bv f 
from then on. 
Now, (f, g) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the contracting 
game withprecommitment if (i) g is a best response to f for the 
principal at t=O, and (ii) f is best against g for the agent on all 
subgames a t-l. 
The condition for (ii) is that 
-192 
T 
(A3) E[ ~ 6"C-t .u( g (et , flat-I), e ) ] 
't=t t 't 
T 
E[ l6't-t.u( gt(et , f'la t - I ), 8 ) ] , 
't=t 't 
all f' "* f, all a t -1, all t = O ••••• T • 
We do not bother to state the equilibrium condition for the principal, 
as it is not required, but it is along the lines of (A3) with t=O. 
The first point to be made is that from Theorem 2, we can restrict our 
attention to those equilibria where the agent always announces his 
correct type. Therefore, let fO be the truthtelling strategy in the 
sequel. 
We are now in a position to prove Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Clearly, condition (6) in the text is a necessary condition. We pro\'e 
sufficiency of (6) in the two cases separately. 
(i) T < CD 
Suppose to the contrary there exists a fn tfO where the agent lies 
n (T-t times at dates t ( tl < t2 ••• ~ t , and this is profitable at 
n 
t on some subgame at-I. By condition (6) in the text, the 
last deviation at t cannot be profitable in any subgame starting at 
n 
t , so that (AJ) above holds at t = t f = fO and f' = fn i.e. 
n n' 
T 
(A4) E[ L6't-tn. u ( gt(e t , fOlatn- l ), e't) ] ) 
-r-t 
n 
T 
E[ L6't-tn. u ( gt(e t , fn\a tn- I ), e't) ] 
-r-t 
n 
Now let fn- ~ be the strategy which follows fn up to and inc 1 uei ng 
tn-i, and follows f~ thereafter. Then, note that for all tn-, < t ,~ 
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( et k\· tl'l_ I - I ) 
, gt ' f 0.;.. are the same for k = 0, n-1, because both 
strategies prescribe truthtelling between these dates, and that the 
same holds for k = 0, n-1, n for t 1< t < t. Using this fact and 
n- n 
inequality CA4), we can then show that f n- 1 yields at least as high a 
payoff as fn in all subgames beginning «r tn_I. Sucessive repetitions 
of this argument establish that fn-kCsimilarly defined to fn-I) yields 
at least as high a payoff as fn in all subgames beginning in t k' so 
n-
that we conclude for k = n that 
(AS) T 
E[ ~ 6't-t .uC g (e t , fOla t - 1), e ) ] ) 
't=t t 't 
T 
E[ 26 't-t .uc g (e t , fnla t - I ), 9 ) ] t 't 
't=t 
all at-I, so that fn cannot improve on f after all. 
(ii) T = eD, 0 < 6 < 1 
Suppose to the contrary there exists a feD where the agent lies at a 
sequence of dates t , n = 1, 2 ••••• eD, and which yields a higher 
n 
payoff than fa in some subgame beginning at t. By the boundedness of 
u, we know that there exists a 0 < b < eD such that 
CA6) 
tn 
E[ 2S't-t .uC gt(et , f n la t - I ), 9't) ] 
't=t 
+ b. 
1-6 
where fn is the strategy which follows feD up to and including tn' and 
fa thereafter. As (A6) holds for all n, we can combine (AS) and (A~) 
and take limits as n+a:> to yield a contradiction. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
In this appendix, we derive the formulae for the conditional 
probabilities given in equations (36) to (39) of the text. 
We show first that the distribution of exit times for a given type i 
has the density function 
= 
(hi +o).exp(-(hi+o).~) if ~ ~ t* 
o.exp(-o(~-t*)).exp(-(h +0)) if ~ > t* i 
(Al) 
where hl = x, h2 = ¢.x. so that f. is left-continuous in ~, and has a 
1 
downward jump at ~ = t*. 
This is easily proved by considering a discrete approximation to the 
model with time periods of length lin. In this case, we suppose 
that if a worker of type i has experienced less than or equal to 
[n.t*] periods of unemployment (where [a] denotes the smallest integer 
greater than or equal to a ) he will leave unemployment with 
r * ] probability (h. +o)/n per period, whereas if he has more than In.t 
1 
period's previous unemployment, he will leave with probability Oi n • 
Then the probability of exiting in period [n.~] is 
'!ti~ = 
(l-(hi+o)/n) [n.~]-l .(hi+o)/n r ] r * l if .n."f ~ _n.t _, 
[n.t*] max{ 0, [n."f]-[n.t*]-l } 
(1-(h.+O)/n) • (l-o/n) .5/:1 
1 
Now '!tit/(l/n) = n.'!tit is the probability of exiting in [n.~] 
normalised by the period length. By inspection, we can see that 
1 i m n. '!t . = f (~; t * ) as de fin e din (A 1), wh i c h COD;' let est he 
n-() l't i 
derivation of the formula. 
We now 
')'= 
''':fS I51J\l!A::J 
":fS 1!JJ\l!A;:J 
W& 1!JJ\l!A;:J 
derive 
-.:::.J>'.::;O 
-, - "'-. 
~l\S is.)i" V:J\..c;' 
®\si!,8'::J15 
®\S I1ll, '::J15 
the formulae given in equations (36) and (38) of the 
lS lJ.lJ\S .£1 "'-:.v~~ 
'-.s U.U\S 8 ~-V G. ~' 
tsLJ.l..i,\s 11\YJLS1' 
text. In 8ach case, the derivation is best understood by considering a 
discrete approximation as above, but we dispense with this 
intermediate step, having already obtained an explicit formula for the 
exit density. We begin with equilibrium unemplo)~ent rates. 
The equilibrium condition is that the expected flow of each type of 
worker into unemployment, L .• O, must be equal to the expected flow 
1 
out. The latter is composed of two elements. The first is the expected 
flow into employment, which is equal to the 
t* * h .• f f.('t;t )d,,: 
10 1 
probability of exiting into employment, , times total 
unemployment of that type, U .. The second element is the expected flow 
1 
out of the labour force, which is simply O.U i • Equating flows in to 
flows out, and dividing through by L. to express them in per capita 
1 
terms, we obtain 
t* * 
o = [ h .• f fi('t;t )d't + oJ.u. 
1 0 1 
Rearrangement of this equation to solve for u. yields equation (38) in 
1 
the text. 
It now follows that the firm's prior belief that a sampled (i.e. 
equation (37). Therefore, if it is matched with a worker whose 
duration is 't it's posterior belief that the worker is of type i is 
2 
)' f i('t;t*).m 
i=l 
which is the formula for P.('t;t*) in the text. 
1 
(A2) 
196 
Finally, we use this formula to demonstate that Pl(t*;t*) ) 
pi(t*;t*), as claimed in the text. Substituting (AI) into (A2), we 
find that this inequality is equivalent to; 
(hl+6).exp(-(hl+6))·~1 
2 I (h.+6).exp(-(hi +6)).ni i=1 1 
2 
2. exp(-(h.+6)).n. 
i=1 1 1 
As hI > h2' (A3) is always satisfied with a strict inequality. 
(~) 
197 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abreu, D (1982) "Repeated Games with Discounting' a Gen 1 Th 
, era eorv and 
an Application to Oligopoly" unpublished paper, Princeton -
University 
Arvan, L (1985) "Optimal Long Term Labour Contracts when Work h 
H 0 ·" ers ave eterogenous pportunlties, unpublished paper, Department f 
Economics, University of Illinois 0 
Azariadis, C (1983) "Employment with Asymmetric Information" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 98, supplement p 157-172 
Basar, T and Oldser G T,(1982) Dynamic Non-cooperative Game Theory 
Academic Press 
Benoit, J and Krishna V (1985) "Finitely Repreated Games", 
Econometrica Vol 53 p 905-923 
Braverman, A (1980) "Consumer Search and Al ternati ve \1arket 
Equilibria" Review of Economic Studies Vol. 47, p.487-502 
Burdet t ,K and Judd, K. L (1983) "Equilibrium Price Dispersion" 
Econometrica Vol .53 p.1133-1151 
Diamond, P A (1980) "An Alternative to Steady-State Comparisons", 
Economic Letters, Vol 5 p 7-9 
Diamond, P A (1982) "Wage Determination and Ef ficiency in Sea rch 
Equilibrium", Review of Economic Studies, Vol 59 p 217-227 
Farmer, REA (1985) "Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information 
and Bankruptcy; the Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs" Revie\.o.' 
of Economic Studies in press. 
Farmer, REA (1985a) "Cash, Contracts, and Clower Constraints" 
unpublished paper, University of Pennsylvania 
Friedman, J (1985) "Cooperative Equilibria in Finite-Horizon 
Non-cooperative Supergames", Journal of Economic Theory Vol 35 
p 390-399 
Friedman, M (1968) "The Role of Monetary Policy" American EconoFic 
Review Vol 58, p 1-17 
Fudenberg, D and Maskin E (1983) "Sequential Bargaining with 
Incomplete Information", unpublished paper 
Fudenberg D and Tirole J (1983) "Capital as a Commitment; Str2tegic 
, . Th n' \' 0 1 3 1 Investment to Deter Mobility" Journal of Econonnc eo., 
p 227-50 
Gale, D (1982), Money; In Equilibrium, Cambridge University Press 
198 
Green, E and Porter H (1984) "Non-cooperative Collusion under 
Imperfect Price Information" Econometrica Vol 52 p 8/-100 
Gros sman, S J and Hart, 0 (1981) "Implici t Cont racts Moral H d 
" ' azar 
and Unemployment American Economic Review, Vol 71, p 301-307 
Grout, P A (1984) "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Legally 
Binding Labour Contracts" Econometrica Vol 52, p 449-60 
Ha rt, 0 (1983) "Opt imal Labour Contracts under As ymme t ric Inf orma t i on; 
an Introduction" Review of Economic Studies, vol 50, p 3-35 
Hart, 0 and Holmstrom B (1985) "The Theory of Contracts" unpublished 
paper 
Harrison, R (1976) "The Demoralising Experience of Prolonged 
Unemployment" Department of Employment Gazette, Vol 84, p 330-~9 
Heckman, J J and Borjas G J (1980) "Does Unemployment Cause future 
Unemployment?" Economica 47, p 247-283 
Johnson, G and Layard R (1984) "The Natural Rate of Unemployment; 
Explanation and Policy" Centre for Labour Economics Discussion 
Paper No 225, LSE 
Jovanovic, B (1979) "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover", 
Journal of Political Economy Vol 87, p 972-90 
Jovanovic, B (1984) "Matching, Turnover and l'nemployment" Journal 
of Political Economy Vol 92, p 109-122 
Kreps, D and Wilson R (1982) "Sequential Equilibria", Econometrica 
Vol 50, p 863-894 
Kiefer, N and Newmann G (1979) "An Empirical Job-Search Model with a 
Test of the Constant Reservation Wage Hypothesis", Journal of 
Political Economy, 87, p 89-107 
Lancaster, T (1979) "Econometric Methods for the Duration of 
Unemployment" Econometrica Vol 47, p 939-956 
1 " Lucas, R and Prescott E (1974) "Equili bri urn Search and Unettp oyT:en t , 
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 7, p 188-209 
Lucas, R E and Sargent, T J (1981) Introduction to Rational 
All d l'n ..... in Expectations and Econometric Practice George en an 
Lynch, L M (1985) "State Dependency in Youth enemployment", Journal 
of Econometrics Vol 28, p 71-84 
McKenna, C J (1985) "Labour Market Participation in Matching 11 Cardi;: Equili brium" Dis cussion Paper 8510, llni versi ty Co ege, 
MacGregor, A (1978) "Unemployment Duration and Re-employment 
Probability" Economic Journal, Vol 88, p 693-706 
199 
MacLeod, W B and Malcomson, J M "Implici t Contracts I i 
, ncent ve 
Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment", unpublished paper 
Main, B G M ::The Length of Employment and Unemployment in Great 
Britain Scottish Journal of Political Economy 28, p 14~-1~5 
Malcomson, J M (1981) "Unemployment and the Efficiencv Wage 
Hypothesis", Economic Journal, Vol 91, p 848-866 
Malcomson, J M and Spinnewyn, F (1985) "The Multi-period Principal 
Agent Problem" Discussion Paper in Economics and Econometrics 
No8511, University of Southampton 
Manning, A (1985) "Long-term Labour Contracts with AsvTI1::letric 
Information and Bankruptcy Constraints" Birkbeck- College 
Discussion Paper in Economics No. 169 
Manning, A (1986) "The Profitability of Private Information in 
Unionised Capitalist Enterprises", Economic Journal Conference 
Supplement, forthcoming 
Manning, A and Lockwood, B (1985) "Inequali ty and Inefficiency in a 
Model of Occupational Choice with Private Information", Birkbeck 
College Discussion paper No 171 
Moore, J (1985) "Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety 
of Privately Observed Reservation Wages" Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol 52, p 31-69 
Moreaux, M (1985) "Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Finite Repeated Games 
and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in the Constituent Game" 
Economic Letters, Vol 17, No 4 
Morgan,P and Manning, R (1985) "Optimal Search" Econometrica Vol. 53 
p.923-945 
Narandrethan, W, S Nickell and S Stern (1985) "Unemployment Benefi ts 
Revisited, Economic Journal 95, p 307-329 
Nickell, S J (1979) "Estimating the Probability of Leaving 
Unemployment" Econometrica, vol 47, p 1249-1265 
Oswald A J and P J Turnbull (1985) "Pay and Employment in Bri tain; 
what are Labour 'Contracts' really like?", oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol 1 p 80-97 
Parthasarthy, K R (1977) Introduction to Probability and Measure, 
MacMillan 
Pissarides, C A (1983) "The Allocation of Jobs through Search; some 
questions of efficiency", Centre for Labour Economics Discussio~ 
Paper 156, LSE 
Pissarides, C A (1984) "Efficient Job Rejection" Economic Journal, 
Vol 94 Conference Supplement p 97-107 
200 
Pissarides, C A (IQR5) "Short-run nynami cs of Unemployment, Vacancies 
and Real WaJ:!;es" American Economic Review Vol. 75 pf..7f>-f>91 
pissarides, C.A. (1 QR<;a) "Taxes, Subsidies, and Equilibrium 
lTnemployrnent", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 52, pp.121-}1S 
Radner, R (19RI) "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated 
Principal-AJ:!;ent Relationship" Econometrica Vol 49, p 1127-48 
Radner, R (19R5) "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with DiscountinJ:!;" 
Econometrica, Vol 53 p 1173-98 
Radner, R (19 85a) "Decent rali sat ion and Incentives" unpub Ii shed paper, 
Bell Laboratories 
Radner, R, R Myerson and E Maskin (1984) "An Example of a Repeated 
Partnership Game with DiscountinJ:!; and with Uniformly Inefficient 
Equilibria" unpublished paper 
Reinganum (197Q) "A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion" 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.R7 p.R51-859 
Roberts, K W S (1982) "LonJ:!;-term Contracts" unpublished paper, 
University of Warwick 
Rogerson, W.P. (19 R5) "Repeated Moral Hazard", Economet ri ca Vol. 53 
p.69-77 
Rubenstein, A (19 7Q) "F.quili brium in Supergame s wi th the Overt aki ng 
Criterion" Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 21 
Rubens tei n, A (1982) "Perfect Equilibrium ina Bargaining Model" 
Econometrica, Vol 50 p 97-109 
Rubenstein, A and Wolinsky, A (1985) "Equilibrium in a Market with 
Sequential Bargaining" Econometrica Vol. 53 p.1133-11 S1 
Salant, S W (1977) "Search Theory and Duration Data; a theory of 
sorts" Ouarterly Journal of Economics 
Salop, S and Stiglitz J E (1977) "Bargaining and Ripoffs; a Model of 
Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion", Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol 44, p 493-510 
Shapiro, C and Stiglitz J E (1982) "Equilibrium Unemployment as a 
Worker Discipline Device" Discussion paper 2R, Princeton 
University 
Sheffrin, S M (1983) Rational Expectations, Cambridge University Press 
Sinfield, A,(1981) What Unemployment Means, Martin Robertson 
Spence, A M (1979) "Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market", 
Bell Journal of Economics, Vol 10 
201 
Spence, A M (19RO) "Multi-product, ()uantity-dependent Prices and 
Profitability Constraints", Review of Economic Studies, Vol 47 
Taylor, J B (19RO) "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts", 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol R8, p 1-23 
Tobin, J (1972) "Inflation and Unemployment" American Economic Review 
Vol. h2, p.1-17 
Townshend, R M (19R2) "Optimal Multi-period Contracts and the Gain 
from Enduring Relationships under Private Information, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol 90, p 1hh-86 
Whittle, P. (1983) Optimisation over Time, John Wiley and Sons 
